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DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: BARGAINED-FOR 
ZONING THAT IS NEITHER ILLEGAL CONTRACT NOR 
CONDITIONAL ZONING 
SHELBY D. GREEN* 
Historically, land development in North America meant the 
subdividing of vast tracts of land into individual building lots that formed 
cities and towns.' The two principal characteristics of this kind of 
development were the grid layout of streets and "the dominance of the 
house-the individual abode7'-as the central architectural element of the 
city or town.2 The grid layout facilitated future sale, since rectangular lots 
were easy to build on and could accommodate different uses.3 This 
scheme contrasts with that "in European cities where churches, palaces and 
government buildings dominate the urban landsca e," and cities are 
"designed around these symbols of belief and power." ? 
The North American developer is no longer free to decide alone what 
development there should be. A developer must comply with a myriad of 
both state and federal land use regulations and standards. As more 
regulatory steps are required and as standards evolve, the process of 
development has become more lengthy and encumbered. A development 
may well involve obtaining scores of permits from almost as many 
agencies.5 Still, in large measure, the role of the developer remains 
dominant, beginning with the original concept and involving the 
assemblage of the materials, professionals, and other participants, such as 
lenders, investors, and community leaders, necessary for making the 
concept a real it^.^ The developer may be the one to locate the site, 
determine its suitability, articulate the development, negotiate with 
governmental officials, and oversee implementation.' 
Environmental laws, both federal and state, requiring either protective 
or remedial measures in the case of sites contaminated with or exposed to 
Copyright O 2004, Shelby D. Green. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. J.D. Georgetown 
University Law Center. B.S. Towson State College. 
' GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 987 (2d ed. 1997). 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
See Donald G. Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-Land Use 
Permits, 11 SW. U .  L. REV. 545,546 (1979). 
See id. at 987-88. 
' Id. at 988. 
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hazardous wastes, may render a development project either prohibitively 
expensive or illegal.' Property that once was an industrial site, a defense 
installation, or even a farm may present such risks. 
Most essentially, development must be in accord with existing land use 
rules? Local governments use four basic mechanisms for land use 
control.1° First, zoning ordinances "impose limits on size and location of 
structures, the size and shape of lots and the use of land and structures."" 
Second, "general plans" specify the goals of future development, including 
a consideration of population density, infrastructure, transportation, and 
housing.'? Third, there are subdivision controls for residential 
developments, in particular single-family developments, that establish 
standards for the location and design of streets, major utility lines, and 
other public infrastructure, and often dedication of land or payments for 
off-site improvements such as roads, parks, and  school^.'^ Finally, 
"building codes" specify "building materials, structural elements, 
minimum habitability standards and in some cases aesthetic elements of 
new buildings."14 
Zoning is an exercise of the police power-the power of the 
government to protect health, safety, welfare, and morals.15 Generally, the 
police powers are said to reside originally in the state and are delegated to 
local governments through enabling legislation.16 The adoption of a 
zoning ordinance pursuant to an enabling act is accomplished by an elected 
body, and the result is a legislative act generally entitled to a presumption 
In the federal regime, the primary law is the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. $5 9601-9675, 
under which a developer who purchases a contaminated site may bear responsibility 'for its 
cleanup. Numerous other environmental regulatory laws limit uses on land, including the 
Clean Air Act of 1977,42 U.S.C. $5 7401-7642; the Clear Air Act Amendments of 1990, 
42 U.S.C. $5 7623-7624; the Clean Water Act of 1977 (covering wetlands and other bodies 
of water), 33 U.S.C. $ 3  1252-1387; the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. $8  
1531-1544; and the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. $$ 1451-1464, to 
name a few. 
LEFCOE, supra note 1, at 1039. 
lo JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A 
COMPARATIVE NSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 898 (1998). 
Id. 
l2 Id. 
l3 Id. 
l4 Id. at 898-99. 
IS 1 KENNETH . YOUNG, ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING $ 1.14 (4th ed. 
1996). 
1 id. $ 2.19. 
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of validity." Many of the early zoning enabling acts were modeled after 
the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, drafted and distributed by the United 
States Department of Commerce in the 1920s.'~ While the goal of the 
enabling acts was to allow for the enactment of ordinances aimed at 
exercising the police powers,'9 the acts were process-oriented, providing 
the authority for planning and specifying the role local agencies were to 
play in the process of zoning." The standard act did not include 
substantive planning policies, leaving these to be developed in the 
process.21 However, the standard act did contemplate the establishment of 
districts within the community by reference to "number, shape and area, as 
may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of [a zoning] act, and 
within such districts to regulate and restrict the erection, construction, 
reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings, structures, or land."22 
It prescribed that regulations governing uses of land be made with 
reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the 
district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and "with a view to 
conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate 
use of land" throughout the municipality.23 
Although zoning in the United States is commonly thought to have 
begun with the enactment of New York City's comprehensive zoning 
ordinance in 1916, it was the 1926 Supreme Court decision in Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty C O . , ~ ~  where the Court upheld the constitutionality 
of municipal zoning regulations as incident to the police power when 
enacted pursuant to valid1 im lemented land use plans that advance the 
l 5  legitimate public interest, that prompted other states to adopt zoning 
legislation. Since then, every state has enacted laws enabling or 
requiring26 municipalities to regulate land use via comprehensive plans.27 
The result is that a landowner cannot simply choose to use land as he 
l7 Durand v. Il)C Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359,364 (Mass. 2003). 
l8 1 YOUNG, supra note 15,s 2.21. 
l9 This meant that limitations could be placed not only on uses of land, but also on 
the density of the development in an area, the height of buildings, and their location on lots. 
DANIEL MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 5 3.07 (5th ed. 2003). 
20 Id. 3.05. 
2' Id. 
22 Id. 4.17. 
23 1 YOUNG, supra note 15, 2.24. 
24 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
25 Id. at 387,390,395-96. 
26 See ROBERT C .  ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS, CASES & 
MATERIALS 67 (2d ed. 2000); 1 YOUNG, supra note 15, 8 2.19. 
27 Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of 
Bargaining in Land Use Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEWT. L. REV. 337,343 (2002). 
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desires, but must obtain permission for a particular use from the local 
government to ensure that the desired use is consistent with the 
comprehensive plan and the health, safety, and welfare of the community. 
Thus, a landowner may be required to obtain subdivision approval before 
dividing a given parcel for development or a building permit before 
initiating new construction. 
The traditional zoning process consists of the adoption of a 
comprehensive plan and the issuance of local zoning ordinances pursuant 
to the plan.28 The adoption of local zoning ordinances is accomplished by 
a hearing and public participation.29 Zoning ordinances are adopted for the 
long-term, and amendments are typically allowed only where mistake is 
shown in the original zoning or significant, unanticipated changes have 
been made since the enactment of the last comprehensive rezoning plan in 
a relatively well-defined area surrounding the property.30 
"[Sltandard zoning enabling acts require that zoning ordinances apply 
,931 uniformly to all property within a district . . . . Thus, characteristic of 
the Euclidean model of zoning is the seemingly rigid division of the land 
into discrete areas, each assigned a particular use-residential, heavy 
industrial, or agr icul t~ral .~~ The idea was that $rough mandatory 
See 1 Y o ~ G ,  supra note 15, 8 5.02. The elements of a comprehensive plan 
include consideration of land use, transportation issues, environmental concerns, and 
housing issues. MANDELKER, supra note 19, 5 3.10. A comprehensive plan will also 
include a statement of the objectives of the municipality regarding the municipality's future 
development, as well as short-and long-range implementation strategies. Id. Not all 
enabling acts, though, required a comprehensive plan as a predicate for enacting zoning 
legislation. 1 Y o ~ G ,  supra note 15, 5 5.04. Instead, some courts have held that all that is 
required is that the land use controls be comprehensive. 1 id. 
29 1 YOUNG, supra note 15, $5 2.25,4.11. 
30 Mayor of Rockville v. Rylyns Enters., 814 A.2d 469, 483 (Md. 2002); Bd. of 
Alderman v. Conerly, 509 So. 2d 877, 883 (Miss. 1987). However, not all jurisdictions 
impose this limitation on rezoning. MANDELKER, supra note 19, 5 6.31. Otherwise, 
judicial review of rezoning focuses on the consistency of the rezoning with the 
comprehensive plan. Id. 8 6.32. 
" Ryan, supra note 27, at 352; see also 1 PAIUICK J .  ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND 
USECONTROLS 8 5.01[1] (2004). 
" 1 ROHAN, supra note 31, §5.01[1]. Different uses still may occur within a single 
district. See 1 YOUNG, supra note 15, 8 5.25. Different uses may be tolerated because of 
the varying circumstances of the land or use of the property. See 1 id. Land in the same 
district near a highway may be treated differently than land not near a highway. 1 id. 
(citing Charter Township of Oshtemo v. Cent. Adver. Co., 336 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1983)). In other words, "a zoning ordinance may be uniform in its application even 
though some uses in a district do not comply with the restrictions imposed in such district 
or incompatible uses are permitted in an adjacent [parcel]." 1 id. In addition, non- 
(continued) 
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separation of uses, each class of land would be protected from the negative 
impacts of other types of uses.33 Euclidean zoning was also designed to 
achieve stability and evenhandedness in land use planning on the 
assumption that development would proceed in appropriate zones, and 
minor adjustments would be made only as necessary in unanticipated cases 
of hardship in which a variance34 might be granted or a special use permit 
or exception issued.35 Although land could be rezoned, this was not a 
conforming uses must be tolerated by the municipality unless they constitute a nuisance, are 
extended, are abandoned, or are extinguished by eminent domain. Pa. N.W. Distrib., Inc. v. 
Zoning Hearing B d ,  584 A.2d 1372, 1375 (Pa. 1991); see also 1 YOUNG, supra note 15, 
6.05; MANDELKER, supra note 19, $ 5.69. 
33 See 1 ROHAN, supra note 3 1, 5.01 [2]. 
" A variance grants the landowner the authority to use property in a manner 
prohibited by the zoning ordinance. See MANDELKER, supra note 19, 6.41. It refers to 
administrative relief from the zoning restrictions that may be granted where enforcement of 
the restrictions would result in unnecessary hardship. Id. Unnecessary hardship may be 
established by a showing that the zoning ordinance "renders the property unsuitable for any 
purpose," Commons v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 A.2d 1138, 1143 (N.J. 
1980), and "that the plight of the owner is due to unique circumstances and not to the 
general conditions of the neighborhood which may reflect the unreasonableness of the 
zoning ordinance itself." Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y.  1939). But, self- 
inflicted hardship would not justify a variance. MANDELKER, supra note 19, § 6.50. It must 
also be shown that the variance would not be contrary to the public interest. Id. 6.41. A 
variance may apply to uses, for example retail stores and single family homes; or area 
requirements, such as density, height of buildings, and setbacks. Id. 6.42. Some states 
also authorize variances upon a showing of "practical difficulties," but usually in the case 
of area and opposed to use variances. Id. 6.48. The practical difficulties test includes a 
consideration of "the significance of the economic injury, the magnitude of the variance 
. . . , whether the difficulty [is] self-created, and whether other feasible alternatives could 
avoid the difficulty," as well as the effect of the variance on the surrounding neighborhood. 
Id. Often, zoning acts provide the standards the administrative agency must apply when 
acting on request for variances, id. 6.41, and often provide for the imposition of 
conditions in granting a variance, id. 6.51. 
35 MANDELKER, supra note 19, 8 6.39. A special or conditional use permit is an 
exception to the existing zoning in a particular district, allowing a different use than is 
expressly permitted as of right by the ordinance. Id. 6.39. It is approved by an 
administrative board, or legislative body. 1 YOUNG, supra note 15, 9.17. The "device 
interposes an administrative review of the probable effect of a proposed use at a specific 
site and authorizes the imposition of conditions designed to protect adjacent land from the 
foreseeable impact of the proposed use." 1 id. The standards for granting special use 
permits are set out in the zoning act, allowing uses on a lot-by-lot, use-by-use basis. 1 id. 
9.18. A special exception is an administrative device that allows additional uses, which are 
conditionally compatible within each zone, but which should not be allowed unless specific 
(continued) 
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practical way of addressing changing uses and needs of landowners and the 
community because of the cumbersome legislative process involved. 
Later, floating zones36 and planned unit developments,37 which are special 
statutory standards assuring compatibility are met by the landowner. 1 id. 5 9.17. A special 
exception recognizes that "certain uses, considered . . . essential or desirable for the welfare 
of the community . . . , are entirely appropriate and not essentially incompatible with the 
basic uses" in a given district, but may not be appropriate at "every and any location . . . or 
without conditions . . . , by reason of special problems the use presents." MANDELKER, 
supra note 19, 5 6.54. Some zoning acts use special use permits interchangeably with 
special exceptions. 1 YOUNG, supra note 15, 5 9.17. However, one treatise notes a 
difference. See 1 id. The special exception, "is less versatile than the special use permit in 
that the only question to be determined by the administrative body is whether the property 
owner has established . . . facts which entitle him to the exception [and rleview of the 
probable impact on the neighborhood," is not often done. 1 id. And, with a special 
exception, no authority to impose conditions is usually present. 1 id. While the standards 
for granting or denying a request for special uses and exceptions are contained in the zoning 
ordinances, they are generally quite vague and broad. For example, some use language 
such as "in the 'pubic interest,' serve the 'public welfare,' [or] consistent with the 'spirit 
and intent' of the zoning ordinance." MANDELKER, supra note 19, $ 6.53 (discussing 
zoning standards, noting that some courts have struck down such standards as too vague to 
meet the constitutional delegation of legislative power). 
36 MANDELKER, supra note 19, 5 6.61. A floating zone is a zoning district usable for 
a specific purpose or class of purposes. Id. The zoning authority does not assign a floating 
zone district a place on the zoning map, and it is later established by amendment to the 
zoning ordinance. Id. $ 6.61. The floating zone ordinance will contain "standards for the 
approval of [such a] zone, such as density and site development standards." Id. With a 
floating zone, the municipality may determine allowable uses as conditions dictate and may 
enable the municipality to impose more limitations on development than under the general 
zoning ordinance. Id. Floating zones are discussed further infra at text accompanying 
notes 21 3 to 2 18. 
37 MANDELKER, supra note 19, 5 9.24. A planned unit development (PUD) is a 
zoning device allowing a mix of uses within the same district, often including residential, 
commercial, and even industrial uses. Id. Because development is planned and viewed as 
an entity, the developer is benefited, for example, by being able to achieve site planning by 
varying lot sizes, setbacks, and other site development requirements, as well as by building 
at higher densities in some parts of the development. Id. The municipality is benefited, for 
example, by the developer's commitment to the preservation of open and natural areas 
elsewhere. Id. A PUD is contained in the zoning ordinance. Id. 9.25. The zoning 
ordinance may require the goveming body to adopt a new PUD zoning district for a 
proposed PUD before it can be reviewed and approved by an agency with delegated 
authority on matters of approval. Id. The goveming body may adopt it as a floating zone 
or as a special exception. See id. This Article discusses PUDs further infra at text 
accompanying notes 31 1 to 336. 
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and more flexible zoning devices, developed. 
This rigidity of Euclidean zoning came at the expense of flexibility, 
allowing for little modification or adoption of regulations to particular uses 
within zones. Moreover, the assumptions underlying Euclidean zoning 
were incorrect. Euclidean zoning underestimated the effects of the 
dynamism of a growing economy and rapidly changing technologies in 
private preferences and municipal needs, and it overestimated the ability of 
officials to anticipate market demand for new uses. Euclidean zoning was 
also nalve as to the vulnerability of zoning and government regulations to 
market demand and political pressure. These changes in the economy and 
urban and suburban demographics forced local governments to regularly 
adjust the zoning scheme, raising the question of whether "changes in 
zoning would be the product of rational, comprehensive planning or the 
result of ad hoc bargaining."38 It seems that nearly a century of zoning 
experience shows a very different practice than first contemplated by the 
standard act,39 such that current zoning practice little resembles the early 
notion of planned development. Today, numerous different uses may be 
permissible within a particular district, and the special-use process 
frequently provides only very generalized standards for issuance of a 
permit, and it operates ineffectively as a limiting tool. Rather than rigid 
adherence to the zoning map, the current model for land use control is 
through bargaining, making particularized decisions regarding the 
suitability of a proposed use, and thus in effect administering land 
development on a case-bycase basis.@ Bargaining takes place over 
variances, conditional use permits, amendments to the zoning ordinance, 
and development  agreement^.^' Each of these devices offer not only 
flexibility, but also the opportunity for the bargaining municipality to 
demand exactions42 or make  concession^.^^ 
38 DWYER & MENELL, supra note 10, at 1010. 
39 Ryan, supra note 27, at 348; see also 1 ROHAN, supra note 31, 8 5.01. 
40 See Ryan, supra note 27, at 349; Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real 
Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2000) (recognizing the 
bargaining environment generated by modem zoning models); Carol M. Rose, Planning 
and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Use Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. 
REV. 837, 849 (1983); Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: 
Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of 
Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957,960 (1987). 
41 Ryan, supra note 27, at 350. 
42 The extent to which a municipality may demand exactions is limited to those 
bearing a rational nexus between the legitimate state interest and the permit condition 
exacted by the government, Nollan v. California Coastal Comrn'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 
(1987), and to those having a rough proportionality between the exaction and the impact of 
the development, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,391 (1994). 
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Even when the existing zoning permits a proposed project, the 
development project that is only proposed may vanish with unanticipated 
changes in political and market conditions or in the land use regulatory 
scheme. These kinds of changes are risks that are difficult to antic1 ate J 
and control. In most jurisdictions, absent a vested right to develop, the 
local land use regulatory body retains the right to alter and apply newly 
enacted zoning or other land use requirements at any time to a proposed 
development. The right to alter remains until quite late in the development 
process, indeed even up to the commencement of constr~ction.~~ The 
43 The extent to which a municipality can make concessions is limited by the 
reserved powers doctrine, discussed infra Part 1II.A. 
The "vested rights" doctrine enables a developer to complete development in 
accordance with rules in place at a certain point in the development process. Teny D. 
Morgan, Vested Rights Legislation, 34 Urn. LAW. 131, 131 (2002). It is premised on 
notions of estoppel. Id. However, the point at which a right to develop arises varies 
considerably among the jurisdictions. See id. at 132-33. In some jurisdictions, the right to 
develop arises at the filing of an application for a building permit. See id. Other 
jurisdictions require the commitment of substantial resources toward development. See id. 
Two somewhat discernible rules exist for determining the point of vesting: the "last 
discretionary approval rule," under which, as the name suggests, a developer acquires a 
vested right to complete a project that is substantially commenced upon acquiring the last 
discretionary approval necessary for its completion, and the "building permit rule," under 
which a developer acquires vested rights upon obtaining a building permit and incumng 
substantial liability in good faith reliance on the permit. Brad K. Schwartz, Note, 
Development Agreements: Contracting for Vesting Rights, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
719, 723-24 (2001); see also GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK (Stuart Meck ed., 
2002); Barry R. Knight & Susan P. Schoettle, Current Issues Related to Vested Rights and 
Development Agreements, 25 Urn. LAW. 779, 780-81 (1993) (identifying four sources for 
vested rights as equitable estoppel, the Constitution, legislation, and contract development 
agreements); Ralph D. Renaldi, Virginia's Vested Property Rights Rule: Legal and 
Economic Considerations, 2 GEO. MASON L. REV. 77 (1994). 
45 See, e.g., Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg'l Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546, 
551 (1976). In Avco Community Developers, Inc., under the authority of pertinent permits, 
the developer had undertaken studies for the development of the tract, proceeded to 
subdivide and grade it, completed or was in the process of constructing storm drains, 
culverts, street improvements, utilities, and similar facilities for the tract, and had spent 
more than $2 million and incurred liability of nearly $750,000 before being able to apply 
for a development permit from the Coastal Commission. Id. at 549. The Coastal 
Commission refused to issue a development permit, and no building permit could be issued 
until a development permit was obtained. Id. at 548-49. The California Supreme Court 
ruled that the developer had acquired no vested rights entitling it to proceed with actual 
construction. Id. at 554. The rationale was that by requiring a building permit as a 
prerequisite to obtaining a vested right to actually build, the court was preserving for 
(continued) 
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possibility of such changes can make the development process appear ad 
hoc and precarious, and reliance on the traditional zoning adjustments, 
such as variances or special use permits under criteria that are less than 
concrete, does little to minimize the risks to a developer. 
This Article explores the new model of land use decision-making that 
is based upon bargaining with the landowner. The fact of a bargain raises 
the issue of whether such bargaining amounts to "contract zoning" based 
upon a bilateral contract between the municipality and the landowner, 
which is largely held to be illegal, or a related form of bargaining, not 
involving an exchange of promises in the context of a bilateral 
agreement-"conditional zoning." Part I1 of this Article discusses the 
emergence of the development agreement, which involves a contract with a 
municipality and the developer under which the developer is assured that 
new zoning ordinances adopted after the date of the agreement will not 
apply to the development. Part 111 considers the effect of the reserved 
powers doctrine on the ability of governments to contract and the issue of 
transparency in making zoning decisions. It further offers an in-depth 
consideration of the murky concepts of contract and conditional rezoning 
and reviews why the courts look at these concepts with such suspicion. 
This section analyzes significant rulings from the courts in the jurisdictions 
that most often considered the question. Part IV considers contract zoning 
compared to conditional zoning. Part V shows how conditional zoning, 
once maligned, has gained acceptance by the courts. Part VI discusses the 
conditional use zoning device in North Carolina. Part VII briefly mentions 
the use of concomitant agreements employed in a few jurisdictions, under 
localities regulatory flexibility in the development process to meet changing circumstances 
and needs. Id. Otherwise, there would be "a serious impairment of the government's right 
to control land use policy." Id. This decision was the impetus for the enactment of the 
California development agreement statute, discussed later. See Hermosa Beach Stop Oil 
Coalition v. City of Hermosa Beach, 86 Cal. App. 4th 534,553 (2001) (upholding repeal of 
exemption for oil drilling effectively nullifying leases for exploration and development 
where all costs were "soft costs," such as for engineering, consultants, and lawyers). For an 
overview of vested rights and estoppel claims, see 4 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER JR., RATHKOPF'S 
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 70 (2004). Depending upon the particular 
circumstances of the case, a governmental action that essentially destroys the landowner's 
reasonable investment-backed expectations could result in a taking, compensable under the 
Fifth Amendment. For a discussion of regulatory takings, see generally John J. Delaney & 
Emily J. Vaias, Recognizing Vested Development Rights as Protected Property in Fifrh 
Amendment Due Process and Takings Claims, 49 WASH. U .  J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 27, 38 
(1996); Steven J. Eagle, The Supreme Court's Evolving Takings Jurisprudence: A First 
Look at Tahoe-Sierra, PROB. & PROP., Nov./Dec. 2002, at 5; Gregory M. Stein, Who Gets 
the Takings Claim? Changes in Land Use Law, Pre-Enactment Owners, and Post 
Enactment Buyers, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (2000). 
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which a municipality has the power to enter into an agreement with a 
developer as to zoning in exchange for the developer's promise to develop 
in a certain way. Part VIII then returns to some theoretical questions posed 
earlier. Part IX considers whether development agreements can be upheld 
against a challenge that they amount to contract or conditional zoning and 
explains why development agreements can and should be encouraged. 
Finally, Part X offers some conclusions about the future of land use 
planning. 
11. THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT AS AN IMPORTANT BARGAINING 
DEVICE, MOVING AWAY FROM TRADITIONAL EUCLIDIAN ZONING 
In recent years, "land use decision-making has shifted significantly 
from the planned toward the particularized, affording more ad hoc 
responses to individual development proposals.'~ In a fluid society, 
adherence to the rigid Euclidean model for zoning, which consists of the 
division of land into zones with identical uses within each zone, has been 
found to be inadequate for achieving a rational and effective land use plan 
since it precludes the zoning authority from considering particular and 
perhaps beneficial uses for a parcel within the zone. Municipal land use 
bargaining is rapidly becoming "the universal language of land use 
planning," as public and private parties to land use disputes adopt the 
bargaining model to obtain mutually agreeable solutions based on mutually 
beneficial exchange.47 Under the bargaining model, the emphasis is placed 
on flexibility and change through the use of  variance^:^ special use 
permits and exceptions:9 incentive and bonus zoning,50 conditional 
zoning:' floating zones:2 planned unit developments:3 and development 
agreements." With these devices, zoning determinations are often made 
administratively based on actual uses discerned from concrete proposals 
that allow municipalities to assess the potential impact of uses in a 
46 Ryan, supra note 27, at 349; see also Rose, supra note 40; Wegner, supra note 
40. 
47 Ryan, supra note 27, at 338. 
48 See supra note 34. 
49 See supra note 35. 
'O Incentive and bonus zoning allow for exceptions to the zoning regulations in a 
particular district, typically allowing greater density or relaxing height restrictions on 
buildings constructed in the district. See 2 ROHAN, supra note 31, 5 8.01. 
" See discussion infra Parts IU-VI, VIII-X. 
52 See 2 ROHAN, supra note 31, 5 8.01. 
53 See supra note 37. 
" Development agreements limit the power of the government to apply new 
ordinances to ongoing developments. 2 ROHAN, supra note 31.5 9A.01. 
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concrete situation." The model also provides municipalities with 
significant leverage over potential development in order to obtain 
concessions from developers.56 
Though zoning ordinances contain standards for granting variances 
and special use permits and exceptions, these devices retain an ad hoc 
flavor and their application is not entirely predictable." As such, 
municipalities and developers have sought more formal and predictable 
ways to achieve particular results from land use decision-making, such as 
in development agreerner~ts.~~ A growing number of states have enacted 
legislation authorizing the making of land use decisions through this 
device.59 Development agreements between developers and municipal 
governments respond to the uncertainties inherent in the use of the minor 
adjustment mechanisms found in Euclidean zoning and in vested rights.60 
They are negotiated agreements between a developer and the local 
government under which the local government agrees to apply the land use 
rules, regulations, and policies in effect on the date of the agreement in 
exchange for the developer's promise to develop in a certain way.61 
'' Ryan, supra note 27, at 349 (citing Mark W. Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts 
of lnterest in Zoning Decisionmaking, 65 N.D. L. REV. 161, 166-67 (1989)). 
56 Id. (citing Cordes, supra note 55, at 167). 
'' Id. at 349. 
See 2 ROHAN, supra note 31, 5 9A.01. In 1515-1519 Lakeview Boulevard 
Condominium Ass'n v. Apartment Sales Colp., 43 P.3d 1233 (Wash. 2002). the Washington 
Supreme Court ruled that "a local government and a property owner may reach an arms 
length, bargained-for agreement which may include waivers of liability for risks created by 
[a] proposed use of property because of the shape, composition, location or other 
characteristic unique to the property sought to be developed." Id. at 1237. In that case, the 
city contended that 
innovative land use instruments, such as exculpatory covenants, should 
be encouraged because the Growth Management Act, chapter 36.70A 
RCW, [was] channeling development onto more and more marginal 
lots[;] that property owners of land marginal for development because 
of the composition, topography, location, or other characteristic of the 
property, should be free to propose creative solutions, and accept the 
risks of development. 
Id. 
59 See inji-a note 65 and accompanying text. 
Schwartz, supra note 44, at 720. 
See Michael H. Crew, Development Agreement After Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), 22 URB. LAW. 23, 28 (1990); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & 
Scott A. Edelstein, Development Agreement Practice in California and Other States, 22 
(continued) 
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Development agreements may also involve zoning changes or amendments 
to the comprehensive plan.62 
A. The Benefits to the Developer and the Municipality 
Under the development agreement model of land use controls, the 
developer gains the following: (1) certainty as to the governing regulations 
for the development project; (2) the ability to bargain for support and the 
coordination of approvals; (3) easier and less-costly financing because of 
the reduction of the risk of non-approval; (4) the ability to negotiate the 
right to freeze regulations as to changes in the project; (5) predictability in 
scheduling the phases of the development; and (6) a change in the 
dynamics of the development process from confrontation to cooperation. 
The municipality gains the following: (1) the facilitation of 
comprehensive planning and long-range planning goals; (2) commitments 
for public facilities and off-site infrastructure; (3) public benefits otherwise 
not obtainable under regulatory takings doctrine; and (4) the avoidance of 
administrative and litigation costs and expenditures. 
Development agreements thus offer both flexibility and certainty- 
flexibility to the local government by incorporating terms and conditions in 
the agreements that may be different from those expressed in the land use 
regulations, and certainty to the developer by setting the governing 
standards and rules for the duration of the development project. Recently, 
a California court of appeals ruled that a development agreement statute 
applied equally to the planning stage of development and to projects that 
have been approved for actual constr~ction.~~ Such a construction of the 
statute, the court said, was entirely consistent with the overall purposes of 
the statute to "encourage[] the creation of rights and obligations early in a 
project in order to promote public and private participation during 
planning, especially when the scope of the project requires a lengthy 
process of obtaining regulatory approvals."64 
STETSON L. REV. 761,762 (1993); Knight & Schoettle, supra note 44, at 787-88; Schwartz, 
supra note 44, at 720. 
62 See CAL. GOV'T CODE 5 65864(b) (West 1997). 
63 Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County Bd. of 
Supervisors, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740,745 (2000). 
64 Id. In that case, the development agreement pertained to the planning of the 
development project that met the requirements of the statute, though the county had not 
approved an actual development, but had "establishe[d] the scope of the [plroject and 
precise parameters for future construction as well as a procedure to process [plroject 
approvals." Id. The agreement also provided for public use improvements that the 
developer may not have offered if the county failed to make corresponding commitments as 
outlined in the agreement. Id. It was nonetheless necessary for the court to construe the 
agreement as an approval of the project because it "committe[d] the parties to a definite 
(continued) 
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Though they are local in nature, development agreements usually are 
entered into pursuant to state enabling legislation. California was the first 
state to enact such legislation in 1980, and thirteen states have followed.65 
Development agreements are said to require enabling legislation because 
of their effect upon the powers of local governments, both confemng and 
limiting. Nonetheless, because development agreements potentially 
empower local officials to control land use in more effective ways than 
course of action aimed at assuring construction of the project, provided certain 
contingencies [were] met." Id. "While further agreement and discretionary approvals 
[were] necessary, every approval or denial permitted by the Agreement [was] designed to 
advance the project in accordance with the standards for . . . development adopted by the 
County in the . . . Area Plan." Id. at 745-46. The court pointed out that though the statute 
was limited to actual projects, the statute did not require that the parties defer development 
agreements until the beginning of constructions, and it did not require, as a prerequisite, any 
particular stage of project approval. Id. at 746. "In fact, by permitting conditional 
development agreements when property is subject to future annexation, [the statute] 
expressly permitted local governments to freeze zoning and other land use regulation before 
a project was finalized." Id. (citing Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. County of 
Riverside, 50 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1996)). In the court's view, nothing "lirnite[d] the statute to 
development agreements which create[d] 'vested rights' to complete construction of a 
project according to completed plans." Id. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 9-500.05 (West Supp. 2004-05); CAL. GOV'T CODE 5 
65864 (West 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. 3 24-68-102 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 163.3220 
(West 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-121 (1993); IDAHO CODE 5 67-6511 (Michie Supp. 
2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 33:4780.21 (West 2002); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, 13.01 
(1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 278.0201 (Michie 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 40:55D-45 
(West 1991); OR. REV. STAT. 5 94.504 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. 5 6-31-10 (West 2004); VA. 
CODE ANN. 5 15.2-2303.1, -2297 (Michie 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 36.70B.170 
(West 2003); see also Azalea Lakes P'ship v. Parish of St. Tarnmany, 859 So. 2d 57,61-63 
(La. Ct. App. 2003) (upholding the validity of a development agreement statute against a 
charge of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Save Our Springs Alliance & 
Circle C Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Austin, No. 03-03-00312-CV, 2004 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 4060, at *14-15 (Tex. App. May 6, 2004) (upholding a development agreement 
entered into pursuant to a statute as a validly enacted amendment to a zoning ordinance, 
entitling the developer to rely on that change in requesting a development permit); City of 
Richland v. Franklin Tiegs, No. 20821-4-111,2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 108 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Jan. 28, 2003) (upholding development agreement statute); R. Alan Haywood & David 
Hartman, Legal Basics for Development Agreements, 32 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 955 (2001) 
(discussing ways to enter into valid development agreement under discrete sections of the 
Texas Local Government Code). See generally Janice C. Griffith, Local Government 
Contracts: Escaping from the GovernmentaVProprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L. REV. 277 
(1990); Wegner, supra note 40, at 995; Comment, Development Agreement Legislation in 
Hawaii: An Answer to the Vested Rights Uncertainry, 7 U .  HAW. L. REV. 173 (1985). 
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under zoning ordinances, their use has been sanctioned, even in states with 
no statutory enabling law, as an exercise of their auxiliary and implied 
powers under the zoning laws.66 
A practical and legal limitation on development agreements is that they 
only bind the contracting parties-the developer and the municipality 
signing the agreement. Projects that require approval from other 
governmental entities (such as the local coastal commission or 
environmental protection agency) remain at risk. However, this can be 
addressed by a multi-party development agreement. 
1 .  Common provisions in the development agreement enabling 
statutes 
a. Municipality's authority to act 
The municipality may be required to first pass an enabling ordinance 
or resolution establishing the details of development agreement procedures 
and re uirements that the executive branch of the governmental unit must 
$7 follow. 
b. Goals 
Most statutes identify the purposes and goals of such agreements, such 
as: 
a) to bring increased "certainty" and "assurance" to 
the development process, which in turn will "strengthen 
the public planning process, encourage private 
participation in comprehensive planning, and reduce the 
economic costs of development,"68 
b) to achieve predictability, and public 
including "affordable housing, design standards, and on 
66 See Bollech v. Charles County, 166 F. Supp. 2d 443, 452-54 (D. Md. 2001) 
(upholding a development agreement against a charge of abdication of police powers where 
the agreement itself stated that the development would be subject to any changes in state or 
federal law and that it did not require absolute deference to the existing zoning); Giger v. 
City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182, 192-93 (Neb. 1989) (upholding a development agreement 
against challenge that municipality bargained away its police powers). See generally 
Jennifer G. Brown, Concomitant Agreement Zoning: An Economic Analysis, 1985 U .  ILL. L. 
REV. 89. 
15' ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 8 9-500.05(A) (West Supp. 2004); CAL. GOV'T CODE 5 
65865(c) (West 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. 5 46-124 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 163-3223 
(West 2000). 
CAL. GOV'T CODE 8 65864(b) (West Supp. 2004). 
69 HAW. REV. STAT. 5 46-121 (1993). 
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and off-site infra~tructure,"'~ 
c) for the vesting of development rights as solutions to 
the problems caused by the lack of certainty in the 
development process.71 
c .  Minimum provisions 
The statutes typically require that a development agreement specify 
certain substantive terms, including the following: 
a) a description of the land subject to the agreement; 
b) a statement of the permitted uses, including density, 
intensity, maximum height, and size of the proposed 
buildings; 
C) provisions for reservations or dedications of land 
for public purposes; 
d) conditions, terms, restrictions, and requirements for 
public infrastructure; 
e) the phasing or time of constr~ction.~~ 
d. Conformance with comprehensive plans 
70 S.C. CODE ANN. 8 6-3 1-10(B)(4) (West 2004). 
" HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-121 (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 8 33-4780.21(1) (West 
2002) ("The lack of certainty in the development approval process can result in a waste of 
resources, escalate the cost of housing and other development to the consumer, and 
discourage investment in and commitment to comprehensive planning," which would make 
"maximum efficient utilization of resources at the least economic cost to the public."); S.C. 
CODE ANN. 5 6-31-10(B)(4) (West 2004). 
72 CAL. GOV'T CODE 5 65865.2 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3227(d), (f), 
(h) (West 2000) (requiring also that the agreement contain a description of the public 
facilities that will service the development; a description of local development permits 
approved or needed to be approved; and a description of any conditions, terms, restrictions, 
or other requirements determined to be necessary by the local government for public health, 
safety, or welfare of its citizens); HAW. REV. STAT. 8 46-126 (1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 
66B, 5 13.01(f) (Supp. 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 278.0201(1) (Michie 2002); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-45.2(A) (West 1991); OR. REV. STAT. 5 94.504(2) (2003); S.C. CODE 
ANN. 5 6-3 1-60 (West 2004). The Arizona statute provides that the development agreement 
may also specify such things as density and intensity of use, and maximum height and size 
of proposed buildings. ARE. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 9-500.05(G)(l)(c) (West 1996). The 
Louisiana statute provides that the statute shall specify such things. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 
33:4780.24 (West 2002); see also VA. CODE ANN. 8 15.2-2303.1(B) (Michie 2003); OR. 
REV. STAT. 5 94-518 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 36.70B.170(3) (West 2003) (setting 
forth development standards that apply). 
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As a condition of enforceability, most statutes require development 
agreements to comply with local comprehensive plans.73 
e. Duration 
Some statutes limit the duration of a development agreement to a 
specific number of years, although extensions by mutual agreement 
following a public hearing may be obtained.74 Others provide that a 
development agreement may include commencement dates for 
con~truction~~ or the duration of the agreement.76 
f. Amendment, cancellations, exceptions 
As with any contract, amendments can be accomplished by mutual 
agreement.77 However, under all the statutes, despite the terms of the 
agreement, the municipality reserves the power to cancel the agreement 
unilaterally when required to ensure public health, safety, or welfare.78 
73 ARE. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 9-500.05(B) (West 1996); CAL. GOV'T CODE 65867.5 
(West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 163.3231 (West 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. 5 46-129 (1993); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 278.0203 (Michie 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. 6-31-70 (West 2004); 
VA. CODE ANN. 15.2-2303.1(B) (Michie 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70B. 170(1) 
(West 2003). 
74 FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 163.3229 (West 2000) (ten years); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, $ 
13.01(g) (Supp. 1997) (five years). 
75 CAL. GOV.'T CODE $ 65865.2 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. $ 163.3227(2) (West 
2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-126 (1993); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. 278.0201 (Michie 2002). 
76 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 33:4780.24 (West 2002). 
77 See, e.g., ARE. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 9-500.05C (West Supp. 2004); LA. REV. STAT. 
5 33:4780.30 (West 2002); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, 13.01(h) (Supp. 1997); OR. REV. 
STAT. 3 94-522 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. 5 6-31-100 (West 2004). But in Hawaii, if the 
county determines that a proposed amendment would "substantially alter" the original 
agreement, a public hearing must be held. HAW. REV. STAT. $ 46-130 (1993); see also FLA. 
STAT. ANN..§ 163.3225 (West 2000) (requiring a hearing upon entering into, amending, and 
revoking an agreement). 
78 See, e.g., CAL. GOV.'T CODE $ 65865.3 (West 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. 46-127 
(1993). In Louisiana, this is so in the case of newly incorporated municipalities as to 
development agreements entered into prior to incorporation. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
33:4780.25 (West 2002). In Hawaii, the current (and later enacted) laws may be applied if 
necessary to rectify a condition "perilous" to residents' health and safety. HAW. REV. STAT. 
5 46-127@) (1993); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 33:4780.24 (West 2002); MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 66B, § 13.01(i) (Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. 5 15.2-2303.1A (2003). The 
Louisiana statute also provides for modification or suspension of provisions of the 
development agreement where necessary to comply with subsequently enacted state and 
federal laws and regulations. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 33:4780.32; see also S.C. CODE ANN. 
5 6-31-130 (West 2004). 
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The California statute requires a municipality to review annual compliance 
with the agreement and authorizes it to terminate or modify the agreement 
upon a finding of noncom l i a n ~ e . ~ ~  The Nevada statute requires review 
only once every two years. 8 
g. Approval and adoption 
The mechanisms for obtaining approval vary. In Hawaii, the mayor is 
the designated negotiator, but the final agreement must be approved by the 
city council and then adopted by resoluti~n.~' In California, a development 
agreement must be approved by resolution or o r d i n a n ~ e . ~ ~  In several 
states, a public hearing must be held prior to adoption of the development 
agreement.83 Whether a development agreement is considered a legislative 
or an administrative act affects the mechanism and procedure for approval. 
If it is a legislative act, a referendum may nullify the agreement.84 In 
California, a developer's rights do not vest under a development agreement 
until the referendum period expires, and if other conforming enactments 
(for example, a general plan amendment or re-zoning) are necessary under 
the agreement, vesting is deferred until the referendum period expires on 
those as well.85 In Hawaii, development agreements are administrative 
acts, precluding repeal by r e fe rend~m.~~  
'' CAL. GOV'T CODE 65865.1 (West 1997); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 
16 1.053 l(5) (requiring review every twelve months). 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 278.0205 (West 1996). The Louisiana statute requires 
periodic review at least every twelve months, at which time the developer must demonstrate 
good faith compliance with the terms of the agreement or face termination or modification. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 33:4780.23 (West 2002); see also S.C. CODE ANN. 5 6-31-90 (West 
2004). 
'' HAW. REV. STAT. 5 46-123-46.124 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. 5 6-31-30 (West 
2004). 
82 CAL. GOV'T CODE 5 65867.5 (West 1997); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
33:4780.28 (West 2002) (stating that after a public hearing, a development agreement must 
be approved by ordinance of the governing authority of the municipality). 
83 CAL. GOV'T CODE 5 65867 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. 3 163.3225 (West 
2000) (requiring at least two public hearings); HAW. REV. STAT. 3 46-128 (1993); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 5 33:4780.28 (West 2002); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, 5 13.01(d) (Supp. 1998); 
OR. REV. STAT. 3 94.508, .513 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. $ 6-31-50 (West 2002); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. 5 36.70B.200 (West 2003). 
84 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 5 24-68-104(2) (2003). The Colorado statute provides 
that development agreements "shall be adopted as legislative acts subject to referendum." 
Id. 
85 Midway Orchards v. County of Butte, 269 Cal. Rptr. 796, 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1990). 
HAW. REV. STAT. g 46-131 (1993). 
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h. Effect of the agreement 
The statutes variously provide that the effect of the agreement is that 
the rules, regulations, and official policies governing permitted uses of the 
land are those in force at the time of execution of the agreement.87 Under 
the Florida statute, subsequently enacted laws and policies are applicable 
only to the extent consistent with those previously in effect or necessary to 
protect health, safety, or welfare; that "are specifically anticipated and 
provided for by the development agreement"; where "[tlhe local 
government demonstrates that substantial changes have occurred in the 
pertinent conditions, existing at the time of approval of the development 
agreement"; or the "development agreement [was] based upon 
substantially inaccurate information supplied by the developer."88 
m. TWO ISSUES REGARDING CONTRACT AND CONDITIONAL ZONING: 
.THE RESERVED POWERS DOCTRINE AND TRANSPARENCY 
Two key problems are raised in connection with any agreement 
entered into between a municipality and a developer regarding the use of 
land. The first question concerns whether such an agreement is 
enforceable under the Contracts Clause of the Constitution, and whether 
such an agreement is void ab initio as violative of the reserved powers 
doctrine. The second question concerns the lack of transparency where 
conditions agreed upon and essential to the land use decision are not 
contained in the ordinance, but are implemented through private 
negotiations and agreements. 
A. The Contracts Clause and the Reserved Powers Doctrine 
The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution provides in part 
that "[nlo state shall . . . pass any . . . [llaw impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts.'' 89 However, it is well-settled that the Contracts Clause is not to 
be applied literally, that is, to forbid all impairments of  contract^.^ Early 
13' ARE. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 9-500.05(B) (West 1996); CAL. GOV'T CODE 8 65866 
(West 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 8 46-127(b) (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 8 
33:4780.27 (West 2002) (except that subsequently enacted rules, regulations, and policies 
that do not conflict with those in effect at the time of the signing of the agreement may 
apply); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, 8 13.016) (Supp. 1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
278.0201(2)(3) (Michie 2002); OR. REV. STAT. $94.518 (2003); S.C. CODEANN. 8 6-31-80 
(West 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2303.1(B) (Michie 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $ 
36.70B.180 (West 2003). 
13' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3233(a)-(e) (West 2000). 
13' U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 10, cl. 1. 
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 
(1983); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 16 (1977). 
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courts realized that the Contracts Clause, if applied literally, "[w]ould 
become a [serious] threat to the sovereign responsibilities of state 
governments."9' One solution was the development of the reserved powers 
doctrine that forbid the contracting away of certain sovereign powers.92 
The reserved powers doctrine holds that "the power of governing is a trust 
committed by the people to the government, no part of which can be 
granted away." 93 Sovereign powers over certain matters are inalienable 
because they may require continuing governmental supervision to address 
changing  circumstance^.^^ This means that the prohibitions against 
abridgement of contracts by state legislatures must yield to the interests of 
the state in the exercise of its police powers to safeguard and promote the 
public interest, safety, health, and welfare.g5 All rights granted from 
government are held subject to the police powers of the state.96 An 
agreement between a developer and the municipality, in which the 
municipality purports to bargain away its reserved powers, therefore is 
void ab initio and not entitled to protection under the Contracts Clause?' 
Thus, the reserved powers doctrine is a limitation on the scope of the 
Contracts   la use?^ 
9' United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839,874 (1996). 
92 See generally West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848) (providing that 
states' contracts do not surrender eminent domain power). 
93 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879). 
94 See id. at 819. The Court stated as follows: 
The supervision of both these subjects [public health and public morals] 
of governmental power is continuing in its nature, and they are to be 
dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment may require. 
Government is organized with a view to their preservation, and cannot 
divest itself of the power to provide for them. 
95 See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914); 
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934) (stating that "the 
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a 
postulate of the legal order"). 
% Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32 (1877); see also Exxon Corp. v. 
Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176,190-91 (1983). 
97 See Beer Co., 97 U.S. at 33. 
98 See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977); Pennsylvania 
Hosp. v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20, 23 (1917); Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563, 571 
(1910) (holding that the Contract Clause does not protect contracts that are prohibited by 
law or against public policy). In Pennsylvania Hospital, the Court held that 
the states cannot by virtue of the contract clause be held to have 
divested themselves by contract of the right to exert their governmental 
(continued) 
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In determining whether a government has bargained away its powers, 
the Supreme Court has made a distinction between police powers on the 
one hand and taxing and spending powers on the other, with the reserved 
powers doctrine only covering the former.99 "Such formalistic distinctions 
perhaps cannot be dispositive, but they contain an important element of 
truth."loO 
Even if no surrender of police powers initially occurs, but the state 
later seeks to abrogate a contract with a private party, the Contract Clause 
does not require a state to adhere to a contract if such abrogation is 
necessary in protection of the public interest.''' In other words, any rights 
created by government contract "are subject to such rules and regulations 
as may from time to time be ordained and established for the preservation 
of health and morality. ,9102 This means that an agreement between a 
municipality and a landowner may be justifiedly impaired by the 
government and such impairment is not unconstitutional if it is "reasonable 
and necessary to serve an important public purpose. 9,103 Every contract 
made with a governmental entity is in some degree subject to the 
subsequent exercise of that government's police powers.104 
Otherwise, the Contracts Clause of the Constitution may prevent a 
authority in matters which from their very nature so concern that 
authority that to restrain its exercise by contract would be a 
renunciation of power to legislate for the preservation of society or to 
secure the performance of essential governmental duties. 
Pennsylvania Hosp., 245 U.S. at 23. 
99 See, e.g., Stone, 101 U.S. at 820; Momson Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 
130 Cal. Rptr. 196, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that the resewed powers doctrine 
voids "only a contract which amounts to a city's 'surrender' or 'abnegation' of its control 
of a properly municipal function," and the annexation agreements were "just, reasonable, 
fair and equitable" even though some of the executory features might have extended 
beyond the terms of current legislative body members). 
I" United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 24. "If a state could reduce its financial 
obligations whenever it wanted to spend the money for what is regarded as an important 
public purpose, the Contract Clause would provide no protection at all." Id. at 26. 
lo' See id. at 23. 
I M  Stone, 101 U.S. at 820. See generally David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, 
Unconstitutional Land Development Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: 
Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663 
(2001). 
Io3 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25; see also Allied Structural Steel Co. v. 
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 243 (1978). See generally Janice C. Griffith, Local Government 
Contracts: Escaping from the GovemmentaVProprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L. REV. 277 
(1990). 
lo4 See Stone, 101 U.S. at 820; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25,32 (1877). 
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municipality from abrogating an agreement once entered into with a 
landowner. That is to say, if the municipality uses its legislative authority 
to impair an otherwise enforceable contract, it may incur liability to the 
landowner. An impairment of a contract addressable under the 
Constitution should be distinguished from a breach of contract under 
common law.'05 An impairment of contract occurs if a governmental entity 
acts in a way that makes performance of the contract illegal or 
impossible.'06 The illegality or impossibility provides a defense to the 
developer in a breach of contract action for damages or for other relief 
brought by the municipality, the non-government party now unable to 
fulfill its contractual obligation.lo7 On the other hand, when the 
government merely refuses or omits to perform its contractual obligation, 
an adequate remedy in damages ordinarily exists, such that the government 
action is characterized as a breach of contract that does not rise to the level 
of a contractual impairment.'08 
The Court has indicated that state actions purporting to impair 
contracts are evaluated according to varying levels of scrutiny in 
determining whether the impairment, if established, rises to the level of an 
actionable unconstitutional impairment.lW The level of scrutiny varies 
with the degree of impairment, being more strict where the impairment is 
more substantial.ll0 
1 .  Contract zoning as bargaining away of police powers 
"[Clontract zoning [is] defined as a 'process by which a local 
government enters into an agreement with a developer whereby the 
lo5 E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist., 613 F.2d 675, 677, 679 (7th Cir. 
1980). 
Io6 Id. at 679. 
lo' Id. 
lox Id. 
log Energy Reserves Group v. Kan. Power & Light Co, 459 U.S. 400,410 (1983). 
"O Id.; United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 27 (1977); Rue-Ell 
Enters., Inc. v. City of Berkeley, 194 Cal. Rptr. 919, 923 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). In Rue-Ell 
Enterprises, the court set out the following three-step analysis for determining whether a 
contract has been impaired: (1) whether the state law has substantially impaired the 
contractual relationship; (2) if substantially impaired, whether the impairment was justified 
by a significant public purpose behind the regulation, such as remedying a broad and 
general social or economic problem; and (3) if there is a legitimate public purpose, whether 
the adjustment of the rights and duties of the contracting parties was reasonable and 
appropriate to the public purpose justifying the law. Id. The California Supreme Court has 
also stated that any such modification must be reasonable, and, when resulting in 
disadvantage to a private-sector party, must be accompanied by comparable new 
advantages. 
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government extracts a performance or promise from a developer in 
exchange for [the government's] agreement to rezone the property. ,'>ill It 
is said to violate the reserved powers doctrine because it involves a deal 
that creates binding reciprocal obligations between a private interest and a 
government entity.l12 It is defined as the required exercise of the zoning 
power pursuant to an express bilateral contract between the property owner 
and the zoning authority and an agreement to rezone that lacks a valid 
basis independent of the contract on which to justify the zoning 
amendment.ll3 Thus, the problem with a deal arising under contract 
zoning is that it would bind the government to specific terms of the 
contract that may ultimately prevent it from carrying out its public duties, 
while confemng on private parties special rights different from other 
landowners within the same zone. l4 
McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Mass. App. 
(quoting 3 RATHKOPF, ZONING & PLANNING 8 44: 11 (Zeigler rev. ed. 2001)). 
Id. 
See Morin v. Foster, 380 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 1978); Almor Assoc. v. Town of 
Skaneateles, 647 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Quigley v. City of Oswego, 419 
N.Y.S.2d 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Carlino v. Whitpain Investors, 453 A.2d 1385 (Pa. 
1982); Larkin v. City of Burlington, 772 A.2d 553 (Vt. 2001). But see AFUZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. 3 11-832 (West 1999) (authorizing contract zoning); ME. ZONING ORDINANCE 8
II(I)(l) (2004) (specifically authorizing "contract zoning" for zoning map changes "when 
the Town Council, exercising its sole and exclusive judgment . . . determines that it is 
appropriate to modify the zoning district regulations applicable to a parcel of land [to] allow 
reasonable uses of the land . . . which remain consistent with the Town['s ] Comprehensive 
Plan"); R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 45-24-53(h) (1990) (authorizing contract zoning); Crispin v. 
Town of Scarborough, 736 A.2d 241, 245-46 (Me. 1999) (upholding a contract zoning 
agreement under statute); Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 364 A.2d 1277, 1281 (R.I. 
1976) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute authorizing conditional zoning by city 
council). 
'I4 See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93  So. 2d 86 (Ha. 1956); Chung v. Sarasota County, 
686 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 250 N.E.2d 791, 
796 (111. 1969) (asserting that zoning ordinances should not be subject to bargaining or 
contract, and that when zoning is conditioned upon collateral agreements or other 
incentives supplied by a property owner, zoning officials are placed "in questionable 
position of bartering their legislative discretion for emoluments that had no bearing on the 
requested amendment"). Another form of zoning that is often challenged as illegal, 
although not under the resewed powers doctrine, is spot zoning. See Mayor of Rockville v. 
Rylyns Enters., 814 A.2d 469, 488 (Md. 2002); Galuska v. Racine County, No. 87-0151, 
1988 WL 78384, *2 (Wis. Ct. App. May 25, 1988) (citing Cushman v. City of Racine, 159 
N.W.2d 67,69 (Wis. 1968)). Spot zoning involves the singling out of a small parcel of land 
for a use classification entirely different from that of the surrounding area, for the benefit of 
the owner of such property and to the detriment of other owners. Mayor of Rockville, 814 
(continued) 
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"The process is suspect because of the concern that a municipality will 
contract away its police power to regulate land use on behalf of the public 
in return for contractual benefits offered b a landowner whose interest is 
principally served by the zoning action."" it is thus said to be "an ultra 
vires act bargaining away the police power, [since] [zloning must be 
governed b the public interest and not by benefit to a particular 
landowner. 99 Y 16 
A.2d at 488. In other words, spot zoning occurs when a single lot or area is granted 
privileges that are not granted or extended to other land in the vicinity in the same use 
district. Id. It is usually understood to be zoning "by which a small area situated in a larger 
zone is purportedly devoted to a use inconsistent with the use to which the larger area is 
restricted." State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 174 N.W.2d 533,539 (Wis. 1970) (quoting 
Higbee v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 292 N. W. 320 (Wis. 1940)). Spot zoning is invalid 
where some or all of the following factors are present: (1) a small parcel of land is singled 
out for special and privileged treatment; (2) the singling out is not in the public interest, but 
only for the benefit of the landowner; and (3) the action is not in accord with a 
comprehensive plan. Mayor of Rockville, 814 A.2d at 488; Howard v. Village of Elm 
Grove, 257 N.W.2d 850 (Wis. 1977); Rodgers v. Menomonee Falls, 201 N.W.2d 29 (Wis. 
1972); State ex rel. Zupancic, 174 N.W.2d at 539 (citing Boerschinger v. Elkay Enters., 
Inc., 145 N.W.2d 108 (Wis. 1966)); Cushman, 159 N.W.2d at 69-70. However, spot zoning 
is not regarded as illegal per se, and courts do not consider rezoning in this way to be illegal 
spot zoning where it is in the public interest and not solely for the benefit of the developer. 
Cushman, 159 N.W.2d at 69. It is illegal only when a change exists that is otherwise than 
part of a "well-considered and comprehensive plan calculated to serve the general welfare 
of the community." Collard v. Inc. Village of Flower Hill, 421 N.E.2d 818, 821 (N.Y. 
1981). Nonetheless, the attitudes of courts and commentators toward spot zoning have 
differed. Spot zoning has been characterized both as a necessary device to provide 
flexibility to comprehensive zoning ordinances. 2 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMWCAN LAW 
OFZONING 5 9.17 (2d ed. 1976). and as "the very antithesis of planned zoning." 1 NORMAN 
WILLIAMS, JR. &JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW 5 27.01 (1988). In any 
case, it is a form of rezoning and "should only be indulged in where it is in the public 
interest and not solely for the benefit of the property owner who requests rezoning." 
Howard, 257 N.W.2d at 854 (quoting Buhler v. Racine County, 146 N.W.2d 403, 410 
(1966) (Cume, C.J., concumng)). 
McLean, 778 N.E.2d at 1020 (citing Rando v. North Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d 
544 (Mass. 1998)). 
116 Pima Gro Sys. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 52 Va. Cir. 241, 244 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000) 
(citing 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning 5 46) (emphasis added). In Derrenger v. City 
of Billings, 691 P.2d 1379 (Mont. 1984), landowner, Derrenger, purchased a parcel of land 
comprised of three tracts. Id. at 1380. One tract was zoned for single-family residences. 
Id. The remaining two tracts were zoned Agriculture Open Space. Id. Thereafter, the City 
of Billings and the landowner entered into a written agreement entitled "Waiver of Right to 
Protest Annexation and Agreement on Non-conforming Use." Id. The two tracts were 
(continued) 
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In contrast to contract zoning, conditional zoning117 is defined as 
rezoning subject to conditions, which are not applicable to other property 
in the same zone, where the municipality makes no promise to the 
landowner to rezone but does rezone upon the imposition of conditions, 
covenants, and restrictions on use of the rezoned land."' Under 
conditional zoning, the landowner covenants to perform certain conditions 
if the rezoning is granted.'19 Conditional zoning "allows municipalities 
annexed and rezoned R-96. Id. at 1381. Later, a subsequent owner of the tract proposed to 
build a multi-family residential unit on his property, all portions of which were then zoned 
R-96. Id. His plans were objected to, and he sued for construction on the meaning of the 
restriction on use in the annexation agreement. Id. The trial court found that the subject 
agreement was clear on its face and did not constitute contract zoning. Id. The appellate 
court reversed, holding the issue reduced to simplest terms was "whether 'residential 
purposes' [was] so clear on its face as to preclude multi-family residential purposes." Id. at 
1382. The court thought not. Id. 
[Tlhere is a fact question about what was intended. The parties may 
have intended to assure additional future uses in return for agreeing to 
annexation. They may not have fully understood the limitations on 
contract zoning. Surely, they must have intended to receive some 
consideration for not protesting annexation. These questions should be 
resolved by the trier of fact. 
Id. The dissent thought that the trial court's interpretation of the agreement to involve only 
conforming uses so as to avoid the contract zoning charge unsupported by a fair reading of 
the agreement. Id. at 1383 (Gulbrandson, J., dissenting). The dissent would have found 
contract zoning, stating that 
the parcel of land . . . located within the City of Billings and having 
been zoned [for single-family residence] long before the date of the 
agreement, but bearing a non-residential non-conforming use could not 
legally be the subject of an agreement whereby the City would agree to 
grant a residential multi-family use variance. Such an agreement, in my 
view, would constitute contract zoning. 
Id. The dissent went on to state that "[a] contract made by the zoning authorities to zone or 
rezone for the benefit of a private landowner is illegal and is denounced by the courts as 
'contract zoning' and as an ultra vires bargaining away of the police power." Id. 
(emphasis in original). "The parties may have intended to assure additional future uses in 
return for agreeing to annexation," but in the dissent's view, "such an additional future 
residential use would constitute illegal contract zoning." Id. 
'I7 This concept is discussed in depth infra at text accompanying notes 336 to 339. 
See 2 YOUNG, supra note 15, 5 9.20. 
'I9 2id. 
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and developers essentially to negotiate the terms of a de~elopment."'~~ 
Under an agreement, the developer obtains the certainty that the 
development project will proceed, thus making financing easier to obtain, 
and tenants more likely to sign leases.12' At the same time, the 
municipality is able to set definite conditions that govern the process of 
development, thus limiting the potential negative im acts from the 
development on neighboring land and the community. R 2  Conditional 
zoning is said not to violate the reserved powers doctrine because the 
promise by the developer is unilateral and the municipality does not 
promise to rezone based on the developer's promises, but does so in the 
public interest.'23 Nevertheless, some have argued that 
[wlhere the imposition of conditions on land development 
is desirable, it might better be done by uniform ordinances 
providing for special uses, special exceptions, and overlaid 
districts. . . . "Conditions imposed in such cases have a 
sounder legal basis because [they are transparent, where] 
guidelines for their imposition are spelled out in the 
ordinance. ,9124 
But, the process of conditional zoning at times seems almost 
indistinguishable from the process of "contract zoning," meaning 
negotiating a contract where there is an exchange of promises between a 
developer and the municipality.125 The closeness of these devices in 
definition and application has led to murky and overlapping discussions in 
cases. Therefore, several theoretical questions arise such as the following: 
(1) is lawful conditional zoning the same as illegal contract zoning? (2) 
does conditional zoning extinguish or nullify the concept of contract 
zoning? (3) is the result that conditional zoning is illegal if contract zoning 
is illegal? Or the converse, (4) if conditional zoning is legal, then should 
contract zoning be legal? 
2. When an agreement between a municipality and a developer is 
subject to challenge 
By bargaining away the police powers, the courts cannot mean that 
the current legislature must refrain from entering into binding contracts or 
lZ0 1 ROHAN, supra note 3 1,  5 5.01 [2]. 
"' 1 id. 
'22 1 id. 
1 id. 
lZ4 State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 174 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Wis. 1970) (quoting 
CUTLER, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE IN WISCONSIN 8, at 27 (1967)). 
lZ5 1 ROHAN, supra note 3 1 ,  § 5.01 [2]. 
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other obligations whose terms extend beyond the terms of the current 
body. Such an interpretation would almost nullify the municipality's 
power to contract and its power to be sued if every time, when things 
looked different, it could claim that the act was outside its power.126 What 
126 In Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Bnmetti, 207 A.2d 522 (N.J. 1965). a New Jersey 
court enforced an agreement against the municipality finding that such an obligation did not 
constitute a contracting away of the police power. Id. at 533. The landowners had an 
agreement with the borough that no building could be erected in the area exceeding 35 feet 
in order to preserve the beauty of the area. Id. at 531. The borough subsequently amended 
the zoning ordinance to allow the developer to construct a tower in excess of thirty-five 
feet. Id. The developer contended that the borough "[did] not have the power to restrict the 
use of privately owned property pursuant to an agreement with [the landowners] or to agree 
to insure the integrity of the skyline of the Palisades through its power of zoning. Such 
action, [the developer] argue[d], would be invalid as 'contract zoning."' Id. at 532. The 
court agreed with the general proposition that "a municipality may not contract away its 
legislative or governmental powers." Id. at 533. However, the court mled that a city has 
not only such rights as the legislature grants in express terms, but also "such other powers 
as 'arise by necessary or fair implication, or are incident to the powers expressly conferred, 
or are essential to the declared objects and purposes of the municipality."' Id. 
Accordingly, the general proposition "is subject to the limitation that where a municipality 
has incurred an obligation which it has the power to incur it cannot escape that obligation 
by asserting that it is merely exercising the police power delegated to it. Such an exception 
is necessarily appended to every such municipal contract." Id. The court went on to hold 
that 
the municipality, by virtue of [the statute], had the express statutory 
power to execute the [earlier] contract imposing the restrictive 
covenants. The purpose of that agreement was not to restrict the 
municipality from further zoning. The sole objective was the 
imposition of restrictive covenants on specifically described parcels of 
land. From that contract flowed the same duty and obligation that 
would be incurred by individuals and private corporations under similar 
circumstances, i.e., the duty not to take any affirmative action which 
would destroy the fruits thereof. Under such circumstances, barring 
[the borough] from taking &rmative governmental or legislative 
action which would constitute a breach of its agreement is not to be 
regarded as the proscribed contracting away of such powers. [The 
borough] could not escape the obligations incurred by the [earlier] 
agreement under the guise of police power. [The landowners] and the 
Commission were therefore entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief 
against this "inequitable conduct" 
because the borough "violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" in its 
agreement with the landowners when it amended the zoning ordinance. Id. at 532-33 
(continued) 
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seems to be the meaning given to the phrase by the courts goes largely to 
the process of decision-making in the particular rezoning at issue. Did the 
municipality, through its zoning authority, arrive at the decision based 
upon its own assessment of what best serves the public health, safety, and 
welfare,127 and did it provide the public an opportunity to participate in the 
zoning procedure before it acted to rezone?128 Substantively, did the 
municipality purport to surrender all power to act in the future to protect 
the public health, safety, and welfare? Where the answer to the first 
question is in the affirmative and the second in the negative, an agreement 
between a municipality and a private landowner should be enforceable. 
This means that not all agreements between the municipality and a 
developer amount to contract zoning. Instead, the courts have said that 
"contract zoning properly connotes a transaction wherein both the 
landowner who is seeking a certain zoning action and the zoning authority 
itself undertake reciprocal obligations in the context of a bilateral 
contract. ,9129 r c  In short, a 'meetin of the minds' must occur; [and] mutual fj assurances must be exchanged."13 Thus, the central issue in many of these 
(citations omitted); see also Gladwyne Colony, Inc. v. Township of Lower Merion, 187 
A.2d 549, 550 (Pa. 1963) (holding an agreement valid where the owner agreed to grant the 
town a right of way, an access road, and to convey a site if demanded by the city). 
lZ7 See Alderman v. Chatham County, 366 S.E.2d 885, 890-91 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) 
(holding that the rezoning in this case was accomplished as a direct consequence of the 
conditions regarding density of land use agreed to by the applicant, rather than as a valid 
exercise of the county's legislative discretion). 
Iz8 See State ex rel. Zupanic, 174 N.W.2d at 537 (stating that "[clontract zoning is 
illegal not because of the result but because of the method). 
Iz9 Chrismon v. Guilford County, 370 S.E.2d 579, 593 (1988) (distinguishing 
contract zoning from conditional zoning based upon whether there were bilateral or 
unilateral promises); see also Graham v. City of Raleigh, 284 S.E.2d 742, 746 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1981) (holding that absence in the record of any representation by the developers as to 
their specific plans for development of the subject property meant there was no unlawful 
contract zoning involved in the adoption of the challenged ordinance). 
I3O Hall v. City of Durham, 372 S.E.2d 564, 568 (N.C. 1988). In Hall, although the 
landowner made representations and offered assurances to the city council regarding the 
acreage to be deeded to a community association and a promise for the reversion of the land 
to its prior zoning class, in this case the landowner did not use land as represented. Id. No 
evidence demonstrated that the city council made assurances in return, no meeting of minds 
took place, and nothing demonstrated that the city council undertook to obligate itself in 
any way. Id. Therefore contract zoning did not exist. Id. However, the rezoning 
ordinance was invalid because in 
rezoning property from one general use district with fixed permitted 
uses to another general use district with fixed permitted uses, a city 
(continued) 
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cases is whether bilateral negotiations took place between the landowner 
and the municipality resulting in an agreement that consisted of mutual 
covenants (that is, mutual promises with consideration running to one party 
from the other, as opposed to the unilateral imposition of conditions by the 
municipality).'31 
In accordance with this definition, in evaluating a charge of contract 
zoning, courts have undertaken the seemingly impossible task of 
distinguishing those agreements involving bilateral exchanges from those 
involving unilateral promises from the landowner. Courts look to see if 
governmental power has been used as a bargaining chip and if rezoning 
occurs not based on the merits of the zoning chan e request, nor on the 
public interest, but because a deal had been struck.h2 On the other hand, 
where a developer makes promises regarding the use of the land, but the 
municipality makes no reciprocating promises, the rezoning that follows is 
not regarded as contract zoning. If all that is alleged is that "a reciprocal 
understanding resulted in a tacit agreement" based upon the landowner's 
assurance to the zoning authorities that the property would be used only for 
a particular purpose, no contract zoning is found based upon the 
assumption that this was the use to which the property would be subjected 
under the rezoning.133 Courts have explained that 
council [was required to] determine that the property is suitable for all 
uses permitted in the new general use district, even where it has 
additional authority . . . to require any submitted site plan to conform 
therewith. 
Id. at 572. The court further stated that "[rlezoning on consideration of assurances that a 
particular tract or parcel [would] be developed in accordance with restricted approved plans 
[was] not a permissible ground for placing the property in a zone where restrictions of the 
nature prescribed are not otherwise required or contemplated." Id. at 571. In other words, a 
rezoning must be a true rezoning, with all lands open for use for all permitted uses in the 
new zone, but a rezoning should not be applied only to a particular parcel. 
13' O'Dell v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 910 S.W.2d 438, 440-41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) 
(holding that the proof showed no evidence of a bilateral agreement, the landowner 
followed the customary procedure in an attempt to have its property rezoned, no evidence 
of negotiations between the parties existed, and no quid pro quo, only unilateral conditions 
requiring that necessary improvements be made). 
13' Id. at 441. 
133 Dale v. Town of Columbus, 399 S.E.2d 350, 353 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). There, a 
small tract was rezoned Highway Commercial from an R-2 Residential district. Id. at 352. 
The parcel faced a major highway to its south and across that road, the land was zoned 
Public Service. Id. At its southwest corner, the tract touched a Highway Commercial 
district and a city boundary. Id. Across that boundary was a county Highway Commercial 
district. Id. 
(continued) 
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[tlhe illegal aspect of contract zoning occurs when a 
zoning authority binds itself to enact a zoning amendment 
and agrees not to alter the zoning change for a specified 
period of time. When a zoning authority takes such a step 
and curtails its independent legislative power, it has acted 
ultra vires and the rezoning is therefore a nullity.'34 
The record [was] clear that the [planning] Board discussed the negative 
effects of highway traffic on any residential property along the road. 
The Board reviewed the commercial nature of the remainder of 
Highway 108 and the town's comprehensive plan of commercial 
development along the highway. It also discussed the possible benefits 
of increasing the town's tax base and providing more jobs through the 
establishment of more commercial enterprises. 
Id. The appellate court found no showing of illegal contract zoning, which "properly 
connotes a transaction wherein both the landowner who is seeking a certain zoning action 
and the zoning authority itself undertake reciprocal obligations in the context of a bilateral 
contract." Id. (quoting Chrismon, 370 S.E.2d at 593) (emphasis in original). Nothing 
indicated that the decision-making procedures were employed to cover up a hidden 
agreement between the landowner and the zoning authority. Id. at 353. But see Carole 
Highlands Citizens Ass'n, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 158 A.2d 663, 664-66 (Md. 
1960) (striking down conditional use zoning, finding that impermissible influence need not 
be explicit where the record shows that the zoning action would not have taken place but 
for the understanding that an impermissible condition would be in operation). 
Dale, 399 S.E.2d at 353 (citations omitted). 
[The court] found no evidence of any reciprocal agreement made 
between the Board and the current owner, the applicant who filed for 
rezoning, or with anyone else concerning the property. The transcript 
[was] unequivocal that the Board understood that if the property was 
rezoned, the owner was not bound to operate an automobile dealership 
or any other specific establishment on the tract. The record [was] also 
clear that the board was advised of all the possible uses that could be 
made in a Highway Commercial district and of the possible uses if the 
property remained R-2 Residential. After comparing the two 
alternatives, the Board made the decision to rezone. 
Id. The court then concluded as follows: 
Furthermore, all the proper rezoning procedures were followed in this 
case. Initially, the proposed change was referred to the Town Planning 
and Zoning Board, which endorsed the change. A public hearing was 
held, and at a separate public meeting, the Board unanimously adopted 
(continued) 
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Short of such act, however, the rezoning of land should raise no contract 
zoning issue.135 However, mere allegations of improper motive by the 
legislative body absent evidence of fraud or deceit are not sufficient to 
overturn an ordinance. Courts will not investigate the wisdom or motives 
of the legislative branch to invalidate zoning  ordinance^.'^^ 
3. Per se illegality of agreements 
Some jurisdictions have declared agreements amounting to contract 
zoning invalid per se,13' the reasoning being that the police "power may 
the zoning change. There [was] no indication that the Board's decision 
was a foregone conclusion or that the decision-making procedures were 
a ploy to cover up a hidden agreement between the landowner and the 
zoning authority. Plaintiffs' argument that the Board's knowledge of 
the landowner's intended use may have influenced their decision [was] 
not sufficient to support an allegation that contract zoning occurred. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
13' Alabama courts have also looked for a binding mutual agreement between the 
city and the developer before finding contract zoning. Bradley v. City of Trussville, 527 
So. 2d 1303, 1306 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988). In Bradley, the city gave a right of way to the 
property owner through park land for a road to facilitate the development of newly annexed 
adjoining land, which the city rezoned. Id. at 1304. The court found no evidence of an 
agreement between the city and developer to rezone. Id. at 1306. Rather, the agreement 
was that if the Zoning and Planning Commission did not rezone the property to the 
classification sought and there appeared to be no assurance that it would, then the city 
would agree to de-annex the property. Id. Moreover, the court found the city did not 
abdicate its legislative responsibility with regard to annexing and rezoning of the property. 
Id. On the contrary, the evidence indicated that "the City was extensively involved in the 
development of the subdivision. There was apparently much negotiating between the City 
and the developer both as to the type of residential subdivision that would be built and the 
type of road that would be laid through the park." Id. Also, public hearings were held on 
the developer's-petition to rezone. Id.; see also Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 120 N.W.2d 
270, 276-77 (Neb. 1963) (upholding a zoning ordinance where it was enacted with 
protective covenants including a buffer zone between the proposed shopping center 
abutting the residential area, there was no evidence of a bargain or agreement between the 
developer and the city, the only representations made by the developer to the city were in 
the developer's rezoning application, the effect of the protective covenant was to give some 
further assurance to the city, and the representations of the applicant were made in good 
faith, giving the city greater control over development of the property rezoned). 
136 Rutland Envtl. Prot. Ass'n v. Kane County, 334 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1975). 
13' In Wilmington Sixth District Community Commission v. Pettinaro Enters., No. 
8668, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 142 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1988), defendants sought to have a 
(continued) 
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not be exerted to serve rivate interests merely, nor may the principle be 
subverted to that end."'$ Still, it is not at all dear from a reading of the 
cases when contract zoning occurs. Additionally, not all zoning actions 
former hospital site rezoned to permit residential development and use. Id. at *2. 
Defendants negotiated for the possible purchase of the site, which required rezoning. Id. 
An ordinance was subsequently introduced providing for the rezoning of the site for 
residential use. Id. at *3. "Shortly thereafter, defendants met with representatives of [the] 
Committee to assuage the expressed concerns over the possibility of the renting of the units 
erected on the site, the lack of adequate parking and the increased congestion which would 
follow in the neighborhood if the rezoning occurred." Id. Defendants assured the 
Committee and represented at a public hearing that all housing units would be offered for 
sale with no rentals, that ample parking would be provided, and that they would ask the 
seller to place restrictions in the deed of conveyance to that effect. Id. at *3-4. The 
application for rezoning received unanimous approval from the Planning Commission. Id. 
at *3. However, the deed did not contain any such restrictions, and the defendants changed 
their plans, deciding on three story townhouses establishing a lease payment arrangement 
whereby a prospective purchaser could lease a unit for a time. Id. at *5. Plaintiffs filed an 
action seeking specific performance of defendants' representations to the Council. Id. at 
*6. Defendants asserted the following two arguments: (1) that the representations made to 
the Council did not as a matter of law create an enforceable contract, the performance of 
which could be specifically enforced, because it would amount to contract zoning; and (2) 
that Plaintiffs claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at *7. The court stated: 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the necessary prerequisites for a contract 
arose [by the defendant's representations to Council,] contracts between 
a municipality and a developer to rezone in accordance with mutual 
promises are apparently per se invalid in Delaware [as] the legislative 
function may not be surrendered or curtailed by bargain or its exercise 
controlled by the consideration which enter into the law of contracts. 
Id. The court noted that "[tlhis rule is contrary to the holdings of some other courts which 
have upheld contract zoning if reasonable, non-discriminating and serving the public 
welfare." Id. at *8. The court went on to distinguish contract zoning (involving a bilateral 
agreement) from conditional zoning (where the government does not agree to rezone but 
merely decides to impose conditions that would otherwise not be applicable to the land), 
but found the rezoning here was not conditional zoning because "the Council approved the 
ordinance without written conditions, and there were no recorded covenants, agreements, 
etc. which could show the existence of conditional zoning." Id. at *9-10; see also Hartnett 
v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Ha. 1956); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 148 A.2d 429 (Md. 
1959) (considering an agreement that provided "in consideration of the rezoning, the 
owners would develop and maintain property as a funeral home only"); Allred v. City of 
Raleigh, 178 S.E.2d 432,440-41 (N.C. 1971). 
Wilmington Sixth Dist. Cmty. Comm., 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 142, at *7-8 (quoting 
Hartman v. Buckson, 467 A.2d 694,699-700 (Del. Ch. 1983)). 
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decided by agreement with an affected landowner are unlawful, as the 
existence of an agreement per se does not invalidate related zoning 
actions.'39 Instead, in most jurisdictions, it is the nature of the agreement- 
whether the municipality promises to rezone without regard to the merits 
of the rezoning application and whether the rezoning serves the public 
interest-that determines whether an agreement amounts to contract 
zoning.14' Where the evidence shows that the municipality entered into an 
agreement with a landowner, was involved in the development process, 
and refrained from simply acting to rezone at the request of the developer, 
a finding of contract zoning is not required.14' 
McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2002). 
140 Id. 
14' See City of Orange Beach v. Peridio Pass Dev. Inc., 631 So. 2d 850, 854 (Ala. 
1993). In that case, the developer proposed development of an island, which, at the time 
the developer purchased it, was outside the boundaries of any municipality. Id. at 852. The 
developer met with the mayor of the City of Orange Beach and discussed an annexation of 
the island to the city. Id. The developer wrote a letter to the city attorney requesting 
Planned Unit Development zoning to allow various types of development and mixed uses 
within the area. Id. '"The city attorney amended the letter by adding a request for the least 
restrictive zoning and a statement that zoning would occur at the time of annexation." Id. at 
852. The mayor and the developer "also discussed the idea that the annexation was 
conditional upon receiving the zoning." Id. at 852-53. The developer then submitted an 
annexation-zoning letter to the City of Orange Beach, which agreed to support the project. 
Id. at 853. The developer wrote the town council, stating that the development would occur 
in several phases and that the number of lots were reduced. Id. The town council then 
reaffirmed its approval of the project, and the city annexed the island. Id. The developer 
sold the island to Peridio Pass Development, Inc., which "began to plan its development in 
reliance upon receiving proper development zoning." Id. At a town council meeting, 
several members of the community began to express concerns for the impact on the coastal 
development. Id. 'The council then voted to deny the developer's request for PUD 
zoning." Id. The developer brought a breach of contract action against the town. Id. In 
defense, among other things, the Town Council claimed that the implementation of "the 
agreement would amount to unlawful contract zoning by a municipality that is legislative in 
nature." Id. at 854. However, the court rejected that argument, stating that "an annexation 
and zoning agreement is permissible if the city does not abdicate its legislative 
responsibility and the city is extensively involved in the development of the property," as 
the evidence showed the city was here. Id. (citing Bradley v. City of Trussville, 527 So. 2d 
1303 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988)); see also Bradley v. City of Trussville, 527 So. 2d 1303, 1306 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (involving a situation where "the city was extensively involved in the 
development of the subdivision and there was apparently much negotiating between the city 
and the developer both as to the type of residential subdivision that would be built and type 
of road that would be laid through the park"). But see Hale v. Osborn Coal Enters., Inc., 
(continued) 
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Some courts have specifically upheld contract zoning or have declined 
to declare it illegal under all cir~urnstances.~~~ In Alaska, contract zoning 
was soundly upheld in City of Homer v. ~ a m ~ b e l 1 . l ~ ~  The court found an 
interest in a zoning contract to be a property right, the deprivation of which 
is subject to due process.'44 
Indiana courts have declined to rule on the question of whether 
contract zoning is illegal. In Prock v. Town of ~ a n v i l l e , ' ~ ~  the court 
729 So. 2d 853, 855 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (considering a case where the city was involved 
in development only to the extent of obtaining promised payment from landowner in 
exchange for rezoning). 
14' See, e.g., Murphy v. City of West Memphis, 101 S.W.3d 221 (Ark. 2003). In 
Murphy, a company wanted to sell fireworks within the city. Id. at 222-23. Another 
company was permitted to sell fireworks only because it was grandfathered into the city 
limits. Id. at 223. The company filed a federal action against the city. Id. At public 
hearings, the company agreed to dismiss the suit if the city voted in favor of an ordinance 
allowing the sale of fireworks from a specific location. Id. The city passed several zoning 
ordinances to allow this. Id. at 223-24. The ordinances were challenged as contract zoning. 
Id. at 224. The trial court determined that the only reason the city relented to the 
company's demands was to settle the suit. Id. But, such settlement could be upheld as long 
as the city went through a bona fide procedure in the zoning process. Id. The supreme 
court found that the trial court was correct in finding that the company and the city had not 
entered into any type of binding agreement to settle until the city council meeting, and the 
agreement was only finalized after the city council passed the challenged ordinance, not 
before. Id. at 226. The court otherwise found none of the circumstances that traditionally 
give rise to a finding of contract zoning. Id. Therefore, the question of the legality of 
contract zoning in the State of Arkansas was not an issue to be addressed by the court on 
that appeal. Id. The legality of contract zoning was otherwise an issue of first impression 
in the state, the court specifically noting that not all jurisdictions that had examined the 
issue had found contract zoning to be prohibited. Id.; see also Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso, 
845 P.2d 793,797 (N.M. 1992) (declining to adopt a per se rule). 
'43 719 P.2d 683, 685 (Alaska 1986) In City of Homer, the court found that the 
landowners had a proprietary interest in the business that was protected by due process 
when concurrent with a zoning amendment. Id. The landowners entered into a contract 
with the city enabling them to operate a fish processing plant, and later the city sought to 
terminate the contract. Id. 
Id. at 685. 
14' 655 N.E.2d 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). There, the landowner requested that the 
town annex certain property the landowner owned and zone it for use as a landfill. Id. at 
554. The town did annex the property and zoned it as requested. Id. Thereafter, the 
landowner and the town entered into an agreement that provided, among other things, that 
the landowner would 
(continued) 
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declared that "Indiana courts have not yet addressed the issue of whether a 
contract for zoning is illegal. However, several courts in our sister states 
have considered the issue and, in general, they hold that contract zoning is 
illegal."146 The Prock court went on to discuss Dacy v. Village of 
~uidoso,'~' a case from the New Mexico Supreme Court.'48 Dacy defined 
contract zoning as "an agreement between a municipality and another party 
in which the municipality's consideration consists of either a promise to 
zone the property in a requested manner or the actual act of zoning the 
property in that manner."'49 However, the Dacy court refused to subscribe 
to a per se rule against contract zoning, but recognized that numerous 
courts had in fact declared contract zoning invalid per se because it is "an 
illegal bargaining away or abrogation of the police power."150 The Dacy 
court explained further that a contract in which a municipality promises to 
zone property in a specified manner is illegal because in making such a 
promise, a municipality preempts the power of the zoning authority to zone 
the property according to prescribed legislative procedures, including 
notice and a public hearing prior to passage and a right of citizens to be 
heard at the hearing.'5' "By making a promise to rezone before a zoning 
hearing occurs, a municipality denigrates the statutory process because it 
1) reserve space in its landfill to dispose of waste materials generated in 
the town for the next 26 years; 2) abide by various limitations on the 
operation of the landfill and permit inspections; 3) maintain roads to the 
front gate of the landfill; 4) cooperate in the development of plans for 
recreational facilities on the property; 5) pay the Town certain fees per 
ton of waste received at the landfill; and 6) make three annual payments 
of $50,000 to the [local chamber of commerce] to be used to promote 
economic development. 
Id. at 554-55. In exchange for these promises, the town agreed "to actively support the use 
of the landfill and to support [the landownerl's future attempts to secure permits for 
expanding the landfill" and also to provide municipal water and sewage services. Id. at 
555. 
Id. at 559 (citing Ford Leasing Dev. Corp. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 528 P.2d 
237, 240 (Colo. 1974) (recognizing that the general rule in most states is that contract 
zoning is illegal as an ultra vires bargaining away of the police power); Hedrich v. Village 
of Niles, 250 N.E.2d 791, 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (holding that zoning ordinances should 
not be subject to bargaining or contract)). 
14' 845 P.2d at 796. 
14' Prock, 655 N.E.2d at 559. 
14' Dacy, 845 P.2d at 796. 
150 Id. at 797; see also Hartman v. Buckson, 467 A.2d 694,699-700 @el. Ch. 1983); 
Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956). 
Dacy, 845 P.2d at 797. 
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purports to commit itself to certain action before listening to the public's 3,152 comments on that action. However, in Dacy, the court pointed out that 
the analysis implies that one form of contract zoning is legal: a unilateral 
contract in which a party makes a promise in return for a municipality's act 
of rezoning. lS3 
In this situation, the municipality makes no promise and 
there is no enforceable contract until the municipality acts 
to rezone the property. Because the municipality does not 
commit itself to any specified action before the zoning 
hearing, it does not circumvent statutory procedures or 
compromise the rights of affected persons.154 
The court pointed out that "[s]ome courts have nonetheless condemned this 
form of contract zoning on the ground that the contracting party's promise 
provides improper motivation for the municipality's rezoning action."'s5 
The court did not find this reasoning persuasive because "private interests 
are inherently involved in any zoning matter."lS6 Moreover, if the zoning 
authority's action is improper, judicial review may correct potential 
misconduct occurring through unilateral contract zoning.157 The Dacy 
court implied that the agreement that results after the zoning hearing would 
be enforceable against the city-that it is the accord before consideration 
of relevant factors that makes the agreement illegal.'ss 
In Prock, the court failed to find contract zoning because the town did 
not promise to rezone the land in a certain way.lS9 Instead, the agreement 
provided as follows: 
In consideration of the payment of the [fee], the Town 
agrees to actively support [the developer's proposed] 
operation [of a landfill] within the annexed area and [the 
developer's] attempts to secure all permits and approvals 
for [expanding] the area. Such support may include 
without limitation the submission of whatever reasonable 
documentation is required to establish the Town's need for 
the expansion of the [operation] upon receiving a request 
lS2 Id. 
lS3 Id. 
'" Id. at 797-98 (citations omitted). 
lSs Id. at 798. 
lS6 Id. 
lS7 Id. 
lS8 See id. 
lS9 Prock v. Town of Danville, 655 N.E.2d 553,560 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
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to do so from [the developer].'60 
The court pointed out that by the agreement, "the town was not 
contractually bound to zone the property in a particular way or to promise 
that, in the future, it would rezone the property to expand the landfill."16' 
Further, the town did not promise to support the developer's efforts 
regardless of whether those efforts were in compliance with the town's 
statutory zoning procedures.'62 The court also noted that the agreement 
was signed after the property had been r e ~ 0 n e d . l ~ ~  As such, no contract 
zoning could be found.'64 Because there was no contract, the court 
declined to express an opinion as to whether contract zoning was in fact 
illegal, thus resulting in invalidating the zoning ordinar~ce.'~~ It seems that 
in evaluating this bargained for agreement, the court drew a fine line 
between the agreement to support the developer's application in exchange 
for the payment of a fee and a contract with mutual promises and the city 
agreeing to rezone in exchange for a fee.'66 Clearly, the inducement for the 
rezoning was the anticipated agreement, which provided that it would be 
effective following recording of the 0rdinan~e. l~~ 
In a more recent Indiana opinion, the court again declined to take a 
position on the legality of contract ~ 0 n i n g . I ~ ~  In Ogden v. Premier 
Properties, U.S.A, Inc., the city council voted to adopt an ordinance that 
rezoned from residential to commercial certain property in order to 
construct a retail shopping fa~i1ity. l~~ The developer filed a petition to 
rezone four years earlier.I7O The Area Plan Commission recommended 
denial of the request to the city council, and the city council denied the 
zoning petition.17' The developer filed another petition that was also 
denied, then another petition seeking to rezone the property.172 The Area 
Plan Commission again recommended "Each rezoning petition 
Id. 
I6l  Id. 
la2 Id. 
Id. 
'@ Id. at 561. 
Id. 
See id. at 560-61. 
Id. 
Ogden v. Premier Props., USA, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 
Id. at 664. 
I7O Id. 
17' Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
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included a Use and Development ~ o m m i t m e n t , ' ~ ~  which placed 
restrictions and requirements on the proposed de~eloprnent."'~~ The city 
council considered the petition at a hearing at which the developer 
"introduced a document titled 'Covenant' that contained written 
commitments 'in addition to the covenants set forth in the Use and 
Development Commitment. 77,176 c c  The commitments were conditioned on 
the City Council approving the developer's zoning request and were 
binding on the developer for twenty years. 7,177 c c  The City Council voted in 
favor of the petition adopting the rezoning Ordinance which incorporated 
the [Use and Development C~mmitment]."'~~ 
The court rejected the contract zoning claim asserted by the 
neighbors.179 The neighbors claimed that the city council and the 
developer entered into a contract for zoning because of the alleged 
agreements made by members of city council verbally and in a written 
covenant.'80 The court first pointed out that the fact that the developer met 
with city council members did not impeach the validity of the rezoning 
since the council acted "officially only though minutes and records at a 
duly organized meeting."18' As such, alleged verbal promises outside a 
'74 Under the zoning ordinance, a petition for rezoning was required to be referred to 
the Area Plan Commission (APC), which made recommendations to the city council for 
final action. Id. at 666. The APC could ''permit or require a landowner to make a written 
commitment on the use or development (UDC) of the property that was subject to the 
rezoning." Id. If the rezoning is approved, "the UDC is attached to, incorporated by, and 
recorded with the ordinance, and the APC retainrs] the power to modify, enforce and 
terminate the UDC." Id. at 667. The court ruled that UDCs are properly considered in 
connection with a rezoning petition, and it was not a violation of the ordinance for the city 
council to consider commitments other than UDCs. Id. at 666. The court also rejected the 
claim that the ordinance was void because the city council considered the UDC before it 
had been reviewed by the APC in its final form as contemplated by the ordinance. Id. at 
668. Instead, the city council had the power to reject the UDC as proposed or require 
amendment of the petition for rezoning and obtain another APC review before returning to 
the city council. Id. 
17' Id. at 664. 
176 Id. "The covenant was intended to accommodate the concerns of the adjoining 
landowners and the city council." Id. For instance, the developer promised to construct 
berms on two sides of the proposed facility, restrict hours of garbage disposal, maintain 
landscaping, construct improvements to the roads abutting the facility, including adding 
traffic lanes and turn lanes, and install a traffic light. Id. 
'77 Id. at 664-65. 
17' Id. at 665. 
17' Id. at 668. 
180 Id. 
18' Id. at 669. 
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meeting did not contractually bind the city council, but simply reflected the 
nature of the legislative process.'82 The court went on to show how the 
facts there were weaker than in Prock, where the town was a party to the 
agreement with the developer and agreed to support the developer in 
obtaining permits and approvals for the project.Ig3 Yet, the court in Prock 
failed to find contract zoning.Ig4 Here, the city council was not a party to 
the covenant, which did not bind the city council to zone the property in 
any particular way.lg5 AS in Prock, the rezoning was approved before the 
covenant became effective-that is, the agreement was signed after the 
ordinance was passed, hence the town council could not have contracted 
away its power to zone because the zoning was already completed before 
the agreement was executed.'86 Here, a provision in the covenant stated it 
would become effective five days after the passing of the ordinance.18' 
The holding in this case can be criticized as evasive and superficial, that 
the order in which the act of rezoning and formal signing of an agreement 
to rezone occurs does not make a critical difference if the inducement and 
sole reason for the rezoning is the promise by the developer, and the 
rezoning contemplates the entering into the agreement. At the same time, 
it is hard to see what was wrong with the proposed covenants or why a 
decision to rezone should not be made on the basis of proposed uses. It 
should have been sufficient that a promise to rezone was made on the basis 
of the consideration of the public interest, that allowing the new use 
reflected the changing needs of the community, and that the landowner's 
proposed uses would be in harmony with prevailing conditions. 
The Massachusetts courts have also rejected a per se treatment of all 
agreements between a municipality and a developer as illegal contract 
zoning.lgg Instead, what seems to matter is whether the rezoning serves the 
public interest and that the consideration offered by the developer was not 
extraneous to the property at issue.'89 In McLean Hospital Corp. v. Town 
of ~ e l m o n t , ' ~  prior to rezoning, a hospital was situated on a single 
residence D zoning district as a non-conforming use.l9' Residential zoning 
districts bordered the locus on the northeast and northwest, and local 
Id. 
Id. (citing Prock v. City of Danville, 655 N.E.2d 553, 560 (111. App. Ct. 1995)). 
Id. (citing Prock, 655 N.E.2d at 560). 
Id. at 670. 
Id. at 669. 
Id. 
See, e.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 183 N.E.2d 118 (Mass. 
Id. at 122. 
778 N.E.2d 1016 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). 
Id. at 1018. 
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business districts bordered the locus on the ~0utheast . l~~ The hospital 
presented a proposal that led to the parties entering into a memorandum of 
understanding of the proposal, which contemplated rezoning the entire site, 
together with commitments to benefit the town generally, but not 
ex~lusively. '~~ These commitments included the following: (1) legal 
protection of significant historical features; (2) acquisition by the town of 
an interest in the site, including title to a major portion for open space and 
a cemetery; and (3) a tax exemption for that portion dedicated for hospital 
operations, traffic management, and commitments for recreational 
benefits.'" 
"Pursuant to the memorandum of understanding, the town embarked 
on a process leading to a comprehensive rezoning of the [area],"195 the 
proposed rezoning being substantially similar to the memorandum of 
~ n d e r s t a n d i n ~ . ' ~ ~  The town planning board recommended that the 
amendment be appr0~ed . l~~  After extended discussion, the amendment 
failed.19* But on reconsideration of a revised roposal that reflected 
concerns expressed earlier, the proposal passed.'98 The hospital and the 
town then executed a memorandum of agreement incorporating the parties' 
various commitments to each other.200 In considering a challenge to the 
rezoning, the court noted that the challengers "employ[ed] the label 
'contract zoning' as an epithet that suggest[ed] that zoning action taken in 
connection with any agreement with an affected landowner is unlawful.'y201 
This was wrong as a general proposition.202 The court explained that 
"[tlhe existence of an agreement per se does not invalidate related zoning 
actions; it is the nature of the agreement and the character of the zoning 
action that determine the outcome."203 
Attacks on zoning enactments as unlawful contract zoning had been 
lg2 Id. 
lg3 Id. 
Id. at n.5. The commitments included reducing the maximum square footage of 
the research and development subdistrict, the payment of $800,000 by the hospital to the 
town for traffic mitigation, payment by the town to the hospital of $1.5 million, and further 
amendments. Id. at 1019. 
lg5 Id. at 1019. 
lg6 Id. 
lg7 Id. 
lg8 Id. 
'* Id. at 1020. 
2* Id. 
201 Id. 
202 See id. at 102 1. 
203 Id. at 1020. 
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considered previously by the appellate courts in ~ a s s a c h u s e t t s . ~ ~ ~  Each 
case involved an agreement between the municipality and the developer, 
but in each case the zoning action was upheld.205 In the first such case, 
Sylvania Electric Products, Znc. v. City of ~ e w t o n , ~ ' ~  the agreement 
provided that if the city rezoned a potential parcel from a single residence 
district to a limited manufacturing distri~t,2~' the landowner would restrict 
its uses of the parcel in certain ways and convey to the city an option to 
purchase a portion of the property.208 The McLean court quoted the 
Sylvania court and stated that "[ilt was clear that the respective 
undertakings were contingent on each other or, as the court expressed it, 
'the option proposal was a significant inducement of the zoning 
amendment and the amendment induced the giving of the option. 3,209 The 
McLean court went on to state that "[tlhe mutual dependence of the 
parties' commitments did not by itself render the zoning aspect invalid. 9,210 
Notwithstanding that local "officials let it be known that favorable 
rezoning depended in great likelihood on the adoption of the option 
restrictions," this was still It also did not "infringe zoning 
principles that, in connection with a zoning amendment, land use was 
regulated otherwise than by the amendment" to the zoning ordinance.212 
The court explained that the "'[zloning regulations existfed] unaffected 
by, and [did] not affect, deed restrictions.' In other words, the zoning 
action, if otherwise valid, [stood] by itself and its legitimacy [was] not 
lessened because it was accompanied, and even encouraged, by ancillary 
agreements not involving consideration extraneous to the property being 
rezoned. ,7213 
In Sylvania, the zoning decision that the locus, as 
restricted by the owner, should be a limited manufacturing 
district "was an appropriate and untainted exercise of the 
zoning power. What was done involved no action 
contrary to the best interest of the city and hence offensive 
-- - -- 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
2M 183 N.E.2d 118 (Mass. 1962). 
'07 Id. at 1 19. 
'08 Id. at 120. 
'09 McLRan Hosp. Corp., 778 N.E.2d at 1020-21 (quoting Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 
183 N.E.2d at 122). 
'lo ~ d .  at 1021. 
211 Id. 
'I2 Id. (quoting Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 183 N.E.2d at 122). 
'I3 Id. (quoting Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 183 N.E.2d at 122). 
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to general public policy. 9,214 
The other Massachusetts appellate case, Rando v. North 
~ t t l e b o r o u ~ h , 2 ~ ~  held the same.216 In Rando, a developer sought to have 
land in a residential district rezoned to a commercial distri~t.~" TO induce 
the rezoning, the developer made various promises relating to the subject 
property and the area, "including a 'no build' buffer zone, traffic 
improvements, mitigation payments, and a commitment not to seek tax 
abatements with respect to the rezoned land for five years."218 'The 
plaintiffs argued that the town had bargained away its police powers in 
return for the promised benefits."219 Comparing the objection to that in the 
Sylvania case, the Rando court upheld the trial court's finding that the 
town meetings had not been improperly influenced to act against the 
town's best interests and instead on behalf of the developer.220 
In addition, the [Rando] court agreed that the benefits 
promised by the developer did not constitute "extraneous 
consideration," stating, "We do not think a payment that is 
promised by the developer rather than required by the 
municipality and that is reasonably intended to meet 
public needs arising out of the proposed development can 
be viewed as an 'extraneous influence' upon a zoning 
decision."221 
Under this definition, the zoning authority was found not to have entered 
into a bilateral contract with a landowner because of the following: (1) the 
landowner's application for rezoning detailed various conditions to be 
placed on the proposed rezoned property, including undisturbed buffers 
(these promises were unilateral, and no promises were made by the zoning 
authority); and (2) the zoning authority imposed a 100 foot buffer on a 
parcel and made no promise associated with this provision and the 
landowner made no promise in return.222 Viewing the "whole record," no 
evidence supported that a transaction occurred in which either side 
2'4 Id. (quoting 183 N.E.2d at 122). 
'I5 692 N.E.2d 544 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). 
'I6 McLean, 778 N.E.2d at 1021. 
'I7 Id. (citing Rando v. Town of N. Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1998)). 
Id. (citing Rando, 692 N.E.2d at 546). 
219 Id. (citing Rando, 692 N.E.2d at 546). 
220 Id. (quoting Rando, 692 N.E.2d at 549-50). 
221 Id. (citing Rando, 692 N.E.2d at 548). 
222 See id. 
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undertook to obligate itself in any NO meeting of the minds took 
place, and no reciprocal assurances were made.224 The court continued, 
Thus, challenges to zoning enactments on the basis that 
they are products of contract zoning provoke two 
questions: (1) was the action "contrary to the best interest 
of the city and hence offensive to general public policy;" 
and (2) did it involve extraneous consideration "which 
could impeach the enacting vote as a decision solely in 
7 ~ 2 2 5  respect of rezoning the locus. 
Rando seems much more narrow and strict in its treatment of 
agreements between municipalities and landowners than Sylania. In 
Sylvania, the court upheld an arrangement involving mutual commitments, 
which the court found were contingent upon each other, and the rezoning 
was in the public interesteZz6 In contrast, the Rando court took pains to 
show only unilateral promises by the landowner, seemingly suggesting that 
zoning involving a bilateral agreement would be invalid in 
Massach~setts.~~' However, the two questions identified as pertinent in 
contract zoning challenges said nothing about bilateral promises. Rather, 
they focused solely on the benefit to the municipality and the connection 
between the promises forming the basis for the zoning and the property. 
Additionally, it is difficult to view the landowner's promises as being 
unrelated to the anticipated rezoning. The McLean court relied on both 
Sylvania and Rando to uphold what could hardly be regarded as anything 
but a bilateral agreement.228 This reliance on both cases, therefore, makes 
the resolution of the issue unclear.229 McLean simply found the 
223 Id. at 1023. 
224 See id. 
225 Id.at1021. 
226 Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 183 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Mass. 1962). 
227 See Rando v. Town of N. Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 548 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1998). 
228 See McLean Hosp. Corp., 778 N.E.2d at 1021. 
229 The McLean court went on to state that 
[i]n determining whether the rezoning challenged here satisfied the 
criteria of Sylvania and Rando, we apply the standard that a party 
attacking a zoning amendment has a heavy burden, one requiring that 
he "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the zoning regulation 
is arbitrary and unreasonable, or substantially unrelated to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 
(continued) 
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challengers failed to demonstrate that the interests of the town were not 
served by the rezoning.230 "Indeed, while McLean's interests [were] 
obviously enhanced, a factor that [did] not discredit the zoning action, . . . 
the benefits that flowed to the town from the agreement [were] obvious."23' 
The town was confronted with a situation in which the landowner had the 
right to "develop the unused portion of its property into sin le family 4 
residences and had an immediate economic incentive to do so." 32 Under 
the agreement, the landowner surrendered this right, a concession of clear 
benefit to the town, on the conditions that the land be rezoned, that the 
town pay McLean $1.5 million, and that the town help McLean receive tax 
relief that similar institutions enjoy.233 In return, 
the town received not only the elimination of the potential 
for an undesired residential development of the locus, an 
accomplishment that by itself would appear to satisfy the 
requirement that the zoning be for a public purpose, but 
also open space; a cemetery; protection for significant 
historical features; commitments with respect to affordable 
housing and recreational benefits; and a traffic 
management agreement.234 
The landowner's commitments were substantially related to the 
general welfare, and the town meeting therefore could lawfully act to 
rezone based upon them.235 No evidence indicated that the developer 
improperly influenced the town meeting to decide in favor of the developer 
rather than in the town's best interests.236 Moreover, "[tlhe consideration 
flowing to the town under the agreement [was] not 'extraneous' in the 
sense used in Sylvania and Rando (as, for example, a request to give land 
Id. at 1022 (quoting Johnson v. Edgarton, 680 N.E.2d 37,40 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997)). The 
challenger "must demonstrate that the validity of the enactment 'is not even fairly 
debatable."' Id. (quoting Crall v. Leominster, 284 N.E.2d 610, 615 (Mass. 1972)). "If the 
validity of the zoning action is fairly debatable, local judgment on the subject should be 
sustained." Id. (quoting National Amusements, Inc. v. Boston, 560 N.E.2d 138, 140 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1990)). 
230 Id. at 1022. 
23' Id. (citations omitted). 
232 Id. at 1022. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. (citing Sylvania Elec. Prods, Inc. v. City of Newton, 183 N.E.2d 118, 122 
(Mass. 1962)). 
236 Id. (citing Rando v. Town of N. Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 549 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1997)). 
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for a park elsewhere in the city) which could impeach the enacting vote as 
a decision solely in respect of rezoning the Instead, "each 
element of such consideration was reasonably related to the [property] 
being rezoned."238 The court explained: 
We believe it too narrow to require that, in order not to be 
labeled excessive, consideration must directly "mitigate" 
some deleterious effect of the development authorized by 
the rezoning (although such consideration would 
obviously be permissible). Rather, it is adequate that the 
consideration bear some identifiable relationship to the 
locus so that there can be assurance that the town's 
legislative body did not act for reasons irrelevant to the 
zoning of the site at issue. This requirement was satisfied 
here.239 
Therefore, it seemed that the crucial point made by the court in 
determining the validity of the rezoning made in connection with an 
agreement was that the town benefited from the developer's promises and 
that those promises related to the parcel at issue. 
At the end of the opinion, the court did state that the "rezoning [was 
not] a product of a bilateral contract that bound the town to rezone solely 
9,240 in consideration of the promises of the landowner, and at the same time 
it recognized that the rezoning was conditioned on the developer's 
promises.24' It pointed out that the rezoning was not a term of a contract, 
but was a "condition that had to be fulfilled before a separate agreement 
became enforceable."242 The court attempted to distinguish this from a 
bilateral contract between the developer and the municipality by stating 
that in the case before it, "the municipality [made] no promise and there 
[was] no enforceable contract until the municipality act[ed] to rezone the 
property."243 This attempted distinction seems disingenuous and belied by 
the terms of the agreement. Arguably, an agreement between the parties 
existed, as the developer's promises clearly induced the rezoning, and 
these promises would only be fulfilled upon rezoning. The court might 
237 Id. (quotations omitted) (citing Sylvania, 183 N.E.2d at 122). 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
Id. at 1023. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. The court also ruled that "[tlhe rezoning having been adopted for a valid 
public purpose in relation to an area that is discrete in its geography, contours, and size, it is 
not spot zoning." Id. 
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well have upheld the rezoning based upon its concluding remarks that it 
saw 
nothing in the Zoning Act, . . . or in other applicable legal 
principles that prohibite[d] a municipality from 
negotiating with a private landholder to bring about the 
receipt of benefits for desirable public purposes once 
otherwise valid zoning has taken place, assuming that 
those benefits have some reasonable relationship to the 
site covered by the zoning.244 
Indeed, as the court recognized, "such arrangements are consistent 
with good overnment in general and with effective land use planning in 8 particular." 45 They do not involve a surrender of police The 
court's suggestion that a bilateral contract binding the town to rezone 
solely in consideration of the promises of the landowner and that benefit 
the city would be illegal, but that the city can negotiate and extract 
promises from a landowner and based upon these romises decide to 
rezone so long as the rezoning benefits the ~ i t~ : '~makes  too fine a 
distinction. Yet, it seems to reflect the approach taken by courts inclined 
to uphold rezoning where the developer has made significant concessions 
of benefit to the parcel at issue and surroundings.248 In this vein, courts 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 In Paul v. City of Manhattan, 51 1 P.2d 244 (Kan. 1973), restrictive covenants 
placed on the property in connection with rezoning did not amount to contract zoning 
because they "were not prerequisites to the zoning, nor . . . a controlling factor in the 
court's decision. They were merely considered as they might bear on population density- 
a key issue raised by plaintiffs." Id. at 251. Further, "rezoning would conform to the 
master land use plan even if the covenants were ignored." Id. In Arkenberg v. City of 
Topeka, 421 P.2d 213 (Kan. 1966), in connection with an application by the developer for a 
rezoning, the developer "expressed its willingness to convey to the city an easement for 
parking purposes consisting of a ten foot strip of land." Id. at 216. Rezoning was 
approved. Id. The plaintiffs alleged contract zoning. Id. The court held contrary to the 
case cited by plaintiffs, Hudson Oil Co. v. City of Wichita, 396 P.2d 271 (Kan. 1964), 
stating that "[o]bviously the effect of any agreement respecting the right-of-way would be 
to alleviate the traffic condition. If it were in fact made by the governing body as a 
prerequisite to rezoning, which does not affirmatively appear, that would be a reasonable 
requirement." Arkenberg, 421 P.2d at 218. 
248 See Carlino v. Whitpain Investors, 415 A.2d 461, 464 n.2 (Pa. Comrnw. Ct. 
1980). In Carlino, the court stated that "where the 'contract' would consist of special 
limitations affecting the zoning amendment in respects which the landowner accept[ed] in 
(continued) 
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have held that the fact that the city stands to benefit from the rezoning, by 
itself, does not make an agreement contract zoning.249 
What seems a departure from the qualified conclusion in McLean is 
Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC,~~' where the court focused its analysis of 
the contract zoning challenge on the relationship the rezoning bore to the 
consideration re~eived,'~' finding what can only be regarded as a most 
tenuous relationship between the consideration received and the use of the 
parcel at issue sufficient to avoid the contracting away of governmental 
powers ~hallenge.~~' There, the Massachusetts high court upheld a 
rezoning where the developer offered to make an $8 million gift for the 
construction of a new high school if its rezoning application was permitted, 
allowing it to build and operate a power plant on the site.253 The town held 
order to have the amendment enacted," such "contract zoning" is a valid exercise of the 
police power. Id. 
249 See City of Springfield ex rel. Burton v. City of Springfield, No. 00 CA 14,2000 
Ohio App. LEXIS 2721, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. June 23, 2000). In this case, 
the city agreed to bear the cost of construction with the understanding 
that, if the zoning was changed to allow for residential or commercial 
development of the abutting property, the developer would contribute to 
the cost of the road in proportion to the manner and extent to which the 
property was developed. Neither the [original] [algreement nor [slide 
[agreement], which supplemented it, required the city to zone the 
property in any particular way. As the trial court pointed out, the fact 
that a city st[ood] to benefit from a zoning decision d[id] not disqualify 
the city from enacting zoning regulations and [could not] be considered 
as illegally controlling the course of legislative decision making. 
Id. at Y7. 
250 793 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 2003). 
"' See id. at 365-66. 
'" See id. at 368. 
253 Id. at 361-62. After the town began to examine ways to increase it property tax 
base, it appointed an economic development task force to study the issue. Id. at 361. The 
task force prepared a report, identifying a parcel of land that abutted land already zoned for 
industrial use as a candidate for rezoning from agriculture and suburban to industrial use. 
Id. 
Subsequently, at the . . . town meeting, a zoning article proposing the 
rezoning fell eight votes short of the required two-thirds majority. 
Thereafter, IDC, which owned a power plant in the town, began 
discussions with town officials about the possibility of rezoning the 
[site] so that a second plant might ultimately be built on it. These 
discussions included the subject of what public benefits and financial 
(continued) 
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an open town meeting at which the proposed rezoning was introduced.254 
IDC made a presentation at the meeting and reiterated its offer of an $8 
million gift.255 "The planning board and finance committee both 
recommended passage of the zoning article. There was some discussion of 
the zoning aspects of the proposal, as well as discussion regarding the 
offered gift."256 The ordinance passed by more than the two-thirds vote 
required.257 Thereafter, IDC submitted applications for five special 
permits, which were granted.258 Landowners located near the site filed suit 
against IDC, the town, the town zoning, board of appeals, and the property 
owners, arguing inter alia that the rezoning constituted illegal "contract 
zoning" or "spot zoning."259 The trial court viewed the $8 million gift as 
"extraneous consideration" since no attempt was made to show that the 
developer offered it to mitigate the impact of the project.260 As such, it was 
"offensive to public The trial court ruled that the offer made 
was sufficient to nullify the rezoning vote, even "without the necessity of 
finding that voting town meeting members were influenced by it. 7,262 ne 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed.263 The court stated that 
[tlhe enactment of a zoning bylaw by the voters at a town 
meeting is not only the exercise of an independent police 
inducements IDC might offer the town with regard to the proposed 
[power] plant. The town administrator told IDC that the town was 
facing an $8 million shortfall in its plans to construct a much needed 
new high school. Shortly thereafter, the president of IDC publicly 
announced that IDC would make an $8 million gift to the town if IDC 
(1) decided to build the plant; (2) obtained the financing and permits 
necessary to build the plant; and (3) operated the plant successfully for 
one year. The offer was made to generate support for the plant and 
became [public] knowledge in the town. 
Id. at 361-62. 
254 Id. at 361-62. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 362. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 362-63. 
260 Id. at 363. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at 363-64. The court began with a discussion of the source of the municipality 
power to enact local ordinances-the Home Rule Amendment to the Constitution. Id. at 
364. The zoning power enabled municipalities to enact zoning ordinances or bylaws as an 
exercise of their "independent police powers." Id. 
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power; it is also a legislative act, carrying a strong 
presumption of validity. It will not normally be undone 
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate "by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the zoning regulation is arbitrary and 
unreasonable, or substantially unrelated to the public 
health, safety . . . or general welfare."264 
This "analysis is not affected by consideration of the various possible 
motives that may have inspired the legislative action."265 The court 
explained that "contract zoning" involves "a promise by [the] municipality 
to rezone a property either before the vote to rezone has been taken or 
before the required [statutory] process has been undertaken."266 The court 
ruled that the trial court found no such advance agreement occurred here, 
since despite IDCYs offer of $8 million, the voters of the town meeting 
were not bound to approve the zoning change.267 Because the town 
followed the statutory procedures, the rezoning was not illegal under state 
law on that basis.268 
The court noted that the trial judge found that absent the $8 million 
offer, the rezoning was substantively valid, meaning not arbitrary nor 
unreasonable, and was "substantially related to the public health, safety, or 
general welfare of the town."269 In other words, the adoption of the 
rezoning even without the offer of $8 million served a public purpose.270 
Here, the site "abutted land zoned for industrial use; a town-appointed task 
force . . . had recommended its rezoning after studying the town's tax base 
and the need for economic development; and a previous rezoning attempt 
. . . barely failed to get the necessary two-thirds [vote required]."271 
Therefore, the enactment of the rezoning was not violative of state law 
or constitutional provisions, as the $8 million was not "extraneous 
con~ideration."~~~ Instead, the court concluded that a voluntary offer of 
public benefits is not, standing alone, an adequate ground on which to set 
aside an otherwise valid legislative In general, the court found "no 
- - 
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Edgartown, 680 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Mass. 1997)) (citations 
omitted). 
265 Id. 
266 Id. at 365. 
267 Id. at 366. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 368. 
270 Id. 
271 ~ d .  (footnote omitted). 
272 Id. 
273 Id. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the trial court's reliance on Sylvania to 
this effect was misplaced. Id. at 368. "Th[at] opinion cit[ed] no supporting authority for 
(continued) 
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reason to invalidate a legislative act on the basis of an 'extraneous 
consideration,' because [courts] defer to legislative findings and choices 
without regard to motive."274 The court saw "no reason to make an 
exception for legislative acts that are in the nature of zoning 
enactments."275 It found "no persuasive authority for the proposition that 
an otherwise valid zoning enactment is invalid if it is an way prompted or 
encouraged by a public benefit voluntarily offered. 7 9 2  6 ' The offer of a 
the proposition that the presence of an 'extraneous consideration' at the time of the vote on 
a zoning amendment would invalidate the vote, but the language has since been given 
added life in two cases decided by the Appeals Court." Id. at 368-69 (citing McLean Hosp. 
Corp. v. Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016 (Mass. 2002) (holding that a promise of the landowner 
to surrender its right to develop an unused part of the property and provide open space, a 
cemetery, protection for significant historical features, commitments with respect to 
affordable housing and recreational benefits, and a traffic management agreement were not 
extraneous consideration, but were reasonably related to the locus being rezoned); Rando v. 
Town of N. Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 548 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that where 
payment that was "promised by the developer rather than required by the municipality and 
that [wals reasonably intended to meet public needs arising out of the proposed 
development [could not] be viewed as an 'extraneous influence' upon a zoning decision")). 
The Durand court also noted a change in attitude among the courts on the concept of 
contract zoning, with recent courts confining its meaning to a situation involving reciprocal 
promises between a municipality and a landowner. Id. at 367. In their definition, the courts 
do not include rezoning made on conditions designed to limit use of land or other forms of 
mitigation for the adverse impacts of its development, as this is a commonly accepted tool 
of modem land use planning. Id. In any event, the court cautioned, "A court examining a 
zoning arrangement should not affix a formalistic label to it, but rather should engage in the 
substantive inquiry [to ascertain] whether the zoning action [wals consistent with . . . law 
and constitutional requirements, and otherwise satisfies the criteria for a valid exercise of 
police power." Id. at 367 n. 17. 
274 Id. at 369. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. The dissent found that "the town meeting improperly agreed to exercise its 
power to rezone land in exchange for a promise to pay money. The exercise of that power 
to approve the requested zoning change was a condition precedent to the promise of IDC 
. . . to pay money under its agreement with the town." Id. at 370 (Spina, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). Additionally, the dissent found that this was not "a decision solely 
in respect of rezoning the locus. [Instead, t]he parties struck a bargain: the payment of 
money in retum for a zoning change." Id. at 370-71 (citations omitted). This was a sale of 
the police power because nothing in the record "legitimize[d] the $8 million offer as 
'intended to mitigate the impact of the development upon the town,' or as 'reasonably 
intended to meet public needs arising out of the proposed development."' Id. at 371 
(quoting Rando, 692 N.E.2d at 548). The consideration was extraneous and unrelated to 
any aspect of the development. Id. at 37 1. 
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benefit in exchange for the exercise of the municipality's zoning power 
seems to fall at the heart of the contract zoning prohibition, if the 
prohibition exists for that sake alone. But if the prohibition exists in order 
to require the zoning authority to show that a rezoning is otherwise in the 
public interest, then the fact that a municipality achieves a benefit while 
otherwise faithfully carrying out its responsibilities should not be of great 
concern, particularly if the municipality could have rezoned without the 
benefit offered.277 However, if the presumption of the validity of the 
enactment of the legislation is applied as the court did here?78 then the 
concern that the public interest considerations may be given short shrift 
with the lure of $8 million will not be tested by judicial review. 
B. Lack of Transparency Where Zoning Bypasses the Statutory 
Procedures 
Contract zoning has been held to be objectionable because such an 
agreement by the zoning authority bypasses the notice and public hearing 
procedures required for enacting a zoning ordinance.279 This lack of 
transparency occurs even if the municipality informs the public at the time 
of the rezoning that the land at issue will be governed by separate rules. 
Others who come later to examine the ordinance to try to understand the 
general plan for the community will not fully understand how the plan is 
designed since the plan itself will not reflect all of the considerations that 
went into the rezoning decision. Similarly, if the zoning authority board 
has already contracted to support the landowners' request for rezoning 
before public hearing, "hearings regarding the issue of rezoning would 
then be a 'pro forma exercise since the [board would have] already 
obligated itself to a decision. ,~280 If the agreement is expressly 
277 But see Treme v. St. Louis County, 609 S.W.2d 706 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). There, 
the court declared invalid as an instance of contract zoning an ordinance where the 
consideration was extraneous to the land at issue. 'The 'contract zoning' charge aros[e] 
from the requirement of [the ordinance] that the developer improve [the road] next to the 
property and widen a one-lane bridge on [the road] near, but not adjacent to, the property." 
Id. at 716. The court explained that "[wlhere the offer made or the exaction demanded for 
the rezoning bears no reasonable relationship to the activities of the developer the action of 
the county or municipality in rezoning the property in exchange for such offer or exaction," 
amounts to a "contracting away of the police power, which is forbidden." Id. at 717. 
278 See Durand, 793 N.E.2d at 364. 
279 See Morgran Co. v. Orange County, 818 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002). 
Id. at 643 (quoting Chung v. Sarasota County, 686 So. 2d 1358, 1360 (Ha. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1996)). The city had not expressly or irrevocably committed itself to rezone the 
area. See id. at 641-42. Nonetheless, the court concluded that since the decision to rezone 
(continued) 
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conditioned upon approval by the public at a hearing, then there seems to 
be no good reason for not allowing the municipality to work out the terms 
of the rezoning and future uses in advance, as is contemplated under a 
development agreement. Of course, the zoning authority begins the 
hearing process with a contractual obligation to obtain public approval, but 
it is free to be persuaded otherwise at the hearing. 
The question of bypassing the notice and public hearing procedures 
has also arisen in the context of settlement of litigation brought by a 
developer challen 'ng the municipality's denial of an application for a 
proposed land useFgl The Florida courts have found such agreements the 
equivalent of invalid contract zoning where, under the settlement 
was contingent on the filing of restrictive covenants by the developer, a bargaining away of 
police power had occurred. Id. at 643. 
See Warner Co. v. Sutton, 644 A.2d 656 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). There, 
the landowner owned approximately 3,000 acres of land adjoining the Manumuskin 
Watershed in Maurice River Township, which for many years was used for mining of sand 
as a legal nonconforming use. Id. at 658. The city then rezoned the land to a classification 
in which mining was not permitted. Id. The landowner's application for a renewal of its 
license to continue its mining activity was granted in part and tabled in part. Id. The 
landowner sued seeking to invalidate the ordinance, alleging spot zoning and a taking of 
property. Id. The parties reached a tentative settlement of the suit. Id. "Under the 
proposed agreement, the Township recognized [Landowner's] mining nonconforming use 
status, and that it applied essentially to [Landowner's] entire tract." Id. Landowner 
abandoned its challenge to the rezoning and its damage claim, "and in turn was given a 
conditional right to construct a planned residential village on the tract." Id. The court 
found that the consent order caused the municipality to surrender its legislative function and 
took away the public's right to be heard. Id. at 660. The consent order, therefore, 
amounted to contract zoning, and it frustrated the public's right to be heard on rezoning. Id. 
"In other words, the municipality's exercise of its police power to serve the common good 
and general welfare of all its citizens 'may not be surrendered or curtailed by bargain or its 
exercise controlled by the considerations which enter into the law of contracts."' Id. at 659 
(quoting V.F. Zahodiakin Eng'g Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 86 A.2d 127, 131 (N.J. 
1952)). But see Murphy v. City of W. Memphis, 101 S.W.3d 221 (Ark. 2003) (failing to 
address the contract zoning issue where the settlement agreement involving rezoning was 
not finalized until a council meeting was held, and all procedures for passage of an 
ordinance, including notice to the public and opportunity to be heard, were followed); Toll 
Bros., Inc. v. Township of W. Windsor, 756 A.2d 1056, 1065 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2000) (holding that consent orders and judgments are not necessarily a form of contract 
zoning provided certain procedures are followed to ensure that the interests of low and 
moderate income households are adequately protected); Livingston Builders, Inc. v. 
Township of Livingston, 707 A.2d 186, 192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (approving a 
settlement against a charge of illegal contract zoning where the order was expressly 
conditioned on the city adopting an ordinance through established procedures). 
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agreement, the municipality binds itself before satisfying the public notice 
and hearing req~irements.~" This could not be allowed, for the carefully 
structured provisions for public notice and public hearings, which in many 
cases required consideration of staff or planning commission 
recommendations, would be stripped of all meaning and purpose if the 
decision-making body had previously bound itself to reach a specified 
282 Chung, 686 So. 2d at 1360. 
See id. at 1359. In Chung, the landowner filed a petition with the county to 
rezone eleven acres. Id. After the county commissioner denied the rezoning petition, the 
landowner took legal action. Id. Subsequently, the landowner and the county entered into a 
settlement agreement that obligated the county to rezone the landowner's property, subject 
to numerous stipulations and conditions. Id. "Based on the settlement, the trial court 
entered a stipulated final judgment and retained jurisdiction over its enforcement." Id. An 
adjacent landowner intervened, and the trial court vacated the stipulated final judgment. Id. 
On appeal, the adjacent landowner argued that the settlement amounted to contract zoning. 
Id. In agreeing with the adjacent landowner, the court explained that "[c]ontract zoning 
refers to an agreement between a property owner and a local government where the owner 
agrees to certain conditions in return for the government's rezoning or enforceable promise 
to rezone." Id. (citing James D. Lawlor, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of 
Agreement to Rezone, or Amendment to Zoning Ordinance, Creating Special Restrictions 
or Conditions Not Applicable to Other Property Similarly Zoned, 70 A.L.R.3d 125, 131 
(1976)). The court explained that "[olne of the reasons contract zoning is generally rejected 
is because 'the legislative power to enact and amend zoning regulations requires due 
process, notice, and hearings."' Id. (quoting Teny Lewis et al., Spot Zoning, Contract 
Zoning, & Conditional Zoning, in 2 FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL & LAND USE LAW 9-1,9-13 
(James J. Brown ed., 2d ed., 1994)). 
Assuming that the developer and municipality bargain for a rezoning 
ordinance that is fairly debatable and non-discriminatory, contract 
zoning is nevertheless illegal when they enter into a bilateral agreement 
involving reciprocal obligations. By binding itself to enact the 
requested ordinance (or not to amend the existing ordinance), the 
municipality bypasses the hearing phase of the legislative process. 
Id. at 1359-60 (citing Roy P. Cookston & Burt Bmton, Zoning Law, 35 U .  MIAMI L. REV. 
581, 589 n.34 (1981)); see also P.C.B. P'ship v. City of Largo, 549 So. 2d 738, 741 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
In Chung, it can be argued that the court did not prohibit settlement agreements per se, 
but implied that the agreements may be upheld if the local government conforms to the due 
process, notice and hearing requirements. Id. However, the Second and Fourth Districts of 
Florida have come to mixed decisions when confronted with the issue of contract zoning in 
the context of settlement agreements. Compare P.C.B. P'ship, 549 So. 2d at 741, with 
Molina v. Tradewinds Dev. Corp., 526 So. 2d 695, 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). In 
(continued) 
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The Maryland courts have taken a similar position on rezoning arising 
out of settlement agreements, specifically against agreements whereby the 
city agrees to rezone upon the landowner's agreement to conditions to be 
imposed on the land.284 
C. Agreements that Destroy the Uniformity that Is Required in Each 
District 
"The rezoning of a parcel of property by a municipality based in any 
way upon an offer or agreement by an owner of property" is said to be 
illegal to the extent that it "is inconsistent with, and disruptive of, a 
comprehensive plan."285 One court stated: "If local government could 
P.C.B. Partnership, the Second District ruled that contract zoning resulted from a 
settlement of litigation, and the settlement agreement was unenforceable because it restricts 
the city's decision-making responsibility and eliminates the city's ability to exercise its 
police power. P.C.B. P'ship, 549 So. 2d at 741. Conversely, the Fourth District in Molina 
upheld a rezoning settlement agreement and ordered the city to comply with the agreed 
terms. Molina, 526 So. 2d at 696. 
284 See, e.g., AttmanIGlazer P.B. Co. v. Mayor of Annapolis, 552 A.2d 1277 (Md. 
1989). In Anman, a developer sought rezoning of two parcels that had been acquired and 
assembled by the city for an urban renewal project. Id. at 1278. Originally, one parcel was 
zoned neighborhood commercial and business use and the other for residential use. The 
developer proposed the construction of a commercial office building. Id. The developer's 
initial request was granted, and the aldermen amended the urban renewal plan to change the 
designation of the two parcels to commercial use. Id. at 1279. "The resolution also 
permitted the erection of a professional office building, on the condition that the owner of 
the building provide 252 parking spaces, [which] could be located on-site or on other 
property within 500 feet of the building." Id. By resolution, a conditional use for the 
proposed building was approved. Id. Disagreements later developed regarding the number 
of parking spaces to the point that the city denied the developer a use permit for the 
building. See id. at 1279-80. The developer sued and the parties reached a settlement 
agreement, although there was serious disagreement between the parties as to the terms of 
their settlement. Id. at 1280-81. The court of appeals ruled that if, as the developer 
contended, the agreement was intended to require the city council to grant an amended 
conditional use on the conditions specified, the agreement was invalid. Id. at 1282. The 
mayor and aldermen could not bind themselves acting in the capacity as zoning authority to 
future zoning or conditional use decisions. Id. at 1282. The court did not reach a decision 
as to whether the conditions agreed upon were themselves legally permissible, but noted 
that the prohibitions against contracting away the exercise of zoning power applies whether 
the conditions are valid or invalid. Id. at 1284. 
285 Hale v. Osbom Coal Enters., Inc, 729 So. 2d 853, 855 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) 
(holding that there was invalid contract zoning where the landowner entered into an 
agreement with the city whereby the city would annex the property and rezone additional 
parcels in return for the landowner's promise to pay $.I5 per ton of coal mined in the town 
(continued) 
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change its zoning laws by private agreements with individual landowners, 
a hodgepodge of regulations would develop, the legislative process would 
be usurped, and the public good would be Thus, 
agreements that would result in the destruction of the uniformity required 
by Euclidean zoning have been struck down as a form of contract 
zoning.287 The Florida Supreme Court in Hartnett v.   us tin^^^ took this 
position. There, because landowner wanted to buy land and build a 
shopping center, the landowner asked the city to rezone the land for 
commercial use.289 The city refused to make the change unless the 
landowner agreed to certain conditions, including building a wall, 
maintaining a forty-foot setback, landscaping the setback, protecting 
neighbors against glare and disturbance, and paying for additional police 
protection.290 The action was held invalid, and the court stated that "[ilf 
each parcel of property were zoned on the basis of variables that could 
enter into private contracts then the whole scheme and objective of 
community planning and zoning would collapse."291 
limits); see also Willis v. Union County, 335 S.E.2d 76, 77 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985). In Willis, 
the court held as follows: 
To avoid contract zoning, all the areas in each class must be subject to 
the same restrictions. If the rezoning is done in consideration of an 
assurance that a particular tract or parcel will be developed in 
accordance with a restricted plan, this is contract zoning and is illegal; 
[evidence in this case showed] that at meetings regarding the rezoning 
petition, defendants' attorney . . . referred to specific plans, including 
drawings and rental rates for a proposed apartment building to be 
constructed on the property. There is also evidence that [the attorney] 
made representations at the various hearings to the effect that there 
should be no concern about mobile homes on the property after 
rezoning because the defendants were willing to put restrictions in the 
deeds prohibiting mobile homes. 
Id. at 77. But see Riverschase Homeowners Protective Ass'n., Inc. v. City of Hoover, 531 
So. 2d 645 (Ala. 1988) (holding there was no contract zoning). 
'" Pima Gro Sys., Inc. v. King George County Bd. of Supervisors, 52 Va. Cir. 241, 
244 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000) (finding that the county did not just agree to rezone, an act which of 
itself is generally illegal as "contract zoning"; rather, the county actually agreed to allow an 
activity that was prohibited to all others under the zoning ordinance, and this was beyond 
the county's powers). 
287 Atrrnan/Glazer P.B. Co., 552 A.2d at 1282-83. 
'" 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956). 
289 Id. at 87. 
Id. at 89. 
291 Id. 
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Early on in Illinois, contracts between a city and a developer regarding 
zoning were similarly condemned on this basis, among others.292 In 
Cederberg v. City of RocL$ord, the city rezoned two lots from residential to 
local business.293 In rezoning, the landowner was required to execute a 
restrictive covenant, which was recorded as a condition to the passage of 
the zoning committee's report recommending rezoning.*" The covenant 
provided that notwithstanding the rezoning and business classification 
(which by the city's ordinance, permitted forty-four types of local 
businesses), twenty-six enumerated uses would not be allowed on the lots 
in question.295 The parties agreed that the covenant was void because it 
was a type of contract zoning.'% Thus, "[tlhe precise question left for 
review [was] what effect, if any, the restrictive covenant bore upon the 
validity of the ordinance rezoning the property from a residential to a local 
business distri~t."'~' The court agreed with the trial judge and the parties 
that the restrictive covenant was an invalid attempt by the city to control 
the use of the land.298 Among the reasons emerging from the cases 
establishing this rule against such zoning practices were the following: 
[Tlhat by entering into agreement with the property owner, 
the zoning authority might use the zoning power to further 
private interests in violation of public policy; that such 
rezoning was a deviation from a basic zoning plan 
resulting in non-uniform application of the zoning law and 
inconsistencies within a zoning classification; that when 
the actual zoning requirements in force are determined by 
reference to evidence extrinsic to the zoning ordinance, 
that zoning law is rendered vague.299 
292 See, e.g., Cederberg v. City of Rockford, 291 N.E.2d 249, 251 (Ill. Ct. App. 
1972). But see Goffinet v. County of Christian, 333 N.E.2d 731, 738 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) 
(expressing acceptance of conditional zoning). 
293 Cederberg, 291 N.E.2d at 250. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. 
'" Id. at 251. 
297 Id. 
298 Id. (citing Houston Petroleum Co. v. Auto. Prod. C. Ass'n, 87 A.2d 319 (N.J. 
1952); Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Ha. 1956)). 
299 Id. The zoning ordinance also failed in the absence of evidence that it was 
necessary or that it was granted only after a consideration of the appropriate use of the land 
within the total zoning scheme of the community. Id. at 252. The court struck down the 
ordinance, stating that no evidence demonstrated that the city gave any consideration to the 
statutory standards of public health, safety, comfort, morals, or welfare, and that the effect 
(continued) 
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However, imposing differing conditions on property in the same land 
use category is not wholly arbitrary. Rezoning upon conditions or 
promises limiting use recognizes that the particular characteristics of 
particular parcels may differ sufficiently so that different uses make sense. 
Some parcels that have particular uses may have greater or lesser impact 
on surrounding properties. Also, use classifications may have occurred at 
different times when the concerns of the municipality were different.300 
Indeed, uniformity for that sake alone may be arbitrary and inconsistent 
with good governance. 
D. When the Municipality Is not a Party to the Agreement, Contract 
Zoning Has not Been Found 
When the zoning authority is not a party to an agreement between the 
town and the developer, and the zoning authority acts to rezone in 
accordance with the public hearing requirements, courts have not found 
contract zoning, even when it appears that the zoning authority was 
motivated to rezone by the agreement.301 Thus, under one court's 
of the enactment taken together with the covenant was to create a classification not set forth 
in the general zoning ordinance. Id. 
300 See Pressman v. City of Baltimore, 160 A.2d 379, 382-83 (Md. 1960) Giger v. 
City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Neb. 1989); Nicholson v. Tourtellotte, 293 A.2d 
909,911 (R.I. 1972). 
301 See, e.g., Funger v. Mayor of Somerset, 239 A.2d 748, 757 (Md. 1968). In 
Funger, the developer and the town entered into an agreement whereby the town would 
recommend rezoning to the county council if the developer dedicated two acres to a scenic 
and conservation easement, limited the development of sixteen acres for a period of twenty 
years to the use currently permitted in the rezoned classification and to the density currently 
permitted for eighteen acres, and gave the town twelve acres of the tract for park land. Id. 
The area was rezoned by the county council following the hearing. Id. at 752. The 
ordinance was held valid and not contract zoning. Id. at 757. Moreover, in State ex rel. 
Zupancic v. Schimenz, 174 N.W.2d 533,537,540 (Wis. 1970), neighboring landowners and 
a developer had an agreement made enforceable by the city by injunction. Id. at 536. The 
court held that such an agreement was valid where the agreement did not directly involve 
the city, though a contract between the city and landowner to zone or rezone would be 
illegal and the ordinance void. In City of Greenbelt v. Bresler, 236 A.2d 1 (Md. 1967), the 
court held that an agreement between a landowner and a governmental body of an 
organization not having formal zoning authority does not amount to contract zoning. Id. at 
4. The city agreed to recommend rezoning in return for a developer's agreement to limit 
development density of the land as rezoned and promise to donate several acres to the city 
for use as a park. Id. at 2-3. When the developer later reneged, the court held that the 
agreement was enforceable against owner. Id. at 6; see also Pressman v. City of Baltimore, 
160 A.2d 379,386 @Id. 1960) (upholding rezoning ordinance where there was no evidence 
that the city council was actually influenced in passing the ordinance by the existence of the 
(continued) 
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conception, 
when a city itself makes an agreement with a landowner to 
rezone the contract is invalid; this is contract zoning. 
However, when the agreement is made by [persons other 
than the municipal arm of government with ultimate 
zoning authority] to conform the property in a way or 
manner which makes it acceptable for the requested 
rezoning and the [municipality] is not committed to 
rezone, it is not contract zoning in the true sense and does 
not vitiate the zoning if it is otherwise valid.302 
If the concern is about the influence of a promise by the developer in 
connection with a zoning request, that the party entering into the 
agreement is not the ultimate zoning authority, but plays an important role 
in the zoning process, should make little difference if the prohibitions 
against contract zoning are to be consistently applied. Surely, a 
recommendation by a planning board, even if based upon an agreement 
with the landowner, will have significant influence on the legislative body 
ultimately enacting the zoning ordinance. As such, the distinction may not 
be a valid one. 
E. Special Types of Zoning Resist Challenge as Contract Zoning 
Special types of zoning may require pre-zoning contact, negotiations, 
and bargains between the developer and the municipality toward the 
adoption of a development plan, and such contacts and bargains may not 
be regarded as contract zonin . In Rutland Environmental Protection 
Association v. Kane County,"'the county rezoned the property from a 
farming district to a community unit district (CUD), allowing the 
developer to build an amusement park.304 The adjoining landowners 
agreement between the landowner and city planning commission, and there was no 
authority in the state enabling act authorizing the planning commission to condition 
approval as such); People's Counsel for Baltimore County v. Beachwood I Ltd. P'ship, 670 
A.2d 484, 507 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (holding that a contract zoning charge was not 
established absent evidence of a deal with the county council, the body with authority to 
rezone, as opposed to the planning board); Ass'n to Protect Anderson Creek v. City of 
Bremerton, No. 20878-4-11 1998, Wash. App. LEXIS 166, at *17 (Wash. App. Feb. 6, 
1998) (finding no contract zoning existed when the city administrator agreed to apply and 
agreed to support rezoning of property, but the city administrator did not have the power to 
rezone, only the city council did). 
302 State ex rel. Zupancic, 174 N.W.2d at 538. 
303 334 N.E.2d 215 (111. App. Ct. 1975). 
3W Id. at 217. Under the ordinance, 
(continued) 
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complained that "the requirements under the CUD zoning classification 
were changed from planned arrangements of residential uses and attendant 
commercial and industrial uses to allow for the proposed park."305 The 
court found that CUD "is a method of land use control designed to 
supplement existing master plans and zoning ordinances."306 It does this 
by permitting the combining of different land uses on the same tract.307 It 
"is intended to apply to specific property and [is] meant to facilitate the 
development of an environmentally sound and functional unit."308 CUD 
zoning enjoys the advantage of flexibility over traditional Euclidean 
zoninb which divides communities into districts and rezones segregated 
uses.3 Because negotiations are necessary so that the overall aims of 
CUD zoning may be accomplished, and because the regulatory ordinance 
mandates conferences, the defendants' conduct in meeting beforehand with 
the developer did not contribute to contract zoning.310 
Agreements in connection with floating zones, as well as the 
community unit district in Rutland, a type of planned unit development 
(PUD),~" have withstood the contract zoning ~harge.~" Their effect is 
an applicant for CUD zoning must, at in informal conference, submit to 
the plat officer a sketch plan describing existing conditions of the site 
and of the proposed development. After the preapplication conference, 
the plat committee reviews the proposal. Recommendations made by 
the plat officer or committee during the initial review may be 
incorporated into the development plan. After approval in the initial 
proposal by the plat committee, a detailed development plan is prepared 
which must include certain specified information, and this plan is then 
reviewed by the plat officer and committee with approval contingent 
upon the plan meeting specified criteria. Regulations require that a 
developer's final plan contain approved provisions for such items as 
streets, utility easements, water distribution, lighting and landscaping. 
It is only after the plat committee has approved the development plan 
that the applicant may first petition for CUD zoning. 
Id. at 219. 
30S Id. at 217. 
Id. at 219. 
" Id. 
Id. 
309 Id. (citing Rudderow v. Township Comm. of the Tp. of Mt. Laurel, 297 A.2d 583 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972)). 
310 Id. 
311 
"[Tlhe floating zone involves a predetermined set of criteria, established in the 
zoning code, but not yet affixed to any specific property." Roy P. Cookson & Bart Bruton, 
Zoning Law, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 581, 594 (1981). Before the zoning authority "'settle[s] 
(continued) 
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similar "in that the local government may require performance of certain 
conditions and impose restrictions before approving the developer's plan," 
but uses are determined based on the particular circumstances of the 
area.313 Unlike most districts created [under the general] zoning ordinance, 
a floating zone has no fixed location within the It is usually 
attached to a particular tract of land through rezoning of the land by 
petition of the landowner.315 It may contain any use permitted in the 
particular district by the specific ordinance creating it, or it may restrict 
uses to be permitted on the tract based on a determination of conflicts with 
adjoining existing or potential uses, when required for a greater degree of 
control over the manner and development to protect the general welfare.316 
A floating zone, therefore, is, by definition, conditional317 and rezoning to a 
floating zone cannot, by its very nature, be bound upon precise and 
inflexible standards for each plot of ground because each plot of ground is 
different and the environment in which it lies is different.318 "So long as 
the floating zone on a particular tract, the developer must comply with the conditions, 
density, setback, height, and other specified requirements." Id. A minimum size for the 
proposed zone may be required, and conditions of the Euclidean zoning type are usually 
imposed by the ordinance. Id. A PUD is similar to a floating zone. Id. It is a district in 
which a planned mix of residential, commercial, and even industrial uses is sanctioned 
subject to restrictions calculated to achieve compatible and efficient use of land. Id. The 
ordinance authorizing the PUD will usually define the rights and objectives only in general 
terms, leaving the specifics to the development by the developer. Id.; see also MANDELKER, 
supra note 19, $5  6.60,6.61,9.01,9.24. 
312 See Cookson & Bruton, supra note 31 1, at 593-94. 
313 
. Id. at 593; see also Wegner, supra note 40, at 983-85. 
314 Treme v. St. Louis County, 609 S.W.2d 706,710 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
31S Id. 
316 Id.at711. 
317 In Treme, the court rejected the claim that a floating zone was an instance of 
contract zoning, finding that municipalities need a certain degree of "flexibility in 
determining whether particular types of uses should be allowed within the environs of an 
area zoned for some other use where the newly allowed use can be made compatible with 
the existing uses." Id. at 712. The commercial district here satisfied these requirements. 
Id. 
318 See id. In Treme, 
there [were] certain mandatory requirements for uses within the new 
zone which the Council [was] not free to expand. The regulations 
limit[ed] the uses, established minimum performance standards and 
sign regulations. The council [could] impose greater restrictions and 
[was] required to prescribe height restrictions, lot area and yard 
requirements, and off-street parking and loading requirements. 
(continued) 
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the legislative [decision] is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, 
landowners . . . have no cause to object because the determination made 
under the general standards of the ordinance produce different results on 
different tracts of land. 7,319 
In Old Canton Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. Mayor of Jackson, 320 a 
developer filed a zoning application requesting the city to rezone 
approximately 21 acres out of a 150-acre parcel of land from a single- 
family residential and general commercial classification to a restricted 
commercial and limited commercial clas~ification.~~' Plaintiffs opposed 
this rezoning application, and the developer withdrew the application, but 
then refiled seeking to develop the same area as a P u D . ~ ~ ~  The Planning 
Board approved the proposed PUD and recommended that the Jackson 
City Council approve the application so long as a housing component was 
added.323 Following the required notifications, the Planning Board 
Plaintiffs [had no right to] complain that the Council [might] exercise 
its legislative judgment to impose more stringent requirements [on a 
commercial district] than it [did] in another. 
Id. The court further found "no objection to the fact that the ordinance [did] not spell out in 
detail the standards upon which a determination to rezone to [commercial] is to be made. 
The section [did] provide for general standards which [were] to be considered by the 
legislative body." Id. 
319 Id. at 713. Though the ordinance did authorize spot zoning, it was not invalid on 
that ground. Id. The court pointed out that any zoning ordinance that allows for 
amendment allows spot zoning. Id. Spot zoning may be invalid or valid. Id. 
If it is an arbitrary and unreasonable devotion of the small area to a use 
inconsistent with the uses to which the rest of the district is restricted 
and made for the sole benefit of the private interests of the owner, it is 
invalid. On the other hand, if the zoning of the small parcel is in accord 
and in harmony with the comprehensive plan and is done for the public 
good-that is, to serve one or more of the purposes of the enabling 
statute, and so bears a substantial relationship to the public health, 
safety, morals and general welfare, it is valid. 
Id. Nor was the zoning otherwise unconstitutional because of ample evidence of 
reasonableness, it served the general welfare, did not adversely affect the public roads and 
the value of nearby property, and did not deviate from the comprehensive plan. Id. at 713- 
15. 
320 749 So. 2d 54 (Miss. 1999). 
321 Id. at 56. 
322 Id. 
323 Id. 
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considered the developer's application, but failed to reach a consensus.324 
The developer then filed an amendment increasing the size of the proposed 
PUD from twenty-one to fifty acres.325 The Site Plan Review Committee 
approved the proposed PUD, but the developer was obligated to meet 
twenty-three req~irernents.~'~ After a hearing, the city council 
unanimously approved the application, contingent upon those 
requirements.327 These included the following: a pedestrian circulation 
plan; that the revised site plan comply with all requirements of the PUD 
district provision of the zoning ordinance; that the functional aspects of the 
project did not negatively impact surrounding land uses of the area's 
infrastructure capacity; that the covenants previously submitted by the 
developer be incorporated as much as possible into the final covenants; and 
that the final covenants be approved by the city council. 328 Plaintiffs 
challenged the rezoning on the ground inter alia that it amounted to 
contract zoning, which was The court pointed out that 
[almple statutory authority exist[ed] in the form of 
traditional zoning legislation that [could] be construed to 
support this novel regulatory device. The key question 
was whether such authority should be narrowly or broadly 
construed. Many states have traditionally opted for 
narrow construction of enabling legislation to ensure 
against unwarranted action by local governments, but the 
present trend is toward a more expansive view of local 
government powers and a more generous interpretive 
view.330 
324 Id. 
325 Id. 
326 Id. 
327 Id. 
328 Id. at 56-57. 
329 Id. at 57. 
330 Id. at 58. The court chose to rely on the decision from the New Mexico Supreme 
Court, Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso, 845 P.2d 793, 796 (N.M. 1992), for the proposition that 
"contract zoning was only illegal in cases in which a municipality committed itself to 
rezone property in such a manner as to circumvent the notice and hearing process or to 
compromise the rights of affected persons." Old Canton Hills Homeowners Ass'n, 749 So. 
2d at 58. The court noted that Dacy raised serious doubt as to whether the agreement in the 
present case constituted contract zoning at all. Id. The court then quoted the Dacy court, 
stating that "[c]onditional zoning is not contract zoning at all, because it does not involve a 
promise by either party. Rather, conditional zoning describes the situation in which a 
(continued) 
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Under the more generous interpretive view, it is "[tlhe absence of an 
enforceable promise by either party [that] distinguishes conditional zoning 
from contract zoning."331 Here, the conditions set forth by the site plan 
committee and adopted by the city council were the sort of conditions 
inherent to any PUD, fully consistent with the goals and purposes of the 
PUD land planning device.332 Given the nature of a planned unit 
development, a district containing "a planned mix of residential, 
commercial, and even industrial uses is sanctioned subject to restrictions 
calculated to achieve compatible and efficient use of land."333 In sum, far 
from constituting a "contracting away" of the city's police power, the 
contingent zoning/PUD constituted an effective tool for the development 
of the property in a manner that satisfied the concerns of the residents 
living closest to the property.334 
In Campion v. Board of Alderman of New ~ a v e n , ~ ~ ~  the court upheld 
conditions imposed on approval of a Planned Development District 
because they created a new zone, such that uniformity of regulations was 
not at issue.336 
IV. CONTRACT ZONING COMPARED TO CONDITIONAL ZONING 
In contrast to contract zoning, which usually requires the showing of a 
bilateral contract, conditional zoning is analogous to a unilateral contract. 
The local government does not promise to rezone, but, either voluntarily or 
through negotiation, the developer agrees to conditions that are otherwise 
not required in the proposed zone.337 This type of zoning does not 
represent the same relinquishment of police power authority as contract 
zoning because the agreement occurs as part of a regulation that flows 
from comments made during the hearing process. Here, the deal is not 
complete until after the municipality has heard concerns both of 
landowners seeking to rezone and of the neighbors, and until the 
municipality has tried to arrive at a workable compromise. In addition, the 
deal is transparent in that the conditions that form the agreement are 
municipality rezones on condition that a landowner perform a certain act prior to, 
simultaneously with, or after the rezoning." Id. 
331 Old Canton Hills Homeowners Ass'n, 749 So. 2d at 58 (quoting Dacy, 845 P.2d 
at 796). 
332 Id. at 59. 
333 Id. 
3" Id. at 63. 
33s NO. CV020462505S, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 874 (Corn. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 
2003). 
336 Id. at *19-20. 
337 See Wilrnington Sixth Dist. Cmty. Comrn. v. Pettinaro Enter., No. 8668, 1988 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 142, at *9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1988). 
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explicitly set forth in the zoning amendment so that every one who 
subsequently reviews the zoning amendment will have a clear and accurate 
understanding of the uses to which the land can be put and the reasons the 
municipality decided to allow those uses. The conditions can be made a 
part of the zoning text or can be evidenced by the recording of an 
enforceable covenant binding the developer and his assignees to the 
negotiated condition.338 
The unilateralhilateral distinction has often been overlooked by the 
courts, and much of the confusion in the cases can be attributed to the 
failure of courts to properly define the two concepts.339 
[Clonditional zoning properly understood involves only an 
adopted zoning ordinance which provides either: (1) The 
rezoning becomes effective immediately with an 
automatic repealer if specified conditions are not met 
within a set time limit, or (2) the zoning becomes effective 
only upon the conditions being met within the time 
See id. at *lo. The court noted that "some courts had found contract zoning 
unenforceable per se, while other[s] have enforced contract zoning if reasonable, non- 
discriminatory and serving the public welfare." Id. at *8. Other courts have recognized a 
slight difference between contract zoning and conditional zoning, prohibiting the former 
and permitting the latter. Id. at *8-9 (citing 6 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 5 871.4 (1988); 
State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 174 N.W.2d 533 (Wis. 1970); Church v. Town of Islip, 
168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1960); 2 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 3d 8 
9.20 (3d ed. 1986)); see also Haas v. City of Mobile, 265 So. 2d 564 (Ala. 1972). In Haas, 
an ordinance rezoning an area provided that 
no lot or parcel of land hereinabove described shall be used for any use 
allowed in [the rezoned district] until all the conditions set forth below 
have been complied with: subject to a reservation of the right of way 
for [a parkway] and a second means of ingress and egress to the 
proposed [parkway] be provided. 
Hans, 265 So. 2d at 566. A challenge to the rezoning was made on the basis that such a 
collateral agreement or deed to be executed between the city and he property owner 
constituted contract zoning. Id. The challenge was rejected because, as the court pointed 
out, zoning based upon an offer or agreement would be invalid, but it "is well-established 
that a zoning ordinance may place upon a property owner reasonable restrictions and 
requirements in the use of the zoned property and this court has expressly approved such 
restrictions and requirements." Id. 
339 See City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 263 S.W.2d 528, 530-31 (Tenn. 1953) 
(treating a unilateral promise by a developer without a reciprocal promise by the city as if it 
were a clear unequivocal bilateral contract controlling the discretion of the local 
government, making rezoning invalid per se). 
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The early attitude of the courts was to ignore this distinction and 
declare both contract and conditional zoning to be invalid per se.341 The 
reasons conditional rezoning did not fare well are myriad, including that 
despite the apparent unilateral structure, conditional rezoning introduced 
an element of contract-the imposition of conditions on the land subject to 
rezoning being a quid pro quo for rezoning, although no express contract 
with the zoning authorities could be proven, given the close connection 
between the recording of restrictions at or soon after the rezoning. 
Conditional rezoning was also struck down because it constituted an abrupt 
departure from the comprehensive plan contemplated in zoning.342 
Other faults assigned by courts in their disapproval of 
conditional rezoning are that the zoning authority might 
use the zoning power to further private interests in 
violation of public policy, that the zoning authority might 
improperly try to control the use of the land . . . and that it 
furnishe[d] an avenue for corruption of 
Others viewed the rezoning of a particular parcel of land, upon conditions 
not imposed by the zoning ordinance, as prima facie evidence of "spot 
zoning"344 where it singles out one parcel for non-uniform and non- 
comprehensive treatment in its most maleficent aspect, as not in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan and as beyond the power of the 
municipality.345 This view is premised on the notion that legislative bodies 
State ex rel. Zupancic, 174 N.W.2d at 538. 
341 See Cederberg v. City of Rockford, 291 N.E.2d 249, 251-52 (Ill. Ct. App. 1972); 
Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 250 N.E.2d 791, 795-96 (111. Ct. App. 1969). But see Goffinet 
v. County of Christian, 333 N.E. 2d 731, 736 (111. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that conditional 
zoning may be upheld in some instances). In GofSinet, the proposed use was a plant to 
manufacture synthetic natural gas that would serve an area where a fuel shortage existed. 
Id. at 732. Such use would fill a genuine public need and would unquestionably serve the 
public health, safety, and welfare. Id. at 736. 
"' Treadway v. City of Rockford, 192 N.E.2d 351,356 (Ill. 1963). 
343 Gofinet, 333 N.E.2d at 736. 
" See supra note 114 for a discussion of spot zoning. 
345 Ziegler, supra note 45, 041.4; see also Blades v. City of Raleigh, 187 S.E.2d 35, 
45 (N.C. 1972); Allred v. City of Raleigh, 178 S.E.2d 432,44041 (N.C. 1971); Appeal of 
Cleaver, 24 Pa. D & C 2d 483, 492 (1961) (holding that rezoning upon limitations on the 
use of the rezoned land is invalid because it resulted in the devotion of a comparatively 
small area to a use inconsistent with the uses to which surrounding property was used and 
was made for the sole benefit of the private interests of the landowner); Oury v. Greany, 
267 A.2d 700,702 (R.I. 1970) (finding invalid rezoning upon the condition that the rezoned 
(continued) 
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must rezone in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and Euclidean 
zoning requires that in amending the ordinance to confer upon a particular 
parcel a district designation, it may not curtail or limit the uses and 
structures placed or to be placed upon the rezoned lands differently from 
those permitted upon other lands in the same district. Consequently, 
"where there has been a concatinated [sic] rezoning and filing of a 
declaration of restrictions, the early view . . . was that both the zoning 
amendment and the restrictive covenant were invalid. ,7346 
The early Maryland court decisions showed a disfavor of conditional 
zoning, equal to that with contract zoning, although not clearly 
property be used exclusively for a particular business use because it was not consistent with 
the comprehensive plan, but instead was an accommodation to the landowner, made 
without regard for the public health, safety, and welfare). 
346 State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 174 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Wis. 1970) (citing 3 
RATHKOPF, supra note 345, at 74-9); see also Templeton v. County Council of Prince 
George's County, 321 A.2d 778 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974). The court addressed the 
contention that "conditional zoning might have been utilized in this case . . . in the sense 
that the District Council might have considered a grant of the requested reclassification, 
subject to a reversion to residential use on the discontinuation of the roofing business by the 
appellant." Id. at 783. The court held that even if it were, it was quite apparent that the 
appellant "proceeded upon a distorted construction of conditional zoning generally and as 
contained in Chapter 471, Laws of 1968." Id. 
The latter provides that the District Council for Prince George's County 
in approving any local map amendment, may give consideration to and 
"adopt such reasonable requirements, safeguards and conditions, as 
may in its opinion be necessary either to protect surrounding properties 
. . . or which would further enhance the coordinated harmonious and 
systematic development of the Regional District." 
Id. 
The novel suggestion that a zoning reclassification to commercial might 
be made by the District Council subject to a reversion to residential 
obviously is not supported by this statutory authority for conditional 
zoning, nor by general law. Conditional zoning is a device employed to 
bring some flexibility to an otherwise rigid system of control. The 
conditions generally imposed are those designed to protect adjacent 
land from the loss of use value which might occur if the newly 
authorized use were permitted without restraint of any kind. Reversion 
of the reclassification to residential use when, and if, appellant should 
discontinue her roofing business is patently no such restraint. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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distinguishing the two. In Rodriguez v. Prince George's ~ o u n t ~ , 3 ~ '  the 
court pointed out that the "early view of most courts was that conditional 
(or, as it is sometimes called, 'contract') zoning was unlawful per se."348 
The three reasons for this are 
that rezoning based on offers or agreements with the 
owners disrupts the basic plan, and thus is subversive of 
public policy reflected in the overall legislation, that the 
resulting 'bcontract" is nugatory because a municipality is 
not able to make agreements which inhibit its police 
powers, and that restrictions in a particular zone should 
not be left to extrinsic evidence.349 
Recently, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in Mayor of Rockville v. 
Rylyns ~ n t e r ~ r i s e s ; ~ ~  struck down a zoning ordinance passed in 
connection with an annexation agreement as an instance of impermissible 
conditional zoning.351 While the court held that not all conditional zoning 
"' 558 A.2d 742 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989). 
Id. at 749. 
349 Id. at 749 (quoting Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 148 A.2d 429, 433 (Md. 1959)). 
"[Clovenants coupled with the site plan attached, if adopted as a basis for the requested 
reclassification, [would produce] a form of conditional zoning." Id. at 750 (quoting 
Montgomery County v. Nat'l Capital Realty Corp., 297 A.2d 675, 680 (Md. 1972)). So 
too, an amendment to the basic plan, where the applicant "was offering a deal to the District 
Council: in order to induce the Council to approve its application for reclassification, the 
applicant [agreeing] in advance to exclude from the scope of the approval certain uses 
expressly permitted in the approved zone," is a form of conditional zoning and invalid. Id.; 
see also ,Montgomery County, 297A.2d at 680 (finding invalid rezoning conditioned upon a 
landowner's offer to subject land to restrictions on use, as impermissible conditional 
zoning); Carole Highlands Citizens Ass'n v. Bd. of County Comrn'rs., 158 A.2d 663, 665- 
66 (Md. 1960) (finding invalid rezoning of land from single family residential purposes to 
commercial, subject to an agreement by the landowner limiting the use of the land, whether 
or not a binding contract was involved, where the rezoning created a novel classification 
not authorized by the general plan). 
350 814 A.2d 469 (Md. 2002). 
351 Id. at 503. There, the owners of certain property located in the county, abutting 
the city, petitioned the city for annexation of the property into the city. Id. at 473. At the 
time of the petition, the property was zoned 1-2 (Heavy Industrial), and this was the zone 
recommended and adopted in the county's master plan. Id. The petition requested a 
rezoning to 1-1 (Service Industrial), "consistent with the zoning in adjacent properties 
located within the City's boundaries." Id. On the property, the owners intended to erect 
and operate a gasoline service station. Id. However, the "1-2 zone did not allow gasoline 
service stations under any circumstances." Id. Following the public hearing before the 
(continued) 
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was invalid,JS2 zoning that conditions the rezoning on the landowner's 
agreement not to use the land in ways otherwise permitted by the existing 
zoning is impermissible because the language of the enabling legislation 
was intended to allow local governments "to fashion supplementary 
conditions in the placement of a given property in a Euclidean zone, not in 
derogation of the uses allowed in that zone."353 This meant that only 
conditions relating to the design of buildings, construction, landscaping, or 
other improvements, and alterations, but not those relating to otherwise 
permissible uses, may be subject to conditions in zoning.354 Otherwise, 
such conditions on uses would violate the requirement of uniformity within 
classes or development in a The court explained that the reason 
such a narrow reading of the statute was called for related to the Euclidean 
zoning concept.356 Conditional zoning, resulting in a limitation of 
otherwise permissible uses, would violate the mandated uniformity 
req~irernent.~" The foreclosing, by limitations pertaining only to the 
subject property, of all of the otherwise permitted commercial uses, other 
than the one expressly permitted in the rezoning ordinance (in this case, 
county planning board and consideration by the city council, the city council adopted a 
resolution disapproving the request for rezoning, citing concerns about the appropriateness 
of the use. Id. at 474. Several months later, the city council was asked to reexamine the 
rezoning request. Id. The city council concluded that it would support the rezoning from I- 
2 to 1-1, "provided the city restrict the retail use of the site." Id. The city council resolved 
to rezone the property on the condition that the "city prohibits the retail use of the site, 
except for a gasoline service station." Id. At the time, the "1-1 zone allow[ed] 
approximately 100 permitted uses and 18 additional uses with the grant of a special 
exception." Id. at 474 n.1. Commercial retail uses, including antique shops, garden 
supplies, paint and wallpaper, photographic supply, and pet grooming activities were 
included in these enumerations. Id. Rylyns challenged the annexation and rezoning on the 
grounds that it constituted improper conditional and spot zoning. Id. at 475. Rylyns also 
challenged the rezoning on the ground that the annexation statute prohibits an annexing 
authority for five years from rezoning annexed property to uses different from that applying 
in the pre-annexation jurisdiction without the express approval of the county planning 
authorities of the pre-annexation jurisdiction. Id. The court agreed with Rylyns, finding 
that such a construction of the annexation was necessary to preserve the integrity of the 
master plan adopted by the jurisdiction having planning authority immediately prior to 
annexation. Id. at 492. 
352 Id. at 500. 
353 Id. at 501. 
3" Id. at 502 (citing Bd. of County Comm'rs v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 501 A.2d 489, 
492 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)). 
355 Id. 
356 Id. at 503 n.29. 
' Id. at 502. 
Heinonline - -  33 Cap. U. L. Rev. 449  2 0 0 4 - 2 0 0 5  
450 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [33:383 
operating a gasoline service station) allowed by special exception in the 1-1 
zone, amounted to impermissible conditional zoning.358 The result of the 
agreement to limit permissible uses was "a distinct mini-district that 
undermined uniformity. 9,359 
In a highly critical dissent, one justice argued that the majority misread 
the statute authorizing conditional zoning when it found that the only 
conditional zoning authorized b the statute were those that did not relate 
3 2  to uses of the subject property. The dissent stated that it was difficult to 
perceive how limiting a use, so long as the uses to which the property is 
limited are uses otherwise permitted in the district, affects the uniformity 
of a d i s t r i ~ t . ~ ~ '  Indeed, all the prior cases on conditional zoning involved 
instances in which the conditions related to use limitations.362 Those cases 
prompted the legislature to adopt enabling legislation allowing for 
conditional zoning.363 In addition, the legislative history contained clear 
indication that it was intended to provide municipalities with flexibility in 
achieving desirable means of minimizing the adverse effects of zoning 
change, while at the same time avoiding the constitutional pitfalls of 
contract zoning, permitting orderly development using controls similar to 
those in subdivision regulations.364 
The dissent's points are well-taken. The majority placed undue 
importance on uniformity for uniformity's sake. Considering the theory of 
Euclidean zoning is to protect landowners from the externalities of 
neighboring land uses, uniformity should refer to the outer limits of uses 
while not requiring all uses that are permitted. One could argue that such 
limitations serve this purpose where uses are limited within a zone by 
conditional rezoning. 
Some courts have considered arguments that conditional zoning was 
ultra vires as no such authority could be found under the state zoning 
3'8 Id. at 503. 
3'9 Id. at 504 (quoting Carole Highlands Citizens Ass'n, Inc. v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 158 A.2d 663, 664-66 (Md. 1960)). The court also found impermissible contract 
zoning when, as part of the annexation agreement, the municipality agreed to rezone in a 
certain way. Id. at 505. The court cautioned, though, that its holding should not preclude 
annexation agreements normally involving certain executory accords, for which the parties 
have bargained, governing the anticipated annexation, including the zoning to be assigned, 
so long as the agreements relative to the anticipatory zoning action do not violate other 
legal requirements, such as the prohibition on conditional zoning. Id. at 507 n.34. 
360 Id. at 5 1 1  (Cathell, J., dissenting). 
36L Id. 
362 Id. 
363 Id. 
364 Id. at 520-21. 
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enabling Other courts have rejected the ultra vires argument, 
finding implied authority to rezone with conditions on the basis that the 
procedure was within the spirit of the enabling because silence of an 
enabling act on the question of conditional zoning does not necessarily 
imply a legislative decision to prohibit it.367 
The modem trend is in favor of upholding conditional zoning.368 
Generally, such conditions will be upheld when they are imposed pursuant 
to the police power for the protection or benefit of neighbors to ameliorate 
the effects of the zoning change. Yet, the confusion in the cases continues. 
Many cases presenting the issue of conditional zoning have been 
characterized by their challengers as involving contract zoning and struck 
down on that basis.369 Other courts make an effort to distinguish the two, 
365 See, e.g., Hartman v. Buckson, 467 A.2d 694 (Del. Ch. 1983) (holding that the 
city bargained away part of its zoning power by enacting a new ordinance to benefit a 
private citizen even though in furtherance of a compromise to avoid threat of suit); 
Cederberg v. City of Rockford, 291 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (confusing the 
bargaining away argument with the ultra vires argument, concluding that since the bargain 
was primarily for private benefit, it was not an act on behalf of the general welfare and 
therefore ultra vires). 
366 See, e.g., Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1960) (rejecting the 
ultra vires argument, finding implied authority to rezone with conditions as within the spirit 
of the enabling act). 
367 See, e.g., Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1969); Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 183 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Mass. 1962); 
Palisades Props., Inc. v. Brunetti, 207 A.2d 522 (N.J. 1965); Collard v. Inc. Village of 
Flower Hill, 421 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1981). 
368 See Old Canton Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. Mayor of Jackson, 749 So. 2d 54, 
59-60 (Miss. 1999) (stating that "contingency zoning [is] an effective tool for the 
development of the . . . property in a manner which satisfied the concerns of the residents 
living closest to the property"); Chrismon v. Guilford County, 370 S.E.2d 579, 596 (N.C. 
1988) (approving the practice as long as the local zoning authority acted reasonably and in 
the public interest); Konkel v. Common Council, 229 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Wis. 1975) 
(upholding a rezoning ordinance designed to take effect upon the fulfillment of certain 
conditions and for the reversion of the prior zoning status if the conditions were not 
satisfied). 
369 See, e.g., Baker v. Chartiers Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 677 A.2d 1274, 1279 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (holding contract zoning "is a form of unlawful spot zoning where 
rezoning is permitted based on regulations and conditions devised by agreement between 
the municipality and the landowner"); Knight v. Lynn Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 568 
A.2d 1372, 1376 (Pa. Cornmw. Ct. 1990) (same); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 148 A.2d 
429, 431, 433 (Md. 1959) (holding rezoning invalid as inhibiting the municipality's 
exercise of police power where the rezoning was made conditional upon the execution of an 
agreement between landowner and city, set out in the ordinance in the form for recording as 
(continued) 
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upholding rezonings involving only the imposition of  condition^.^'^ 
Decisions from Connecticut courts have responded by reference to 
a covenant running with the land, providing that in consideration for rezoning, the owner 
would use property only as funeral home, provide adequate facilities for ingress and egress, 
and off-street parking, and not object to or oppose the reversion of the property to the 
former zoning if its use as funeral home ceased); Rodriguez v. Prince George's County, 558 
A.2d 742, 750 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (finding zoning invalid, citing disruptions of 
uniformity and the weakening of police powers when a developer agreed not to use the 
property in certain ways that would otherwise have been permitted in the zone, and finding 
no practical difference between the proposed agreement to omit certain uses in exchange 
for approval and any other conditional zoning). In King's Mill Homeowners Ass'n v. City 
of Westminster, 557 P.2d 1186 (Colo. 1976), the court responded to a challenge of contract 
zoning, largely with a discussion of conditional zoning, finding no contract zoning in the 
case. Id. at 1191. The court held that rezoning contingent upon the landowner's fulfillment 
of certain conditions does not amount to contract zoning. Id. Cram v. Town of Geneva, 
593 N.Y.S.2d 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), is an example of a case confusing contract 
zoning with conditional zoning, although upholding the rezoning. There, the town enacted 
an ordinance to rezone a certain property from residential to business. Id. at 652. In 
enacting the ordinance, the town board imposed certain conditions limiting the use of the 
property. Id. The residents argued that the ordinance was invalid contract zoning and that 
the town failed to take a hard look at the environmental impact of the proposed change as 
required by the state environmental law. Id. at 653. The trial court dismissed the action, 
and the residents appealed. Id. at 652. The court held that, "[iln appropriate circumstances, 
a change in zoning may be subject to reasonable conditions and restrictions related to and 
incidental to the use of the property and designed to minimize any adverse impact in the 
surrounding area." Id. at 652 (citing St. Onge v. Donovan, 522 N.E.2d 1019, 1022-23 
(N.Y. 1988); Dexter v. Town Bd. of Gates, 324 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1975)). The conditions 
and restrictions imposed by the ordinance "were related to the use of the property, were 
reasonably calculated to minimize any adverse impact on the surrounding residential area 
and provide no basis to annul the determination of the Town Board." Id. Accordingly, the 
court rejected petitioners' contentions that the enactment of the ordinance was unlawful 
contract zoning and was contrary to the town law. Id. 
370 See, e.g., Kerik v. Davidson County, 551 S.E.2d 186 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) 
(finding that only unilateral promises made by the landowner and none made by the zoning 
authority meant conditional zoning, not contract zoning); Cross v. Hall County, 235 S.E.2d 
379 (Ga. 1977). The Cross court distinguished conditional zoning from contract zoning. 
Id. at 382. Here, rezoning conditioned on road improvements was conditional zoning rather 
than contract zoning. Id. at 383. At the hearing before the commissioners on the rezoning 
application, several neighboring landowners who opposed the rezoning mentioned that the 
road leading to the quarry needed paving. Id. The president of the zoning applicant offered 
to resurface the road. Id. The rezoning application was approved provided that the zoning 
applicant would agree to resurface the road. Id. The paving condition was an attempt by 
the board to ameliorate the effects of the zoning change. Id. at 383. 
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contract zoning only when conditions are involved. Such courts have 
characterized zoning plans imposing conditions as illegal contract zoning 
and otherwise found zoning ordinances made with conditions on the 
landowner to be invalid. In Bartsch v. Planning & Zoning Commission of 
  rum bull^^' an attempt by the planning and zoning commission to attach 
conditions running with the land that restrict the use of a particular parcel 
to a medical office building was held to be an attempt at contract zoning 
violating the uniformity provision of the statute because the restriction did 
not apply to other properties within the zoning 
Relying on Bartsch, in Kaufman v. City of Danbury Zoning 
~ o r n m i s s i o n , ~ ~ ~  the court addressed both contract zoning and conditional 
zoning, holding that Connecticut did not recognize either.374 There, the 
landowner applied for authority to build affordable housing and in that 
connection, requested a rezoning change to permit more than one lot per 
acre in the area.375 The application was denied.376 Among other 
objections, the city claimed that the landowner's application did not 
contain a system to guarantee that the affordable housing would in fact be 
developed and remain restricted for that purpose, and that it was without 
power to devise a system of guarantee on its own initiative because 
Connecticut law did not recognize conditional or contract zoning.377 The 
court recognized the general prohibition against such zoning on the basis 
that it operates to destroy the uniformity requirement for each district- 
resulting in improper discrimination among owners.378 However, the court 
also recognized an important exception to the general prohibitions where 
the specific conditions on a rezoning imposed are reasonable and are for 
the general community benefit, rather than for the benefit of a single 
landowner.379 The court found that "[tlhe conditions that would be 
appropriate to supply assurance that the development proposed would in 
fact be constructed with the statutory housing com onent could easily 
fulfill both prongs of the test if designed properly.'"g Thus, despite the 
371 506 A.2d 1093 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986). 
372 Id. at 1096. 
373 NO. CV9 0507929 S, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2039 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 
1993). 
374 Id. at *13. 
375 Id. at * l .  
376 Id. 
377 Id. at *3. 
378 Id. at *13-14. 
379 Id. at *14-15. 
380 Id. at *15. As to reasonableness, the court noted the Connecticut statute on 
inclusionary zoning, which authorizes municipalities to adopt zoning regulations to 
encourage the development of affordable housing and to impose conditions toward this end, 
(continued) 
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statement by the court that Connecticut did not recognize conditional 
zoning, the holding in this case seems to establish the opposite proposition. 
Indeed, the bases for the exception seem to be the only circumstances in 
which conditional zoning should be upheld. 
However, the Florida Supreme Court in Hartnett v. h us tin^^' took a 
more categorical attitude on agreements made in connection with a 
rezoning by treating a rezoning on conditions as an instance of contract 
zoning.382 There, the municipality agreed to rezone l k d  to permit the 
development of a shopping center upon certain conditions. In finding the 
ordinance invalid, the court ruled that the city had no authority to enter into 
a private contract with the landowner.383 
An Illinois court, in Cederberg v. City of ~ o c ~ o r d , ~ ' ~  followed the 
reasoning in the Florida case.385 In that case, the court held invalid the 
rezoning of certain lots from residential to local business coincidentally 
conditioned upon the execution of a restrictive covenant providing that the 
property only be used for offices, finding such agreement to be a form of 
contract zoning, making the agreement void.386 The effect of the ordinance 
"was to create a classification not set forth in the general zoning 
ordinances."387 Similarly, in Andres v. Village of   loss moor,^^^ the court 
struck down an ordinance rezoning land upon the landowner's fulfillment 
of certain conditions, finding the ordinance to have resulted from a deal, 
id., as well as authority under other statutes permitting density bonuses for the creation of 
affordable housing and the creation of a Community Development Agency, and also 
providing authority for imposing conditions to assure the objectives were met, id. at *22. 
On the second prong, the court found that such a condition would not only promote benefit 
in the community, but the region, indeed, the entire state. Id. 
38' 93 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1956). 
382 Id. at 89. 
383 Id. at 87-88. 
384 291 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). 
385 See id. at 250,252. 
386 Id. at 251-52. 
387 Id. at 252. 
388 304 N.E.2d 700 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). In Andres, the city enacted an ordinance 
rezoning land based on special ad hoc restrictions and limitations that were not imposed on 
other land in the same district. Id. at 701-03. The restrictions included limitations on the 
use of a single story attached two-family dwelling, whereas multiple family dwellings were 
generally permitted. Id. The restrictions also required construction according to the 
building designs and representations made in their owner-developer's promotional 
brochure, fencing, screening and general landscaping subject to future approval by the 
village, payment of $18,000 to the village for general village purposes. Id. The restrictions 
further provided that any violation of the conditions would result in automatic revocation of 
the zoning granted. Id. 
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which introduced an element of contract.389 Andres relied on a previous 
decision from the Illinois Supreme Court, Treadway v. City of ~ o c k f o r d , ~ ~ ~  
for the reasons why, "absent general statutory authorization and standards, 
the making of individualized zoning deals by local municipalities, apart 
from the provisions they are willing to ado t as general zoning regulations, 
$1 is an invalid abuse of the zoning power." That is, even when a zoning 
ordinance is reasonable and not arbitrary and bears a reasonable 
relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare, it is yet invalid if 
subject to bargaining or contract.392 In Andres, the court explained that 
[i]n accepting . . . donations and entering into or approving 
these agreements the trustees of the Village undoubtedly 
did what they believed was best for the whole community, 
but it places them in the questionable position of bartering 
their legislative discretion for emoluments that had no 
bearing on the merits of the requested amendment.393 
The Andres court also expressed the concerns articulated in a Florida 
Supreme Court decision, Hartnett v.  ust tin,^^^ that 
[i]f each parcel of property were zoned on the basis of 
variables that could enter into private contracts then the 
whole scheme and objective of community planning and 
zoning would collapse. The zoning classifications of each 
parcel would then be bottomed on individual agreements 
and private arrangements that would totally destroy 
uniformity.395 
If the city could legislate by contract, "each citizen would be governed by 
an individual rule based upon the best deal he could make with the 
389 Id. at 703; see also Shibata v. City of Napewille, 273 N.E.2d 690, 693 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1971) (invalidating as contract zoning an ordinance made on the condition that the 
landowner execute and file a declaration of restrictions as to the use of the property). 
3" 192 N.E.2d 351 (Ill. 1963). 
39' Andres, 304 N.E.2d at 703 (citing Allred v. City of Raleigh, 178 S.E.2d 432,440- 
41 (N.C. 1971); Oury v. Greany, 267 A.2d 700, 702 (R.I. 1970); Baylis v. City of 
Baltimore, 148 A.2d 429, 433 (Md. 1959); City of Knoxville v. Arnbrister, 263 S.W.2d 
528,531 (Tenn. 1953); Lewis v. City of Jackson, 184 So. 2d 384,388 (Miss. 1966)). 
392 Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 250 N.E.2d 791,795-96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969). 
393 Andres, 304 N.E.2d at 703 (quoting Hedrich, 250 N.E.2d at 796). 
3" 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956). 
395 Andres, 304 N.E.2d at 704 (quoting Hartnett, 93 So. 2d at 89). 
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governing body. ,9396 Further, Andres relied on Baylis v. City of 
~a l t i rnore ,~~ '  which held that special conditions imposed on rezoning 
amendments are invalid for the chief reasons that 
rezoning based on offers or agreements with owners 
disrupts the basic plan, and thus is subversive of the public 
policy reflected in the overall legislation, that the resulting 
"contract" is nugatory because a municipality is not able to 
make agreements which inhibit its police powers, and that 
restrictions in a articular zone should not be left to 
R s  extrinsic evidence. 
In Andres, the court ruled that the rezoning ordinance, which conditioned 
its effectiveness on subsequent execution by the village and the owner of a 
contract containing all the ad hoc limitations and requirements of the 
ordinance, also exhibited an inherent defect that invalidated the 
ordinance.399 In sum, the ordinance was "the very model of invalid 
conditional zoning, falling squarely within the general policy 
considerations that strongly support the Treadway rule invalidating such ad 
hoc conditional rezoning amendments. ,m 
The zoning ordinances in the Florida and Illinois cases, if the 
definition of contract zoning was faithfully applied, would not be struck 
down on that basis since they did not involve bilateral agreements. This 
may point out that the attempted distinction between contract zoning and 
conditional zoning based on the existence of a bilateral as opposed to a 
unilateral agreement may be too simplistic and yield unpredictable results 
from the courts. Instead, courts would do well to eliminate the false 
distinction and consider the substantive effects of the municipality's 
396 Id. 
397 148 A.2d 429 (Md. 1959). 
398 Andres, 304 N.E.2d at 704 (quoting Baylis, 148 A.2d at 433). 
399 Id. at 706. The court agreed with the trial court that the restrictive covenant was 
an invalid attempt by the city to control the use of the land. Id. at 705. The ad hoc 
restrictions were not and could not purport to be based on any conceivable lawful zoning 
powers of the village in enacting requirements for all similarly zoned property. Id. The 
requirement that landscaping be subject to "future approval by the village authorities, 
without any standard as to what that approval must be based on [was] an unlawfully vague 
provision. To require the payment of a lump sum of money without any basis set forth or 
discernable for aniving at that sum [was] unlawful." Id. (citations omitted). The reverter 
provision was "a patently unlawful use of the zoning power which ordain[ed] a change in 
zoning without any of the procedural steps or substantive considerations necessary thereto." 
Id. at 705-06 (citing Lewis v. City of Jackson, 184 So. 2d 384,388 (Miss. 1966)). 
400 Id. at 706. 
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wielding of its police power. In Andres, the holding is questionable on 
public policy grounds since the court found the ordinance by all indications 
was reasonable, not arbitrary, and it bore a rational relationship to the 
public interest, health, and b elf are.^' Therefore, it should have been 
upheld, as the zoning enabling acts require nothing more. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in People's Counsel for Baltimore 
County v. Beachwood Ltd. ~ a r t n e r s h i ~ , ~ ~  distinguished contract from 
conditional zoningYN3 though declaring the rezoning invalid on other 
grounds.404 There, the board of appeals voted to grant the developer's 
petition to reclassify the property, but with the condition that it finance an 
off-site improvement.405 Opposed to the condition, the developer argued 
that the reclassification was the result of contract zoning and that the office 
of planning and zoning sought to use the comprehensive zoning as a means 
to pressure it into financing an off-site traffic impr~vement.~"~ Though the 
court failed to find evidentiary support for this allegation, it did discuss the 
concept of contract zoning.N7 The court pointed out that 
one reason the allusions to contract zoning in the case had 
such a phantom-like quality is that neither the case law, 
here or abroad, nor the academic commentary seems to 
have a firm grip on exactly what was meant by the term 
"contract zoning" or by its doctrinal doppelganger, 
"conditional zoning." In the broadest of senses, both 
involve some sort of understanding between the 
governmental unit and the developer, whereby the doing 
of certain acts by the developer will result in favorable 
rezoning treatment by the governmental unit. Beyond 
that, the definitions begin to 
While "[s]ome academic authorities treat contract zoning as the more 
generic phenomenon," with conditional zoning as a special instance 
40' Id. at 703. 
670 A.2d 484 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995). 
'03 Id. at 504-05. 
Id. at 502. The court held the evidence insufficient to justify a rezoning on the 
ground of mistake in the original zoning, and the finding of 'change in circumstances was 
not clear and detailed as required by the zoning act. Id. 
'05 Id. at 489,503. 
Id. at 503. 
407 Id. at 504-08. 
'08 Id. at 504 (emphasis omitted). 
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thereof,409 others do just the Yet, others treat the two as 
closely-related but distinct phenomena, with "contract zoning" being 
illegal and conditional zoning slowly emerging into general a~ceptance.~" 
The court explained that Maryland cases had treated "'contract zoning' 
narrowly as a situation wherein the developer . . . enters into an express 
and legally binding contract with the ultimate zoning authority."412 Part of 
the reason for the illegality is that "the governmental unit may not bargain 
away its future use of the police power."413 The court distinguished those 
cases in which a developer makes agreements with a governmental unit 
that lacks ultimate decision-making authority on the rezoning.414 Thus, 
when the city council was not bound by the recommendations of the 
planning commission in which the commission sought to impose 
conditions that it was not authorized to exact and that were therefore 
invalid, and in which the council did not undertake or attempt to 
incorporate the invalid conditions in its rezoning ordinance and did not 
even refer to them, no issue of contract zoning arose.41s In Peoples 
Counsel for Baltimore County, there was no evidence of any agreement 
with the developer or that any changes to the comprehensive zoning was in 
'09 Id. (citing DONALD G. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT 
CONTROL AW 5 94 (1975)). 
4'0 Id. (citing 2 ANDERSON, supra note 338, $8 9.20-9.21 (3d ed. 1986)). 
4" Id. (citing ARDEN H .  RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND 
PLANNING s29A.03 (1975)). 
4'2 Id. at 505. The court went on to discuss Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 148 A.2d 429 
(Md. 1959), a case in which the city granted a rezoning conditioned on a binding agreement 
by the property owner to use the benefit of the reclassification only for the purpose of 
building a funeral home. Peoples Counsel for Baltimore County, 670 A.2d at 505; Baylis, 
148 A.2d at 431. The Baylis court held that the ordinance was invalid because the final 
form of the ordinance made the reclassification conditional upon the execution of an 
agreement, set out in the ordinance, between the owners and the city, and the recording of 
such agreement upon the property owners, their successors, heirs, and assigns. Baylis, 148 
A.2d at 431. But see Pressman v. City of Baltimore, 160 A.2d 379 (Md. 1960), where, in 
contrast to Baylis, the owner entered into a formal and undisputed agreement with the city 
planning commission, which recommended that the rezoning be approved. Id. at 384-85. 
The court there declined to hold that the agreement constituted illegal contract zoning, 
restricting the application of the ban on contract zoning to those instances where the 
legislative body itself, as opposed to some other governmental agency, is party to the illegal 
contract. Id. at 386. 
4'3 People's Counsel for Baltimore County, 670 A.2d at 505. 
4'4 Id. at 506. 
415 Id. 
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any way related to past or future commitments by the 
In recent decisions, despite the blurring of lines, courts have approved 
conditional zoning where they find that under such zoning, without legally 
committing itself to rezone, the municipality bargains for a landowner's 
promise to take remedial action to minimize the adverse effects of the 
proposed development or limit the proposed use in some way as a 
condition of approval so as to protect adjoining landowners, and it is in the 
public interest.417 Most courts rely on the public interest benefits as 
reasons for upholding conditional zoning agreements.418 Additionally, it 
4'6 Id.; see also AttmanIGlazer P.B. Co. v. Mayor of Annapolis, 552 A.2d 1277, 
1283 (Md. 1989). In Athan/Glazer, the court held that the policy prohibiting a 
municipality from contracting away its zoning power applies to special exceptions, 
variances, and conditional uses, meaning that the zoning authority must exercise 
independent judgment in deciding requests. Id. at 1283. The court noted that 
[clonditional zoning, once roundly condemned, appears to be in the 
ascendancy [and] [iln Maryland, the concept has evolved indirectly 
through the use of various zoning devices such as planned 
developments, and has found [some] favor with the state legislature, [in 
Article 66B, 4.01(b), which] perrnit[s] a county or municipal 
corporation to impose certain conditions at the time of zoning or 
rezoning land, under certain circumstances. 
Id. at 1283 n.8. 
417 See Ryan, supra note 27, at 356. 
418 See, e.g., Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1969). The court held that the county had the power to impose conditions even though the 
statute was silent and that the "power to impose conditions on rezoning further[ed] the well- 
being of landowners generally, promot[ed] community development and served the general 
welfare." Id. at 877. The court further stated that similar to other changes in land use, 
though a landowner may be benefited by the rezoning of an individual parcel, the rezoning 
may also "generate augmented demands for public services or create deleterious effects in 
the neighborhood." Id. Moreover, "[rleasonably conceived conditions harmonize the 
landowner's need with the public's interest." Id. The court, therefore, rejected the contract 
zoning charge. Id. at 878; see also J-Marion Co., Inc. v. County of Sacramento, 142 Cal. 
Rptr. 723 (1977). In J-Marion Co., Inc., the court upheld rezoning upon conditions, finding 
the practice of imposing conditions justified as an appropriate exercise of local police 
power. Id. at 725. The court pointed out the adherence to the "[s]o-called 'Euclidean' 
zoning divides the community into homogenous land use zones." Id. Homogenous land 
use zones prevent the imposition of conditions on particular uses of property, but 
"[i]ndividual parcels may often be allowed [as] a justified escape from this rigid grouping 
without detriment to zoning objectives." Id. at 725. The court pointed out that "California 
(continued) 
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seems logical to conclude that imposition of conditions results from the 
consideration of public interest concerns. To the extent that it involves 
promises from the landowner without a reciprocal promise by the 
municipality, conditional zoning enables the municipality to retain and 
satisfy its police power responsibility to see that the zoning change is 
consistent with the public health, safety, and welfare, and amounts to the 
exercise of the built-in flexibility in the zoning enabling acts. "The virtue 
of allowing private agreements to underlie zoning is the flexibility and 
control of the development given to a municipality to meet the ever- 
increasing demands for rezoning in a rapidly changing area. ,9419 
Later Illinois courts have taken differing positions on the legality of 
conditional zoning. In Gofinet v. County of ~ h r i s t i a n ; ~ ~  the court 
departed from the views expressed in the earlier Illinois decisions, 
including Andres v. Village of ~lossrnoor,4~' which was decided two years 
earlier and rejected per se invalidity of conditional zoning.422 The 
challenged action there was a zoning ordinance to rezone 236 acres of 
elucidations of the local police power recognize that other kinds of application for change 
in regulated land use may be granted subject to the landowner's compliance with 
reasonable conditions," and the power to impose conditions on rezoning furthers the well- 
being of landowners generally, promotes community development, and serves the general 
welfare. Id. "The same police power which supports the imposition of reasonable 
conditions upon other kinds of changes in land use sustains the power of California counties 
to engage in 'conditional rezoning."' Id. 
4'9 State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 174 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Wis. 1970); see also 
Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1960); Hudson Oil Co. v. City of Wichita, 
396 P.2d 271, 274 (Kan. 1964) (upholding an agreement granting rezoning only upon the 
landowner's agreement to dedicate a ten-foot strip along the highway for an access road, 
apparently to conform to the city's comprehensive plan for the remainder of the street 
footage); Arkenberg v. City of Topeka, 421 P.2d 213,215 (Kan. 1966) (rejecting a contract 
zoning argument and upholding a zoning ordinance adopted on a landowner's promise to 
convey a right of way to the city along one of the streets upon which the property fronted); 
Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. City of Tuscon, 533 P.2d 693, 695 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) 
(stating its agreement with other courts, including California, that have upheld conditional 
zoning, as an exercise of the police power); Glendon Civic Ass'n v. Borough of Glendon, 
572 A.2d 852, 855 (Pa. Cornmw. Ct. 1990) (stating that "from our review of the record it is 
clear that, by enacting [the ordinance], the Borough specifically designated the site for 
which the conditional use was authorized. The Borough controlled the use by imposing 
requirements in [the ordinance] and the Agreement to prevent the facility from becoming 
noxious or offensive by reason of dust, odor, smoke, gas, vibration or noise"); 3 ZIEGLER, 
supra note 45, 5 44: 18. 
420 333 N.E.2d 731 (Ill. 1975). 
42' 304 N.E.2d 700,706 (Ill. 1973). 
422 Gofmet, 333 N.E.2d at 735. 
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farmland in a rural section of the county from agricultural to heavy 
industrial in order to permit the landowner to construct a plant where 
synthetic gas would be produced.423 The ordinance was adopted pursuant 
to a plan prepared by a consulting firm.424 The challengers, owners of land 
adjoining the subject property, argued that the ordinance was invalid "for 
the reason that it contain[ed] unauthorized restrictions and hence 
constitut[ed] conditional rezoning and also because [it] constitut[ed] 'spot 
zoning. 9,425 
~ I h e  court pointed out that "there [was] a suitable and proper place for 
utilization of the process [as] some conditional rezoning may be in the 
public good, subservient to a comprehensive plan in the best interest of the 
public health, safety, and welfare and enacted in recognition of changing 
circumstances.'*26 In the court's view, "[nlot all conditional rezoning is 
onerous, destructive or an abandonment of the power of the zoning agency 
, 427  nor does it stem from improper motives. Instead, "[ulnder the proper 
circumstances conditional rezoning can be a flexible land use technique of 
considerable utility and may constitute a valuable tool in the hands of a 
423 Id. at 732. 
424 Id. 
425 Id. The disputed ordinance contained four articles. Id. The first, essentially 
found that the best interest of the county would be served by permitting the rezoning and 
variance requested. Id. at 733. The second limited the use of the premises to "only allow 
the storage of naptha, petroleum products, similar hydrocarbon products, and the processing 
of the same into pipeline quality gas suitable for distribution, utility, and industrial 
purposes." Id. The ordinance also limited the height of structures, required compliance 
with local, state, and federal air, water, noise, sewage pollution, and on handling, 
processing, and storage of the products, and provided for reversion of the previous zoning if 
the property was not used for gasification plant facilities as proposed. Id. at 733-34. 
426 Id. at 736. The court noted that "the legal status of so-called 'contract zoning' 
appear[ed] not to have been decided" in Illinois, although there was dicta in Treadway v. 
City of Rockford, 182 N.E.2d 219 (Ill. 1962) and Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 250 N.E.2d 
791 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969), both indicating disapproval of such ordinances. Gofinet, 333 
N.E.2d at 735. The court distinguished Cederberg and Andres, the former finding that the 
"City gave no consideration to the statutory standards of public health, safety, comfort, 
morals, and welfare," and the latter involving a requirement that the developer enter into a 
contract that could be recorded and constituted a covenant running with the land, both 
"quite properly" finding the ordinance invalid. Id. (emphasis omitted). The court held that 
Treadway did not "compel the conclusion that any and every conditional rezoning 
ordinance . . . will be invalid." Id. Instead, without doubt, there is a suitable and proper 
place for the utilization of the process of conditional rezoning, that it may be in the interests 
of the public health, safety, and welfare and enacted in recognition of changing 
circumstances. Id. at 736. 
427 Gofinet, 333 N.E.2d at 736. 
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zoning authority in the proper exercise of their police The court 
approved the rezoning ordinance.429 The conditions permitted the land to 
be used "to accomplish a good for the general public but yet preserve the 
integrity of the comprehensive plan. The ordinance evidence[d] a real 
concern for the public health, safety, and welfare-[indeed] that appear[ed] 
to be the rationale for the enactment.'430 Such benefits should not be 
denied because the use of the particular tract is restricted unlike other areas 
similarly zoned.43' The comprehensive plan already contemplated that 
there would eventually be industrial development in the vicinity and under 
it, the county held the power, authority, and duty to control special uses 
under the zoning classification with the use intended there?32 "The 
benefits received from the rezoning ordinance [tlhere far outweigh[ed] any 
evil that might be said to flow from conditional rezoning, per se. 9,433 In 
sum, the conditions were 
not onerous to the property owner or incompatible with the 
comprehensive plan, . . . [did] not constitute an 
abandonment of the zoning power, [were] not contractual 
in nature, or limited in their terms and they [did] not 
constitute an attempt upon the part of the zoning authority 
to control the use of the land. . . ?34 
Moreover, the court stated that the ordinance was not enacted as a result of 
negotiation of improper conduct by the zoning authority, but instead was 
enacted in good faith, and the conditions imposed had a reasonable and 
direct relationship to the purpose for which the rezoning was granted.435 
428 Id. 
429 Id. at 738. It was adopted on the basis of the detailed findings showing 
a genuine need for the product to be produced by the plant, [which] 
would unquestionably serve the public health, safety and welfare. The 
conditions imposed [took] advantage of the unique situation presented 
by the near confluence of pipelines which [made] the particular location 
highly advantageous for the gas processing plant location. 
Id. at 736. 
430 Id. 
43L Id. 
432 Id. 
433 Id. 
4" Id. at 737. 
435 Id. Nor was the rezoning ordinance invalid as spot zoning under the five tests for 
spot zoning. Id. To anive at this conclusion, the court considered the following questions: 
whether the requirements of the comprehensive plan are met by the ordinance; the 
(continued) 
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However, in Ziemer v. County of ~ e 0 r - i ~ ; ~ ~  the Illinois Appellate Court 
reintroduced a degree of uncertainty on the legality of conditional zoning. 
There, the plaintiff sought invalidation of a zoning ordinance reclassifying 
farmland to agricultural B-3 to permit the landowner to build and operate a 
dance hall-tavern on the premises.437 Plaintiff alleged the rezoning as the 
product of unlawful contract and conditional zoning.438 Upon defendant's 
petition for rezoning, the zoning board of appeals recommended approval, 
particular use for the spot; whether there are changes in conditions in the zoning district; 
where the spot is located; and whether a hardship was created by any individual. Id. The 
shift toward industry was recognized in the comprehensive plan for the county. Id. The 
comprehensive plan "emphasize[d] the shift from agricultural to industry and the 
desirability of industry for economic growth and for keeping young people in the 
community." Id. Though location of the tract on the fringe between two zones might have 
more strongly supported rezoning than a tract not on the fringe, this did not preclude the 
validity of rezoning a tract not on the fringe. Id. at 737-38. "[Un making this determination 
the condition of the entire region and anticipation of future needs [is to] be considered." Id. 
at 738 (citing Duffcon Concrete Prods. Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 64 A.2d 347 (N.J. 
1949)). There was no particular hardship on any individual. Id. The rezoning ordinance at 
issue was not out of harmony with the comprehensive planning for the good of the 
community. Id.; see also Thornber v. Village of North Barrington, 747 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2001). The Thomber court stated that "conditional zoning is not invalid per se." 
Thomber, 747 N.E.2d at 522 (citing Goffinet v. County of Christian, 357 N.E.2d 442 (Ill. 
1976)). Rather, the focus must be on the application of the traditional zoning factors laid 
out in an earlier Illinois Supreme court opinion. Id. Applying those factors to the 
ordinance, the court found the trial court's finding was not against the manifest weight of 
the evidence; the test is whether the ordinance is consistent with the comprehensive plan for 
use of property in the locality. Id. The change here impacted all property zoned residential, 
not just the site at issue. Id. at 523. Rezoning is unlawful when the change violates a 
zoning pattern that is homogenous, compact, and uniform. Id.; see also Lurie v. Village of 
Skokie, 380 N.E.2d 1120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). In Lurie, the challenged ordinance permitted 
the sale of certain municipal property to a developer for the construction of low-income 
housing for the elderly. Id. at 1122. Negotiations and discussions between the town and 
the developer occurred before the ordinance was passed after a sales contract was entered 
into, but the sale was offered to public bid, thereby rendering the contract zoning issue 
moot. Id. at 1127. The court, in upholding the ordinance, pointed out the developer's 
proposal, which was ultimately accepted, was developed over the course of those meetings. 
Id. at 1128. Though that the developer's proposal was not submitted for deliberation prior 
to the board's public meeting, the town's open meeting law was not violated because 
village officials had an opportunity to express their needed and desired requirements for the 
project. Id. 
436 338 N.E.2d 145 (111. App. Ct. 1975). 
437 Id. at 146. 
438 Id. 
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subject to certain conditions, including that defendant dedicate to the 
county land to provide access to a county highway,439 restrict the use of the 
land for a dance hall and public entertai~~ment,"~" and waive and prohibit all 
other uses in the d i s t r i ~ t . ~ '  In striking down the rezoning, the court 
discussed prior cases ruling on the validity of conditional zoning, including 
Gofinet, which had upheld conditional rezoning.442 The court noted the 
value of conditional rezoning as a flexible zoning tool.443 The court, 
however, pointed out that the Gofinet decision rested upon s ecial 
circumstances in which the proposed use would benefit the In 
this case, however, no such special circumstances were established, and the 
record was devoid of evidence showing that the public interest, health, 
safety, or welfare was considered at the time of the rezoning.445 Moreover, 
it was clear that the covenants restricting the defendant's land were related 
in time to the rezoning and contained a recital that it was executed in 
consideration of the zoning board's Therefore, the plaintiff 
made out a prima facie case that the rezoning was done in exchange for the 
landowner's restrictive covenant and was therefore invalid and the 
rezoning amendment void.447 
While it seems clear that after Ziemer, contract zoning is invalid, it is 
also the case now that conditional zoning, despite its declared benefits, will 
be upheld only in the circumstances when it appears the public interest is 
benefited or protected by the conditions. But this requirement seems to be 
a defining criterion for conditional zoning, such that the decision need not 
be viewed as significant retrenchment by the Illinois courts. 
In Benton v. ~ h a t t a n o o ~ a , ~ ~  the Tennessee Court of Appeals found 
439 Id. 
* Id. at 146-47. 
Id. at 147. 
Id. at 148. 
443 Id. 
444 Id. 
Id. 
446 Id. 
447 Id. at 149. 
"8 No. 808, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 1988). There, the 
plaintiff-appellant, Irene Benton, and the defendant were owners of property in the City of 
Chattanooga. Id. at * l .  
Each of the properties [was] adjacent to Bonny Oaks Drive and they 
[were] separated by a jointly used roadway. At the time [defendant] 
acquired its property in 1985 both tracts of land were zoned R-1 
Residential. Soon after [defendant] acquired its property it filed a 
(continued) 
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the use of conditional zoning not to be an abrogation of police power, but 
an exercise of it.449 The court pointed out that it is the use of governmental 
request with the Chattanooga Planning Commission to rezone its 
property from R-1 Residential to C-2 Commercial. 
Id. at *1-2. The Planning Commission recommended the rezoning, and thereafter the Board 
of Commissioners for the city passed an ordinance to amend the earlier ordinance to rezone 
the defendant's property from R-1 to C-2. Id. at *2. However, the rezoning was subject to 
certain conditions. Id. At trial, the chancellor held that it was not necessary to pass on the 
constitutionality of the zoning ordinance to make a proper determination of the case. Id. at 
*3. Resolving all of the other issues in the defendant's favor, he upheld the ordinance as 
being valid. Id. The plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, but the motion 
was overruled. Id. She appealed, arguing, among other things, that the alleged rezoning 
was impermissible contract zoning. Id. at *3-4. On appeal, the court determined it not 
necessary to rule on the constitutional issue of whether contract zoning is violative of the 
Constitution of Tennessee, since there was no contract zoning. Id. at *9. ''The general law, 
as the Court has noted, authorizes conditional zoning which was what was done in this 
case." Id. at *5. 
449 Id. at *7-8. The court, citing Haymon v. City of Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185, 
188 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973), stated the following: "Nothing in this opinion is to be 
construed as holding that a planning commission without a covenant cannot prescribe 
reasonable conditions for the benefit of the general public." Id. at *7. The court 
distinguished the cases on which the appellant relied, including City of Knoxville v. 
Arnbrister, 263 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. 1953) and Haymon v. City of Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 
185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973). Id. at *6-7. The Arnbrister case arose when the City of 
Knoxville sought to enforce an agreement it made with a land developer. Ambrister, 263 
S.W.2d at 528. The city rezoned single dwelling residential property so a multiple dwelling 
unit could be built. Id. at 530. In consideration for the rezoning, the property owner 
promised to dedicate part of the rezoned land to the city sometime in the future. Id. The 
dedicated property was to be used as a public park. Id. at 529. However, the property 
owner reneged on his promise to dedicate. Id. at 530. The city filed suit to enforce the 
agreement. Id. at 528. The supreme court held this was an example of contract zoning and 
could not be enforced. Id. at 53 1. In Haymon, the property owners agreed to execute a 25- 
year covenant to run with the land to maintain a 200-foot buffer zone of vacant property 
between their apartment buildings and adjoining land, which was given in exchange for 
rezoning. Haymon, 513 S.W.2d at 186. The court of appeals said this amounted to contract 
zoning, which was contrary to public policy and illegal in Tennessee. Id. at 185. It stated, 
The same rule with respect to the validity of contracts to influence 
zoning seems to prevail in numerous other jurisdictions, the consensus 
being that contracts entered into in consideration of concessions made 
favoring the applicant are frowned upon as being against public policy 
[because] zoning is an instrument of public authority to be used only for 
the common welfare of all the people. 
(continued) 
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power as a bargaining chip that earlier cases criticized as the unsavory 
aspect of contract zoning.450 "When a government negotiates in this 
manner it agrees to limit its right and duty to act on behalf of the public.'"" 
"Rezoning is approved, not based upon the merits of the zone change 
request nor because it is in the public interest, but because a deal has been 
On the other hand, the court stated that 
the mere unilateral imposition of conditions for public 
benefit is quite different. In contract zoning the 
government entity sacrifices its authority. In conditional 
zoning it exercises it. By imposing conditions under 
which [defendant's] property could be rezoned, 
Chattanooga did not bargain away its authority, but rather 
exercised it for public safety reasons.453 
The court went on to conclude that the conditions in the ordinance required 
that before the property was rezoned, safer access to it had to be 
provided.454 The court stated that "[tlhe proof show[ed] no evidence of a 
bilateral agreement. [Defendant] followed customary procedure in an 
attempt to have its property rezoned. There [was] no evidence of 
Id. at 188. In Benton, however, the court found no agreement by the city to rezone. 
Benton, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454, at *9. 
450 Benton, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS, at *7. 
451 Id. 
452 Id. 
453 Id. at *7-8. The Zoning Administrator for the Regional Planning Commission, 
testified that the defendant's proposed use was appropriate. Id. at *8. However, "a blanket 
approval without conditions was not. Problems posing a threat to public safety needed to 
be rectified before the property could be put to commercial use." Id. The court further 
noted the testimony of the Tennessee Department of Transportation Regional Traffic 
Engineer, who asserted that the existing access drive was in fact dangerous, irrespective of 
the zoning, and a professional engineer from the private sector, agreed with that testimony. 
Id. 
The existing drive [was] located amidst an interchange area. It directly 
[crossed] an exit ramp from a busy highway before connecting into 
Bonny Oaks Drive, the public road from which Appellant [ingressed] 
and [egressed] her property. This [posed] a danger because vehicles 
from two different roads converge onto Bonny Oaks Drive at the same 
point. There [were] visibility or "sight distance" problems. 
Commercial traffic would only augment those problems. 
4" Id. at *8-9. 
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negotiations between the parties [and] there [was] no quid pro quo. There 
[were] only unilateral conditions requiring that necessary improvements be 
made."455 Despite the appeal of this purported distinction, the question 
remains whether the developer would have offered the conditions absent 
the real prospect of a rezoning by the municipality. If not, then the 
arrangement fails to differ substantially from what is viewed as contract 
zoning.456 
The Massachusetts courts also have found conditional zoning valid, 
departing from the views expressed by the Connecticut and Maryland 
courts. In Town of Randolph v. Town of ~ t o u ~ h t o n ? ~ ~  the court stated that 
455 Id. at *9. 
456 Id. at *8-9. The Tennessee Code authorized the city to engage in conditional 
zoning. Id. at *9. The court never reached the constitutionality of the provision because 
conditional zoning is consistent with Tennessee law. Id.; see also Copeland v. City of 
Chattanooga, 866 S.W.2d 565,570 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). In Copeland, the court held that 
the appellee's conditional zoning was a proper exercise of government police power. 
Copeland, 866 S.W.2d at 570. The testimony revealed that the development of appellants' 
property would create a problem remedied by the exaction. Id. Moreover, although the 
videotapes of the two city counsel meetings revealed a concern by some members that the 
city might need the property in the future and therefore be required to purchase it, the 
overwhelming evidence supported a finding that it was this particular development that 
would create a problem remedied by the construction of an acceleration/deceleration lane. 
Id. 
457 NO. 97-0197, 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 410 (Mass. Super. June 23, 1997). 
There, defendant (the Trust), the owner of two parcels of land in the Stoughton Technology 
Center in the Town of Stoughton, undertook a project to construct and operate a cinema in 
the "Center." Id. at *6. 
The Land owned by the Trust was located in an "Industrial" zoning 
district in which the proposed cinema project was a prohibited use. 
[Tlhe Stoughton Planning Board convened a public hearing to consider 
an amendment to the Zoning Map rezoning the Land to a "Highway 
Business" zoning district in which a cinema would be permissible. 
Id. The town voted to enact the amendment. Id. Thereafter, the Trust applied to the 
Stoughton Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) for a 13.5-foot variance from the 30-foot height 
restriction imposed on all buildings in the "Highway Business" zoning district. Id. "The 
ZBA found that in view of conditions and circumstances uniquely affecting the Land, the 
Trust was entitled to the requested height variance, but conditioned the variance on, among 
other things, the construction of a pedestrian overpass across Technology Center Drive," a 
four-lane street separating the proposed cinema building from the cinema parking lot. Id. at 
*7. Thereafter, the Town of Randolph filed the present action against the Town of 
Stoughton, the ZBA, the Planning Board, and the Trust, alleging that the rezoning of the 
(continued) 
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"'[c]ontract zoning' is the term given to acts of rezoning granted on the 
express condition that owners impose certain restrictions on their land in 
order to obtain the desired rezoning."458 An example of invalid contract 
zoning would be if the town had conditioned the rezoning of the locus 
based on a landowner's dedication of land for public use elsewhere in the 
town.459 
However, [here, the plaintiffs] allegation that the town 
rezoned the Land from "Industrial" to "Business 
Highway" on the condition that the [landowner] build a 
movie theater there, conferring tax benefits on the town, 
simply [did] not constitute the type of extraneous 
consideration unrelated to the locus necessary to establish 
contract zoning. The proposed use of the particular land 
[was] intimately related to the locus and [would] always 
be a relevant area of concern for zoning authorities so that 
the imposition of conditions on the proposed use of the 
locus cannot be considered "extraneous. ,460 
Land from "Industrial" to "Business Highway" was invalid either as spot zoning or contract 
zoning. Id. at *7-8. The Massachusetts Code provided that "any zoning'ordinance or by- 
law which divides cities and towns into districts shall be uniform within the district for each 
class or kind of structures or uses permitted." Id. at *32-33 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
40A, 5 4 (1994)). The court construed this provision as prohibiting "'spot zoning,' defined 
as a legislative change to existing zoning restrictions which arbitrarily and unreasonably 
singles out one parcel of land for treatment differently from that accorded surrounding 
parcels in the same district indistinguishable in character." Id. at *33. Randolph's 
allegation of unconstitutional contract zoning "[failed] to state a cognizable claim because it 
[did] not allege that the rezoning of the Land was conditioned on extraneous 
considerations." Id. at *36. The court held that 
although Randolph [was] an abutter to the rezoned parcel at issue, 
Randolph clearly [did] not own property in the same zoning district or 
even within the same municipality as the Trust's land, and thus had no 
standing under [the code], which requires uniformity within each 
zoning district of a city or town and to a lesser extent, uniformity 
among districts within a single city or town. 
Id. at *34. 
458 Id. at *36. 
459 Id. 
Id. at *37; see also Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1969) (upholding conditional zoning where public interest served); Konkel v. 
Common Council, 299 N.W.2d 606 (Wis. 1975) (upholding rezoning ordinance contingent 
(continued) 
Heinonline - -  33 Cap. U. L. Rev. 468  2 0 0 4 - 2 0 0 5  
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
In a well-articulated justification for conditional zoning, the New York 
Court of Ap eals upheld such an ordinance in Collard v. Znc. Village of 
El Flower Hill. The Court of Appeals began its discussion of the issues by 
on landowner's fulfilling certain conditions when the ordinance was otherwise not arbitrary 
or capricious). 
421 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1981). In Collard, in 1976, the earlier owners of the 
subject premises and appellants' predecessors in title applied to the village board of trustees 
to rezone the property from a General Municipal and Public Purposes District to a Business 
District. Id. at 819. That year, the village board granted the rezoning application, subject to 
various conditions. Id. Previously, the subject premises, then vacant, had been zoned for 
single-family dwellings with a minimum lot size of 7,500 square feet. Id. n.1. The court 
stated that 
[i]n that year the then owners applied to the village board to rezone a 
portion of the property and place it in the General Municipal and Public 
Purposes District so that a private sanitarium might be constructed. 
Concurrently with that application a declaration of covenants restricting 
the use of the property to a sanitarium was recorded in the county 
clerk's office. The village board then granted the rezoning application, 
but limited the property's use to the purposes set forth in the declaration 
of covenants. 
Id. n.1. Subsequently, appellants' predecessors in title entered into the contemplated 
declaration of covenants, which was recorded some twelve years later. Id. at 820. 
Consistent with the board's resolution, that declaration provided that "no building or 
structure situated on the Subject Premises on the date of this Declaration of Covenants will 
be altered, extended, rebuilt, renovated or enlarged without the prior consent of the Board 
of Trustees of the Village." Id. "The 1976 rezoning application, which as conditionally 
granted [was] the subject of this suit, was made because the private sanitarium had fallen 
into disuse and it was asserted that without rezoning the property could neither be sold nor 
leased." Id. at 8 19 n. 1. 
Appellants, after acquiring title, made application [two years later] to 
the village board for approval to enlarge and extend the existing 
structure on the premises. Without any reason being given that 
application was denied. Appellants then commenced this action to have 
the board's determination declared arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, 
and unconstitutional and sought by way of ultimate relief an order 
directing the board to issue the necessary building permits. 
Id. at 820. The appellants contended that the conditions imposed amounted to invalid spot 
zoning and conditional zoning. Id. at 821. Claiming that the board's denial of the 
application was beyond review as to reasonableness, respondent moved to dismiss the 
complaint. Id. at 820. That motion was denied, that court "equating appellants' allegation 
that the board's action was arbitrary and capricious with an allegation that such action was 
(continued) 
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stating that 
[plrior to our decision in Church v Town of lslip, in which 
we upheld rezoning of property subject to reasonable 
conditions, conditional rezoning had been almost 
uniformly condemned by courts of all jurisdictions-a 
position to which a majority of States appear to continue 
to adhere. Since Church, however, the practice of 
conditional zoning has [achieved] widespread [acceptance] 
in this State, as well as having gained popularity in other 
 jurisdiction^.^^^ 
The court pointed out that "[plrobably the principal objection to 
conditional rezoning is that it constitutes illegal spot zoning, thus violating 
the legislative mandate requiring that there be a comprehensive plan for, 
and that all conditions be uniform within, a given zoning d i s t r i ~ t . ' ~ ~  The 
court explained that when courts have considered the issue, "the 
assumptions have been made that conditional zoning benefits particular 
landowners rather than the community as a whole and that it undermines 
the foundation upon which comprehensive zoning depends by destroying 
uniformity within use districts.'*64 However, these unexamined 
assumptions must be questioned. First, the court said, it is a downward 
change to a less restrictive zoning classification that benefits the property 
rezoned and not the opposite imposition of greater restrictions on land 
Indeed, the imposition of limiting conditions benefits surrounding 
properties, but "normal1 adversely affects the premises on which the 
conditions are imposed.'& Second, the court ruled that the mere fact that 
only a single parcel is involved or benefited does not render the zoning 
invalid per se.467 Instead, 
the real test for spot zoning is whether the change is other 
than part of a well-considered and comprehensive plan 
calculated to serve the general welfare of the community. 
Such a determination, in turn, depends on the 
lacking in good faith and fair dealing-an allegation which it found raised triable issues of 
fact." Id. The appellate court reversed and dismissed the complaint, "holding that the 
allegation of arbitrary and capricious action by the board was not the equivalent of an 
allegation that the board breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Id. 
Id. at 820 (citations omitted). 
463 Id.at821. 
* Id. 
Id. 
466 Id. 
467 Id. 
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reasonableness of the rezoning in relation to neighboring 
uses-an inquiry required regardless of whether the 
change in zone is conditional in form. Third, if it is 
initially proper to change a zoning classification without 
the imposition of restrictive conditions notwithstanding 
that such change may depart from uniformity, then no 
reason exists why accomplishing that change subject to 
condition should automatically be classified as 
impermissible spot zoning.468 
The court continued by stating that 
[bloth conditional and unconditional rezoning involve 
essentially the same legislative act-an amendment of the 
zoning ordinance. The standards for judging the validity 
of conditional rezoning are no different from [those] used 
to judge whether unconditional rezoning is illegal. It 
stands that [if] modification to a less restrictive zoning 
classification is warranted, then a fortiori conditions 
imposed by a [zoning authority] to minimize conflicts 
among districts should not in and of themselves violate 
any prohibition against spot zoning.469 
Nor should a conditional zoning ordinance be struck down on the basis 
of public policy, that is, that municipal governments lack "the power to 
make contracts that control or limit them in the exercise of their legislative 
,470 powers and duties. Just as "permitting citizens to be governed by the 
best bargain they can strike with a local legislature would not be consonant 
with notions of good government, absent proof of a contract purporting to 
bind the local legislature in advance to exercise its zoning authority in a 
bargained-for manner," so also would "a rule [having] the effect of 
forbidding a municipality from trying to protect landowners in the vicinity 
of a zoning change by imposing protective  condition^."^" 
The imposition of conditions on property sought to be 
rezoned may not be classified as a prospective 
commitment on the part of the municipality to zone as 
requested if the conditions are met; nor would the 
468 Id. (citation omitted). . 
469 Id. 
470 Id.; see also Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956) (striking down rezoning 
ordinance based upon landowners agreeing to conditions); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 148 
A.2d 429 (Md. 1959) (same). 
471 Collard, 421 N.E.2d at 821. 
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municipality necessarily be precluded on this account from 
later reversing or altering its de~ision.~" 
The court concluded as follows: 
Conditional rezoning is a means of achieving some degree 
of flexibility in land-use control by minimizing the 
potentially deleterious effect of a zoning change on 
neighboring properties; reasonably conceived conditions 
harmonize the landowner's need for rezoning with the 
public interest and certainly fall within the spirit of the 
enabling legislation.473 
472 Id. at 822 (citing Grimpel Assoc. v. Cohalan, 361 N.E.2d 1022 (N.Y. 1977)). 
Further, the court found that 
[wlhile it is accurate to say there exists no explicit authorization that a 
legislative body may attach conditions to zoning amendments, neither is 
there any language which expressly forbids a local legislature to do so. 
Statutory silence is not necessarily a denial of the authority to engage in 
such a practice. Where in the face of nonaddress in the enabling 
legislation there exists independent justification for the practice as an 
appropriate exercise of municipal power, that power will be implied. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
473 Id. (citation omitted) (citing Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 
1960)). The court then stated that 
[olne final concern of those reluctant to uphold the practice is that 
resort to conditional rezoning carries with it no inherent restrictions 
apart from the restrictive agreement itself. This fear, however, is 
justifiable only if conditional rezoning is considered a contractual 
relationship between municipality and private party, outside the scope 
of the zoning power-a view to which we do not subscribe. When 
conditions are incorporated in an amending ordinance, the result is as 
much a "zoning regulation" as an ordinance, adopted without 
conditions. Just as the scope of all zoning regulation is limited by the 
police power, and thus local legislative bodies must act reasonably and 
in the best interests of public safety, welfare and convenience, the scope 
of permissible conditions must of necessity be similarly limited. If, 
upon proper proof, the conditions imposed are found unreasonable, the 
rezoning amendment as well as the required conditions would have to 
be nullified, with the affected property reverting to the pre-amendment 
zoning classification. 
(continued) 
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Id. (citations omitted) (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 
(1926); New York Inst. of Tech. v. LeBoutillier, 305 N.E.2d 754, 757 (N.Y. 1973); 
Concordia Collegiate Inst. v. Miller, 93 N.E.2d 632, 636 (N.Y. 1950)). The court then 
discussed appellant's argument by stating that it 
[p]roceed[ed] along two paths: first, that as a matter of construction the 
added prescription [that the town not act arbitrarily] should be read into 
the provision; second, that because of limitations associated with the 
exercise of municipal zoning power the village board would have been 
required to include such a prescription. 
Id. at 823. The court found this argument to be without merit. Id. 
Appellants' construction argument must fail. The terminology 
employed in the declaration is explicit. The concept that appellants 
would invoke is not obscure and language to give it effect was readily 
available had it been the intention of the parties to include this added 
stipulation. Appellants point to no canon of construction in the law of 
real property or of contracts which would call for judicial insertion of 
the missing clause. Where language has been chosen containing no 
inherent ambiguity or uncertainty, courts are properly hesitant, under 
the guise of judicial construction, to imply additional requirements to 
relieve a party from asserted disadvantage flowing from the terms 
actually used. The second path either leads nowhere or else goes too 
far. If it is appellants' assertion that the village board was legally 
required to insist on inclusion of the desired prescription, there is no 
authority in the court to reform the zoning enactment of 1976 
retroactively to impose the omitted clause. Whether the village board at 
that time would have enacted a different resolution in the form now 
desired by appellants is open only to speculation; the certainty is that 
they did not then take such legislative action. On the other hand, 
acceptance of appellants' proposition would produce as the other 
possible consequence the conclusion that the 1976 enactment was 
illegal, throwing appellants unhappily back to the pre-1976 zoning of 
their premises, a destination which they assuredly wished to sidestep. 
Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that it agreed with the Appellate Division's 
finding 
that the allegation of the complaint that the village board in denying 
appellants' application acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner is 
not an allegation that the board acted in bad faith or its equivalent. For 
the reasons stated, the Board of Trustees of the Incorporated Village of 
Flower Hill may not now be compelled to issue its consent to the 
proposed enlargement and extension of the existing structure on the 
(continued) 
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The Collard decision perhaps is not as far-reaching as it might seem at 
first. First, the court seems to place great significance on the fact that the 
conditions operated to restrict uses of the land otherwise permitted, not to 
allow different uses as a true rezoning would produce. Second, that the 
standards for judging the validity of conditional rezoning are no different 
than the standards used to judge whether unconditional rezoning is illegal 
suggests that the rezoning takes place in the abstract without regard to the 
petitioning landowner's intended uses, which is not the case because of the 
conditions imposed. As a criticism of this reasoning, does not the 
imposition of conditions suggest that the municipality would have 
refrained from rezoning absent the landowner's agreement to the 
conditions? This seems like an inducement to rezone, yet not one that 
should be condemned when the conditions serve the public interest.474 
premises or in the alternative give an acceptable reason for failing to do 
so. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division [was] affirmed 
Id. 
474 See Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1960). In Church, the town 
board acted unanimously to rezone a comer lot that was an irregular strip. Id. at 681. The 
board's consent to the rezoning was granted under the following conditions: the building 
could not be more than 25% of the area; an anchor post fence, or equal, six feet high, was to 
be erected five feet within the boundary line of the property; live shrubbery had to be 
planted; and these requirements had to occur before carrying on any retail business on the 
property. Id. The court explained that "zoning being a legislative act, (not a variance) is 
entitled to the strongest possible presumption of validity and must stand if there [is] any 
factual basis therefore." Id. at 682. The court rejected the argument that this was contract 
zoning; all of the appellants' arguments "revolve[d] about the idea that this [was] illegal as 
'contract zoning' because the Town Board, as a condition for rezoning, required the owners 
to . . . record restrictive covenants as to maximum area to be occupied by [the] buildings 
and as to a fence and shrubbery." Id. at 683. The court reasoned that "[slurely these 
conditions were intended to be and are for the benefit of the neighbors. Since the Town 
Board could have, presumably, zoned this . . . comer for business without any restrictions, 
we fail to see how reasonable conditions invalidate the legislation." Id. The court 
explained that "what 'contract zoning' means is unclear and there is really no New York 
law on the subject. All legislation 'by contract' is invalid in the sense that a Legislature 
cannot bargain away or sell it powers." Id. But, the court would "deal here with actualities 
and not phrases." Id. 
To meet increasing needs of [the county's] own population explosion, 
and at the same time to make as gradual and as little of an annoyance as 
possible the change from residence to business on the main highways, 
the [tlown . . . imposes conditions. There [was] nothing 
unconstitutional about it. Incidentally, the record [did] not show any 
(continued) 
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agreement in the sense that the owners made an offer accepted by the 
board. 
Id.; see also In re Rosedale Ave., 243 N.Y.S.2d 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). In In re 
Rosedale Avenue, the city sought and acquired title to five parcels of real estate for street 
widening purposes. Id. at 815. The property owners disagreed with the city as to how 
much they should be compensated for the taking of their property. Id. at 817. The only 
significant issue involved a determination of damages for the parcel of real estate that was 
occupied by a bowling alley, which was a nonconforming use to the residential zoning of 
the property. Id. 
The claimant contend[ed] that the agreement of April 18, 1956, waiving 
enhancement of value of the strip taken by reason of the zoning change 
for retail use [was] not binding [because, among other things,] if the 
waiver was a condition imposed by the Board of Estimate such 
condition would be illegal as constituting so-called "contract zoning." 
Id. The court rejected plaintiffs argument holding that "[elven assuming that the Board of 
Estimate had imposed the waiver agreement as a condition for the change, it does not 
necessarily follow that such condition was not validly imposed in the best interests of the 
citizens of the City of New York." Id. (citing Church, 168 N.E.2d 680; Point Lookout 
Civic Ass'n v. Town of Hempstead, 200 N.Y.S.2d 925 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960), affd, 207 
N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960), affd, 176N.E.2d203 (N.Y. 1961)). Butsee Levine 
v. Town of Oyster Bay, 272 N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966). In Levine the court 
distinguished Church v. Town of Islip. Id. at 173. There, after a public hearing, the town 
voted to adopt a resolution amending the building zone ordinance changing a landowner's 
approximately fourteen acres from residential to industrial. Id. 
One of the four conditions attached to this amendment was that the 
grade of the affected piece . . . be reduced to that of [the road] on which 
it fronted. The existing grade [was] 15 to 18 feet higher than the road 
and [would] require the removal of approximately 267,000 cubic yards 
of earth. 
Id. Homeowners with adjacent residences or residences near the rezoned parcel challenged 
the rezoning. Id. "The . . . amendment was struck down . . . on the ground that the 
condition concerning the grade was infuturo." Id. The court stated that Church 
teaches that conditions per se do not void zoning amendments. 
However, in this case, the condition was proposed by the applicants for 
the downzoning and was adopted in roro by the [tlown [bloard. [The] 
rezoned parcel [was] the first industrial intrusion in the area and it 
seriously upse[t] the use balance that had been advised and maintained 
with respect to the zoning on each side of [the road]. 
(continued) 
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Perhaps the court should have explained that carrying out the public 
interest requires rezoning in response to market, demographic, and 
technological changes affecting land use, and that a municipality can 
responsibly adhere to land use policy as identified in comprehensive plans 
and at the same time allow for changes in land use through rezoning with 
conditions. 
- - - -- 
Id. In sum, the rezoning appeared "not made for the general welfare of the Town but for 
the personal benefit of [the landowner], who petitioned for precisely the change and 
conditions that were adopted." Id. This constituted spot or contract zoning. Id. However, 
this case can be criticized for finding contract zoning without finding a reciprocal promise 
by the town to rezone. Instead, the better basis for striking down the rezoning should have 
been on its merits as not reflecting concern for the public interest. See Hiscox v. Levine, 
216 N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961). In Hiscox, the court distinguished Church on the 
facts. There, the town authorized the respondent planning board to make reasonable 
changes in zoning regulations, but it required the maintenance of the average population 
density and strict conformance with Town Law $ 281. Id. at 804. The developer offered 
land for a park in exchange for a variance to develop the rest of the property. Id. at 803. 
The court noted that "[iln support of their positions both sides place some reliance on 
Church v. Town of lslip," but explained that in that case "the Town Board granted a change 
of zoning from residence to business on condition that the owner comply with stated 
requirements. As against an argument that the [bloard engaged in 'contract zoning,' the 
[clourt upheld the change." Id. at 807 (citation omitted). In Hiscox, the court stated that 
[clontrary to the respondents' belief, the Church case does not support 
their positions. In the first place, the action . . . reviewed was 
legislative action by the Town Board, not administrative action. In the 
second place, the [Church clourt specifically noted that the conditions 
"were intended to be and are for the benefit of the neighbors" and that 
the Town Board "could have, presumably, zoned this Bay Shore Road 
comer for business without any restriction." The respondents [in 
Hiscox could not] make either claim. Except for the conclusion that the 
plans "appropriately and adequately safeguard the use of adjoining 
lands" there [was] not one shred of evidence to show benefit or even 
regard for the neighbors. Nor have respondents argued that all the 
lands zoned " A  could have been zoned " B  by the board absent the 
park element. 
Id. (citation omitted). The court concluded that "[tlhere [could] be no doubt that the 
Board's sole motivation was the lure of a large park, the dedication of which was not 
imposed by the Board as a condition, but offered by the developers as the price for 
rezoning." Id. 
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In Holrnes v. Planning Board of New the court held in a 
lengthy opinion that 
[clonditions imposed as an incident of approval in a 
developmental permit control system are a major weapon 
in a planner's arsenal. Conditions allow flexibility and 
fairness in land use and development control decisions, 
and provide the ability to deal with problems such as 
traffic congestion, something barely contemplated under 
zoning schemes . . . . The most common utilizations of 
conditions in land use and development decisions occur in 
nondiscretionary determinations which are made subject to 
conditions publicly specified in advance, e.g., special 
permits, or discretionary determinations subject to 
stipulated conditions, e.g., variances or site plan 
The court then held that "[iln New York, the use of reasonable conditions 
as a land control device has been long upheld.'A77 
475 433 N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). In Holmes, the court upheld the 
town's power under the enabling act to approve site plans conditionally to mitigate, among 
other things, traffic congestion. Id. at 599. 
476 Id. at 596 (citations omitted) (citing Fonoroff & Tenill, Controlling Traffic 
Through Zoning, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 857 (1970); Freilich & Quim, Effectiveness of 
Flexible and Conditional Zoning Techniques-What They Can not Do for Our Cities, 1979 
INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 167,193)). 
477 Id. (citing Matter of Reed v. Bd. of Standards & Appeals, 174 N.E. 301 (N.Y. Ct. 
App. 1931); Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1960)). The Holmes 
court went on to reject the petitioners' claim that the condition that they consent to an 
easement as a requisite for the approval of the site plan imposed on them was unreasonable 
because it was arbitrary. Id. Petitioners argued "that the condition must be stricken 
because it was not 'directly related to and incidental to the proposed use' of their property." 
Id. The test for determining whether such a requirement is invalid is derived from the 
fundamental rule regarding the exercise of police power-"that there is some evil extant or 
reasonably to be apprehended which the police power may be invoked to prevent and that 
the remedy proposed must be generally adapted to that purpose." Id. at 596-97 (quoting 
Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 275 N.E.2d 585, 589 (N.Y. 1971)). The court went on to 
state, "The petitioners contend that no condition may be imposed which alleviates public 
needs other than those which are 'uniquely and specifically attributable' to the development 
proposed in their application." Id. at 597. The corollary to this rule is "that the benefit 
deriving from a condition must accrue to the development rather than the public as a 
whole." Id. The court then proceeded to state that 
(continued) 
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VI. CONDITIONAL USE DISTRICT ZONING IN NORTH CAROLINA 
UPHELD AS NOT ~NOLVING CONTRACT ZONING 
In North Carolina, there is a land use device called "conditional use 
district zoning."478 With this device, the landowner requests a rezoning to 
a conditional use district and a conditional use permit.479 After rezoning to 
a conditional use district, the local government must issue a conditional 
use permit before any desired use will be ~ermitted.~" Conditions are 
placed in the permit, not in the zoning ordinance, thereby on its face 
avoiding a claim of conditional zoning.48' "Conditional use district 
zoning" differs from contract zoning in that the former features merely a 
unilateral promise from the landowner regarding future use. No bilateral 
contract binds the zoning authority. At the same time, "conditional use 
district zoning" allows the local government to consider proposed land use 
when evaluating a zoning application.4s2 As originally conceived, 
"conditional use district zoning" consisted of two steps: (1) a legislative 
process to consider the rezoning request, and (2) a quasi-judicial 
proceeding to determine whether a permit is appropriate under the 
circumstances presented by the A lower court held that 
without the second step, the zoning decision would be based on the 
[tlhese criteria posed great difficulties for municipal authorities 
confronted by small residential subdivisions which could not contribute 
properly sized recreational facilities but whose presence still generated 
need, by industrial subdivisions which caused environmental needs not 
within the category of assessment soluble problems, and by the inability 
to equate the cost of the exaction with the benefit to or need created by 
the development being accessed. As a result of these difficulties, 
another approach was generated-the Rational Nexus Test. 
Id. at 598 (citations omitted). This test draws support "from the police power in allowing 
conditions based on future oriented planning. Thus, a subdivider can 'be compelled only to 
bear that portion of the cost which bears a rational nexus to the needs created by, and 
benefits conferred upon, the subdivision."' Id. (quoting Longbridge Builders v. Planning 
Bd. of Princeton, 245 A.2d 336, 337 (N.J. 1968)). '"The rational nexus test relieves the 
highly constricting uniqueness factor and allows some incidental benefit to the general 
public." Id. Here, the condition had a rational nexus in that it was imposed to alleviate 
traffic congestion posed by the development. Id. at 599. 
478 CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES $5 6.201-6.208 (2000). 
479 Id. 6.202. 
480 Id. 
48 1 See id. 5 6.205. 
482 See id. 5 6.204. 
483 See id. 
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proposed use of the property-a classic illustration of illegal contract 
zoning.484 
484 See Massey v. City of Charlotte, No. 99-CVS-18764, 2000 WL 33915844 (N.C. 
Super. Apr. 17, 2000), rev'd, 550 S.E.2d 838 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). However, the North 
Carolina Legislature amended the zoning laws to authorize conditional zoning in 
Mecklenburg County until 2001, thus providing for parallel rules, one set for Mecklenburg 
County and another for the rest of the state. See 1999 N.C. Sess. Law. 2000-77. In most of 
the state, local governments employ a legislative process to make zoning decisions and may 
not consider a specific use in making that zoning decision. See id. Once the rezoning has 
occurred, the municipality then holds a quasi-judicial hearing to issue a conditional use 
permit for the specific use. See id. $ l(d). Within the county, local governments have the 
temporary statutory authority to approve a rezoning using a single-step, a purely legislative 
process, subject to a deferential judicial review, and may consider the tract's proposed used 
in making the zoning decision. See id. 3 l(e). That is, the new law could be viewed as 
authorizing conditional zoning and contract zoning in the county because it enabled a 
rezoning based upon a petition including a site plan and supporting information that 
specified actual use or uses intended for the property and the rules, regulations, and 
conditions that, in addition to predetermined ordinance requirements, would govern the 
development and use of the property. Id. 3 l(b). But, conditional zoning decisions must be 
made in consideration of the comprehensive plan, strategic plan, district plan, area plan, and 
other policy documents. Id. $ l(c); see also Stephen C. Keadey, Recent Developments, 
Into the Danger Zone: Massey v. City of Charlotte and the Fate of Conditional Zoning in 
North Carolina, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1155 (2001). Bur see Massey v. City of Charlotte, 550 
S.E.2d 838 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). In Massey, the court overruled the trial court's 
conclusions that the courts and the legislature have limited such approval of conditional use 
district zoning to systems that utilize a two step process-a legislative rezoning decision 
followed by a quasi-judicial determination of whether to issue a conditional use permit. Id. 
at 844. The court found that the ordinance on conditional use permits allowed an applicant 
to apply separately for rezoning and a conditional use permit, but that the ordinance 
allowed for both to be approved or disapproved in a single public hearing held before the 
Board of Commissioners. Id. at 843. The court further held that the Board was within its 
powers to create a special use district that would not require a special use permit, and that 
the absence of a second quasi-judicial step did not render the rezoning decision contract 
zoning when the city made no promise to the landowner regarding the rezoning, but instead 
the landowner only promises to limit uses to those in application. Id. at 845. 
Developers championed Charlotte's rezoning procedure because it had 
the capacity to expedite growth. By condensing the process to one step, 
foregoing the potentially time-consuming quasi-judicial requirements, 
developers could receive the zoning decision and conditional use permit 
quickly. The additional step required by Massey constitute[ed], to some 
developers, an "additional procedural hurdle" that merely slow[ed] and 
complicat[ed] the process. 
(continued) 
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The North Carolina Supreme Court in Chrismon v. Guilford 
dealt with concept and the question of whether it constitutes illegal 
Keadey, supra, at 1171. 
485 370 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1988). In Chrismon, 
beginning in 1980, [landowner] moved some portion of his business 
operation from the 3.18-acre tract north of Gun Shop Road to the 5.06- 
acre tract south of Gun Shop Road, directly adjacent to plaintiffs' lot. 
Subsequently, [landowner] constructed some new buildings on this 
larger tract, erected several grain bins, and generally enlarged his 
operation. Concerned by the increased noise, dust, and traffic caused 
by [landowner's] expansion, plaintiffs filed a complaint with the 
Guilford County Inspections Department. The Inspections Department 
subsequently notified [landowner] by letter dated 22 July 1982, that the 
expansion of the agricultural chemical operation to the larger tract 
adjacent to plaintiffs' lot constituted an impermissible expansion of a 
nonconforming use. The same letter informed [landowner] further that, 
though his activity was impermissible under the ordinance, . . . he could 
request a rezoning of the property. Shortly thereafter, [landowner] 
applied to have both of the tracts in question . . . rezoned from A-1 to 
"Conditional Use Industrial District" ("CU-M-2"). He also applied for 
a conditional use permit, specifying in the application that he would use 
the property as it was then being used and listing those improvements 
he would like to make in the next five years. Under the CU-M-2 
classification, [landowner's] agricultural chemical operation would 
become a permitted use upon the issuance of the conditional use permit. 
The Guilford County Planning Board met . . . and voted to approve the 
recommendation of the Planning Division that the property be rezoned 
consistent with [landowner's] request. 
Id. at 581-82 (emphasis omitted). The trial court affirmed the validity of the rezoning in 
question. Id. at 582. The court of appeals reversed, holding, first, that the rezoning in 
question constituted illegal "spot zoning" and, second, that it also constituted illegal 
"contract zoning." Id. The court of appeals found that 
[tlhe rezoning was accomplished upon the assurance that [landowner] 
would submit an application for a conditional use permit specifying that 
he would use the property only in a certain manner. The Court of 
Appeals concluded that, in essence, the rezoning here was 
accomplished through a bargain between the applicant and the Board 
rather than through a proper and valid exercise of [the clounty's 
legislative discretion. According to the Court of Appeals, this activity 
constituted illegal "contract zoning" and was therefore void. 
Id. 
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contract zoning or permissible conditional zoning. While the court 
recognized that contract zoning and conditional zoning were "two very 
different concepts," it did not recognize the distinction between conditional 
use district zoning and conditional zoning. The latter had therefore not 
been held valid in North Carolina.486 In Chrismon, the court conflated the 
two, setting up a regime in the state that was ad hoc, with "local 
governments employing a wide variety of conditional use district zoning 
procedures.'*87 
The court held "that the rezoning at issue-namely, the rezoning of 
[landowner's] two tracts of land from A-1 [permitting the storage and sale 
of grain, but not agricultural chemicals] to CU-M-2 [permitting the storage 
and sale of agricultural chemicals]-was, in truth, valid conditional use 
,7488 zoning and not illegal contract zoning. The court continued by stating, 
"Illegal contract zoning properly connotes a transaction wherein both the 
landowner who is seeking a certain zoning action and the zoning authority 
itself undertake reciprocal obligations in the context of a bilateral 
contract.'*89 A city council enters into an agreement with the landowner 
and then rezones the property; the agreement includes not merely a 
promise by the owner of the property to restrict uses on the land, but the 
city council binds itself to enact the zoning amendmenL4" The court noted 
that most courts would conclude that by this agreement to curtail its 
legislative power, the city council has acted ultra v i r e ~ . ~ ~ '  Such contract 
zoning is illegal and the rezoning a nullity.492 "[Clontract zoning of this 
type is objectionable primarily because it represents an abandonment on 
the part of the zoning authority of its duty to exercise independent 
judgment in making zoning decisions.'*93 As the court indicated, 
valid conditional use zoning, on the other hand, is an 
entirely different matter. Conditional use zoning . . . is an 
outgrowth of the need for a compromise between the 
interests of the developer who is seeking appropriate 
rezoning for his tract and the community on the one hand 
and the interests of the neighboring landowners who will 
suffer if the most intensive use permitted by the new 
486 See id. at 593. 
487 Keadey, supra note 484, at 1166-67. 
488 Chrismon, 370 S.E.2d at 593. 
489 Id. (citing Ronald M .  Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 
267 (1968); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.59 (1st ed. 1982)). 
490 Id. 
491 Id. 
492 Id. (citing Shapiro, supra note 489, at 269). 
493 Id. (citing Wegner, supra note 40). 
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classification is instituted.494 
One commentator has described the mechanics of conditional use zoning 
as follows: 
An orthodox conditional zoning situation occurs when a 
zoning authority, without committing its own power, 
secures a property owner's agreement to subject his tract 
to certain restrictions as a prerequisite to rezoning. These 
restrictions may require that the rezoned property be 
limited to just one of the uses permitted in the new 
classification; or particular physical improvements and 
maintenance requirements may be imposed.495 
In the court's view, therefore 
the principal differences between valid conditional use 
zoning and illegal contract zoning are related and are 
essentially two in number. First, valid conditional use 
zoning features merely a unilateral promise from the 
landowner to the local zoning authority as to the 
landowner's intended use of the land in question, while 
illegal contract zoning anticipates a bilateral contract in 
which the landowner and the zoning authority make 
reciprocal promises. Second, in the context of conditional 
use zoning, the local zoning authority maintains its 
independent decision-making authority, while in the 
contract zoning scenario, it abandons that authority by 
binding itself contractually with the landowner seeking a 
4" Id. The court found support for this conclusion in the general statutes that 
explicitly enabled local governments to employ conditional use zoning. Id. at 585. The 
statute expressly empowered local governments to divide their territorial jurisdictions into 
districts. Id. Within these districts, a county may regulate and restrict, among other things, 
the uses of buildings or land, and such districts may include special use districts or 
conditional use districts. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 153A-342 (1987)). Although that 
statute was not in effect at the time the facts arose here, the court found the predecessor 
statute, while not specifically mentioning conditional use zoning, provided support since 
the statute did provide that local governments could divide up the area into districts. Id. at 
585-86. It was on this basis Guilford County enacted the zoning ordinance at issue, and the 
absence of reference to conditional zoning alone was not an indication of lack of authority. 
Id. 
495 Id. at 593-94 (emphasis in original) (quoting Shapiro, supra note 489, at 270-71). 
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zoning amendment.496 
Here, the record revealed no evidence of a bilateral contract.497 
Instead, the facts showed that upon learning of the landowner's uses of the 
land, the Gilford County Inspections Department advised him of his 
options, including petitioning for a rezoning, but not guaranteeing the 
rezoning.498 It was the landowner who subsequently initiated the rezoning 
by a petition for rezoning and application for conditional use district 
permit, in which he described his proposed uses and made unilateral 
promises in this connection.499 In acting on the landowner's petition and 
application, the Board held public hearings and acted independent1 
having regard for the impact of the new uses on the surrounding land. Ji 
The Board heard from scores of neighboring landowners in support of the 
application.501 
496 Id. at 594. "The Court of Appeals, in its opinion in this case, determined that 'the 
rezoning here was accomplished as a direct consequence of the conditions agreed to by the 
applicant rather than as a valid exercise of the county's legislative discretion."' Id. (quoting 
Chrismon v. Guilford County, 354 S.E.2d 309, 314 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987)). "In so doing, it 
concluded, in essence, that the zoning authority here-namely, the Guilford County Board 
of Commissioners-entered into a bilateral agreement, thereby abandoning its proper role 
as an independent decision-maker and rendering this rezoning action void as illegal contract 
zoning." Id. The majority thought the appellate court did not fully grasp the subtle 
differences between contract zoning and conditional use zoning. Id. at 593. 
497 Id. at 594. 
498 Id. 
499 Id. 
Id. at 595. 
Id. The court also ruled that the rezoning was not invalid spot zoning, noting that 
not all instances of spot zoning are invalid. Id. at 588. Rather, the determination requires a 
consideration of a number of factors, including the degree of public benefit created by the 
zoning action and the similarity of the proposed use of the tracts under the new conditional 
use zones to uses in the surrounding preexisting zone. Id. at 589. That the landowner is 
benefited by the rezoning does not automatically cast the rezoning as an instance of spot 
zoning. Id. at 589-90. Rather, the effect on the whole community is the most significant 
issue. Id. at 590. Here, while the landowner did reap the benefit of the rezoning, by being 
"able to carry on an otherwise illegal storage and sale of agricultural chemicals," id., it was 
beyond question that the neighboring landowners had also benefited by being able to 
purchase those chemicals. See id. And, the proposed use did not differ substantially from 
the uses already present in the surrounding areas. Id. at 591. The landowner could 
continue with the very activities conducted under the pre-zoning as a conforming use (the 
storage and sale of grain), but was essentially restricted to the very activities (the storage 
and sale of agricultural chemicals) in which he was then engaged. No "parcel" was 
"wrenched out of a uniform and drastically distinct area. Id. 
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The court cautioned that although it was expressly recognizing 
conditional use zoning, this land use device, to be valid, must be 
determined to be "reasonable, neither arbitrary, nor unduly discriminatory, 
and in the public intere~t."~'' However, "it is not necessary that property 
rezoned to a conditional use district be available for all of the uses allowed 
in the corresponding general use district," since the principle advantage of 
conditional zoning is the allowance of suitable uses, at the same time not 
allowing uses that are more clearly inconsistent with ongoing uses under 
the predecessor zone.'03 
In a forceful dissent, one justice pointed out that the effect of the 
decision was to ovenule two prior decisions that reached the opposite 
result on the same facts,'04 Blades v. City of and Allred v. City 
of The dissent explained, "[an an attempt to distinguish Blades 
and Allred from this case the majority goes to some length in explaining 
the difference between what it says is valid conditional use zoning and 
illegal contract zoning."507 The dissent further criticized the majority 
opinion, asserting that the majority's definitions of conditional use zoning 
and contract zoning are not in accordance with the Blades and Allred 
opinions.508 
The facts in each of those two cases were that a landowner 
petitioned the City of Raleigh for a change in the zoning 
ordinance. In each case the landowner submitted plans for 
the buildings he would construct if the change was made. 
The City Council in each case rezoned the property as 
requested by the landowner. This Court in each case held 
this was illegal contract zoning. There was no more 
evidence in either case that there was a bilateral contract 
or any reciprocal promises than there is in this case. There 
was no more evidence in those cases than there is in this 
case that the zoning board abandoned its independent 
decision making authority. In my opinion Blades and 
Allred are indistinguishable from this case. I believe that 
prior to today the rule was that if a person requested a 
'02 Id. at 586. 
'03 Id. at 587. But see Hall v. City of Durham, 372 S.E.2d 564, 569 (N.C. 1988) 
(holding that only zoning changes from a general use district to a conditional use district 
allow the limitation on uses within the zone). 
Chrismon, 370 S.E.2d at 597 (Webb, J., dissenting). 
'05 187 S.E.2d 35 (N.C. 1972). 
178 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. 1971). 
'07 Chrismon, 370 S.E.2d at 597 (Webb, J., dissenting). 
'08 Id. 
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zoning change and submitted plans of the type building he 
would construct if the change were granted, and the 
zoning authority made the change based on the promise to 
construct such a building, that would be contract zoning. 
We have held contrary to this and in doing so have 
overruled Blades and Allred. I vote to affirm the Court of 
~ ~ ~ e a l s . ~ ' ~  
Justice Webb's comparison of the cases points out the impossibility of 
meaningfully distinguishing a bilateral agreement from a unilateral one 
when it is plain that the agreed to conditions formed the basis for the 
rezoning. Yet, it is not clear why rezoning based upon a consideration of 
the petitioner's application could not also be in the public interest or why 
rezoning absent consideration of petitioner's application is not opposed to 
the public interest. Perhaps the better view is not to condemn agreements 
per se, but only those that show an abandonment of considerations of the 
public interest. The illogic behind the prohibition on contract zoning is 
that by precluding any consideration of the landowner's intended uses of 
the land, the zoning board must make a rezoning decision that may seem 
arbitrary and ~ninformed.~ '~ It is not the case that just because the 
landowner is benefited, the rezoning should be invalid because it does not 
also serve the public intere~t.~" The power to rezone exists in order for the 
municipality to make necessary adjustments to its original assignment of 
districts as the community evolves and as demographics and industry 
changes.512 Adherence to Euclidean zoning in the face of such changes 
leads to inefficient land use and unjustifiable burdens on land ownership. 
VII. CONCOMITANT AGREEMENTS WITHSTANDING A CHARGE OF 
CONTRACT ZONING 
In the State of Washington, there is the concept of zoning with 
concomitant agreemenh5I3 The enactment of a zoning amendment occurs 
concurrently with the entering into of an agreement between the developer 
Id. at 597. 
Before the Chrismon decision, the North Carolina legislature enacted a law 
enabling a city council in exercise of the zoning power to require a "development plan 
showing the proposed development of property be submitted with any request for rezoning 
of such property" and authorizing the city council to consider such development plan in its 
deliberations, and enabling the city council to require that any site plans subsequently 
submitted be in conformity with any approved development plan. 1975 N.C. SESS. LAWS, 
ch. 671.5 92. 
Chrismon, 370 S.E.2d at 590. 
512 See id. at 583. 
See, e.g., State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 422 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1967). 
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and the city, the agreement imposing on the developer requirements in 
addition to those otherwise contained in the zoning ~ rd inance .~ '~  In 
Chrobuck v. Shohomish ~ o u n t ~ , ~ ' ~  the court upheld such an agreement, 
finding that 
[tlhe indicia of the validity of such agreements include 
[whether] [tlhe performance called for is directly related to 
public needs which may be expected to result from the 
proposed usage of the [subject] property; the [flulfillment 
of these needs is an appropriate function of the contracting 
governmental body; [p]erformance will [place the burdens 
of those needs] directly on the party whose property gives 
rise to them; and [tlhe agreement involves no purported 
relinquishment of any discretionary zoning power by the 
governing body.516 
"[C]oncomitant agreement[s] provid[e] a source of flexibility by allowing 
an intermediate use permit, between absolute denial and complete approval 
,7517 of a petition. In other words, a 
zoning ordinance and a concomitant agreement should be 
declared invalid only if it can be shown that there was no 
valid reason for a [zoning] change and that they are clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, and have no substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare, or if the city is using the concomitant agreement 
for bargaining and sale to the highest bidder or solely for 
"4 See, e.g., id. at 794. In State ex rel. Myhre, the city plan commission and the 
landowner entered into an agreement that provided for the rezoning of land and included 
plans for development, including the deeding over to the city of certain land as necessary 
for street widening for the area, as well as the construction of "sidewalks, drainage, 
pavement, channelization and street lighting on certain designated streets." Id. at 794-95. 
The agreement also contemplated the city condemning land necessary for the traffic safety 
measures, with the landowner paying the cost of such condemnation. Id. at 795. The 
agreement was forwarded to the city council with a recommendation for rezoning with a 
provision that "[ilf after consideration of the Commission's report, the City Council finds 
such amendment is of public necessity, benefits the general welfare of the Community, or 
constitutes good zoning practices, it may then so amend the ordinance." Id. at 794 
(emphasis in original). 
'" 480 P.2d 489 (Wash. 1971). 
'I6 Id. at 507. 
'I7 Id. 
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the benefit of private speculators.518 
The court explained that its power to review the validity of zoning 
accompanied by concomitant agreements was limited to invalidating an 
ordinance only if no reason for the change was present or the agreement 
was in fact for the primary or sole benefit of the d e ~ e l o ~ e r . " ~  The facts 
here showed ample benefits to the city, including fulfilling a need for more 
business zoned land and providing for the mitigation of possible adverse 
effects from development.520 
In City of Redmond v. ~ e v z e r , ~ ~ '  "the concomitant agreement 
contain[ed] no express promise by the city to rezone."522 Instead, the 
agreement was conditioned upon the city rezoning.523 The court pointed 
out, however, that the distinction for purposes of the question of validity 
524 cc was unimportant. If there is no promise to rezone, there is no promise 
to relinquish legislative power."525 But even "[ilf the city ha[d] made the 
promises claimed, they [would not be] illegal under the Mhyre rationale in 
which the city promised to rezone. ,7526 
In Maine, the zoning enabling act permits a municipality to enter into a 
contract zoning agreement with a landowner for the rezoning of land that 
'I8 State ex re1 Myhre, 422 P.2d at 796. The court found that the concomitant 
agreement was not ultra vires for the following reasons: ( I )  the city's requirement that it be 
reimbursed for costs related to condemnation proceedings for property needed for right-of- 
ways was within the city's legislative authority, id. at 795-96; and (2) the agreement only 
granted the development company its statutory right to file a petition to vacate certain 
streets, but did not oblige the city to grant such a petition, id. at 797. 
'I9 Id. at 796. 
520 Id. at 793. 
52L 517 P.2d 625 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). There, the case involved a "street system 
agreement" that constituted a concomitant agreement with the rezoning of properties. Id. at 
627. The trial court found that 
[tlhe rezoning . . . furnished the consideration for the undertakings of 
the property owners in the . . . [algreement . . . . The city fully 
performed its part of the agreement by the rezoning of the . . . 
properties . . . and had the right to require the performance by the 
property owners to deed and dedicate the necessary street rights-of-way 
when requested to do so by the city. 
Id. at 628. 
522 Id. at 630. 
523 Id. at 628. 
524 Id. at 630. 
525 Id. 
526 Id. 
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may contain conditions for final approval.527 Under a town's contract 
zoning provisions, the planning board is required to conduct a public 
hearing on a developer's proposed contract zoning agreement and to 
provide notice of this hearing to the public and the neighboring 
landowners.528 The Pennsylvania courts have held that rezoning that is 
otherwise valid concomitant with agreements between a developer and the 
municipality concerning the use of the land is not invalid merely because 
of the existence of an agreement.529 
VIII. THE QUESTIONS EARLIER POSED 
Given the confusion and overlapping nature of the concepts of contract 
zoning and conditional zoning, the response to the questions earlier posed 
is to say that a fine and superficial distinction exists between the two. The 
difference in large measure is semantical. Conditional zoning is upheld 
when even though there is no express promise by the municipality to 
rezone, but based upon conditions agreed to by the developer, the 
municipality does rezone to allow the proposed development based on 
those conditions.530 As such, there seems no good reason to outlaw 
contract zoning when the promise to rezone is based on express similar 
promises by the developer, the promise is otherwise in the public interest, 
the consideration offered and received pertains to the property at issue, and 
the zoning authority exercises its independent judgment in acting on the 
zoning application. That is, a contractual promise is made but is subject to 
public comment before the contract becomes final seems not to offend any 
of the rules regarding the public trust under which the zoning power exists, 
any more than rezoning based on conditions suggested by or to the zoning 
authority. It is an unwarranted assumption that merely because the 
527 See ME.  REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, Q 4404(9) (West 2003). 
Tit. 30-A, Q 4352(8); see also Crispin v. Town of Scarborough, 736 A.2d 241 
(Me. 1999). The Town of Scarborough's contract zoning ordinance provided the following: 
"Contract zoning . . . is authorized for zoning map changes when the 
Town Council, exercising its sole and exclusive judgment, . . . 
determines that it is appropriate to change the zoning district 
classification of a parcel of land [to] allow reasonable uses of the land 
. . . which remain consistent with the Town of Scarborough's 
Comprehensive Plan." 
Id. at 246 (emphasis omitted) (alteration in original). 
529 See, e.g., Gladwyne Colony, Inc. v. Township of Lower Merion, 187 A.2d 549 
(Pa. 1963) (holding an agreement valid where the owner agreed to grant the town a right of 
way, an access road, and to convey a site if demanded by the city). 
530 See supra Part V .  
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municipality has promised to rezone that it does so without regard to the 
public interest. 
IX. WHY DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS ARE NEITHER CONTRACT 
NOR CONDITIONAL ZONING 
As the cases state, contract zoning refers to an agreement between a 
municipality and a developer whereby the developer offers consideration 
often, but not necessarily extraneous to the property for zoning ad h o ~ . ~ ~ '  
As a general proposition, ad hoc zoning agreements are invalid to the 
extent that a municipality promises to re-zone land by bypassing the notice 
and hearing requirements of the legislative process, or makes a decision to 
rezone before public hearing, or agrees to rezone in exchange for some 
benefit having nothing to do with the rezoning.532 Ad hoc zoning may also 
be invalid when it conflicts with the municipality's comprehensive plan in 
a way that results in the discriminatory treatment of persons and projects or 
when the rezoning does not further the public interest, safety, or welfare.533 
However, the mere act of rezoning is not contract zoning, and it is a 
different issue if the zoning regulations and comprehensive plan 
specifically contemplate rezoning affecting a specific parcel with the 
imposition of conditions. In fact, the cases upholding conditional zoning 
hold that rezoning in this fashion, that is, with conditions attached that 
limit the use of the rezoned land in a way designed to minimize adverse 
impact on the surrounding area, furthers the municipality's interest in 
achieving desirable and beneficial land use.534 In the same sense, 
development agreements should not be regarded as a form of ad hoc 
zoning since they contemplate the developer's compliance with the 
existing zoning scheme (although they may involve variances, exceptions, 
and rezoning) and are approved by public hearing. They are nonetheless 
subject to challenge if the decision to freeze the applicable zoning rules 
and regulations to those existing at the time of execution of the agreement 
is, based on offers or agreements that inhibit the municipality's police 
powers, the municipality promising in the resulting ordinance not to apply 
new zoning restrictions to the development.535 Courts have recognized the 
531 See, e.g., McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016, 1020-21 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2002). 
532 See 4 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND 
PLANNING, 8 7 1 :4, at 7 1-8 (2003). 
533 See 4 id. 5 44: 16. 
'" See, e.g., Goffinet v. County of Christian, 333 N.E.2d 731, 736-37 (111. App. Ct. 
1975); Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359, 368-69 (Mass. 2003); Cram v. 
Town of Geneva, 593 N.Y.S.2d 65 1,652 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
535 See Pima Gro Sys., Inc. v. King George County Bd. of Supervisors, 52 Va. Cir. 
241, 244 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000) (voiding an agreement under which the county agreed to allow 
(continued) 
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need for land-use agreements between developers and municipalities to 
assure stability in permitting large projects. Thus, the trend has been to 
allow such agreements unless they constitute an abandonment of the 
municipality's zoning authority.536 In fact, as described earlier, "several 
states have codified the process for entering into development 
agreements. 3,537 
While these statutes generally authorize local governments 
to assure developers that zoning regulations in effect at the 
time of an agreement will remain in effect until the project 
is completed, they also require provisions in the 
agreements that pertain to the duration of the agreement 
and the conditions upon which the agreement may be 
terminated,538 
that is, to protect the health, safety, or welfare of the However, 
the extent to which a local government may validly restrict or limit its 
future use of the police power by freezing the zoning under statutorily 
authorized development agreements is an issue that has been resolved by a 
few C O U ~ ~ S . ~ ~  
activity that was prohibited to all others and illegal under a valid zoning ordinance because 
it was beyond the county's power and was a surrender of police power); Delucchi v. County 
of Santa Cruz, 225 Cal. Rptr. 43, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that an agreement 
between a landowner and the county to preserve agricultural land, interpreted to prevent 
application of future land use restriction, would be illegal contract zoning); Miller v. City of 
Port Angeles, 691 P.2d 229,235 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (finding an agreement between the 
city and a developer to limit the city's power to impose a condition on a development in 
order to further the health, safety, and welfare of the community was a surrender of police 
powers and therefore invalid and unenforceable); 3 ZIEGLER, supra note 45, 5 44.10. 
536 See, e.g., Larkin v. City of Burlington, 772 A.2d 553, 557 (Vt. 2001); Giger v. 
City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182, 190-91 (Neb. 1989). 
537 Larkin, 772 A.2d at 557. 
538 Id. 
539 Giger, 442 N.W.2d at 189. 
* In Morgran Co. v. Orange County, 818 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. 2002), the court 
acknowledged that "[d]evelopment agreements are expressly permitted by the Florida 
Statutes." Id. Development agreements are defined as a "contract between a [local 
government] and a property owner/developer, which provides the developer with vested 
rights by freezing the existing zoning regulations applicable to a property in exchange for 
public benefits." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brad K. Schwartz, Development 
Agreements: Contracting for Vested Rights, 28 B.C. E ~ v n .  AFF. L. REV. 719 (2001)). The 
court further stated that "Florida law permits local governments to impose 'conditions, 
(continued) 
Heinonline - -  33 Cap. U. L. Rev. 490  2 0 0 4 - 2 0 0 5  
20041 DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 49 1 
If development agreements are distinguished from contract zoning by 
the absence of any commitment on the part of the municipality to act in 
accordance with the developer's wishes, making them a form of 
conditional zoning, then they may be of little benefit to the developer when 
the municipality promises nothing in return.541 Yet, as a form of 
conditional zoning, they would be upheld, it seems, in the majority of 
ju r i sd i~ t ions .~~~ On the other hand, a binding promise by the municipality, 
made before rezoning, to act in a certain way would be regarded as illegal 
contract zoning.543 But this would be the case only if the municipality has 
by-passed the public hearing procedures because the public interest is not 
served, it is disruptive of the comprehensive plan, and the municipality has 
surrendered its power to rezone if the public interest so requires. 
Development agreements authorized by statute, by their terms, meet all 
these provisos. They specifically reserve some governmental control over 
the project, such as by provisions that specify the duration and grounds for 
unilateral termination in order to protect the public interest, health, and 
welfare. By statute, they must be consistent with the comprehensive plan, 
and they are approved through public hearing.544 
terms, and restrictions' as part of these agreements, where necessary for the public health, 
safety or welfare of its citizens." Id. at 643. But, the problem in that case was the city's 
agreement to support rezoning as part of that development agreement beforehand, rather 
than after hearings on the agreement. See id. at 644. The court did not otherwise 
distinguish development agreements where the city agrees to freeze existing regulations 
from contract zoning in which the city agrees to rezone based on a developer's promises. 
See id. The difference is a subtle one since bilateral promises are precisely at the heart of 
development agreements, although the municipality reserves some residual power to act 
should the public health, safety, and welfare require it, thereby avoiding the bargaining 
away police powers charge. 
541 See Schwartz, supra note 540, at 728. 
542 Id. 
413 Id. 
544 Larkin v. City of Burlington, 772 A.2d 553, 558 (Vt. 2001) (deciding the case on 
another ground, that plaintiff who purchased the original developer's rights in a foreclosure 
sale did not acquire rights under a development agreement with the city); see also Bollech 
v. Charles County, 166 F. Supp. 2d 443,454 (D. Md. 2001) (finding that the county did not 
illegally abdicate its police powers by entering into an agreement where the agreement 
itself stated that the development would be subject to any changes in state or federal law, 
and that it did not require absolute deference to the existing zoning); De Paolo v. Town of 
Ithaca, 694 N.Y.S.2d 235, 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (finding an "agreement" by a 
developer to grant the town a 99-year license to use certain property as a park, conditioned 
upon landowner's receipt of all approvals for a development project, did not present a 
situation of legislating "pursuant to the terms of a contract," nor one in which town agreed 
"in exchange for a predetermined [consideration for] expedited and favorable 
(continued) 
Heinonline - -  33 Cap. U. L. Rev. 4 9 1  2 0 0 4 - 2 0 0 5  
492 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [33:383 
In fact, development agreements, not authorized by special legislation 
have been specifically as involving not contract, but conditional 
zoning. In Giger v. City of ~ r n a h a , ~ ~ ~  the developer applied to the city for 
a rezoning of property to permit the construction of a mixed-used 
development consisting of retail, office, and residential buildings.547 As 
part of the application process, the developer submitted several 
development plans, the final plan including the construction of a public 
park.548 In a new procedure, the developer and the city entered into four 
agreements that incorporated the plan.s49 The four agreements were 
collectively known as the "development agreement" and were submitted to 
the city for approval.550 The city passed an ordinance approving the 
"development agreement," incorporating it as part of the ordinance and 
passed five separate ordinances rezoning the property.55' Clearly, the 
agreements formed the basis of the city's decision to rezone-the parties 
had worked out the terms of the rezoning before it occurred. The 
agreement could be interpreted as a promise by the city to rezone based 
upon the agreed upon conditions.552 
The challengers contended that rezoning by agreement was illegal 
contract zoning and was therefore invalid per se, that it was an ultra vires 
act, and that it fostered the "appearance of evil."5s3 The court found that 
determination, as would be illegal," but instead was only an agreement that furthered the 
town's longstanding objective stated in the comprehensive plan of ensuring public use and 
enjoyment of the donated land); Stephens v. City of Vista, 994 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(finding no bargaining away of police power where city could exercise discretion over the 
site development process). 
545 See, e.g, Save Our Springs Alliance v. City of Austin, 149 S.W.3d 674 (Tex. App. 
2004) (upholding development agreement entered into pursuant to a statute as a validly 
enacted amendment to the zoning ordinance, entitling the developer to rely on that change 
in requesting a development permit). 
546 442 N.W.2d 182 (Neb. 1989). 
"' Id. at 187. 
"* Id. at 187-88. 
"' Id. at 188. 
5s0 Id. 
5s1 Id. 
"* Neighboring property owners challenged the rezoning on the ground, inter alia, 
that the city acted in an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable manner in adopting the 
rezoning ordinance. Id. "Specifically, the [challengers] allege[d] that the city entered into 
a development agreement with [the developer], adopted a rezoning ordinance which 
incorporated that agreement, and rezoned the . . . property pursuant to that agreement," and 
that the city rezoned the property "without giving adequate consideration to the risk of 
flood created by the project." Id. 
553 Id. at 189. 
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distinction between contract zoning and conditional zoning academic 
because its scope of review was "limited to determining whether the 
conditions imposed by the city for rezoning were reasonably related to the 
interest of public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare. 9,554 
"Accordingly, the city should be permitted to condition rezoning 
ordinances on the adoption of an agreement between the developer and the 
city, or any other means assuring the developer builds the project as 
represented."555 Otherwise, "the city would be stripped of the power to act 
for the benefit of the general welfare."556 At the risk of confusion, but for 
the sake of convenience, the court referred to this zoning arrangement as 
conditional zoning.557 Citing a treatise, the court explained that the 
purpose of conditional rezoning is to "minimize the negative externalities 
caused by land development which otherwise benefits the community. 3,558 
Under this device, "[tlhe developer [might] agree to restrict development 
of its property, make certain improvements, dedicate a portion of land to 
the municipality, or make payments to the government" in mitigation of 
the negative impacts.559 
The court pointed out that "[c]onditional rezoning is valuable as a 
planning tool because it permits a municipality greater flexibility in 
balancing developing demands against fiscal and environmental 
~ o n c e r n s . " ~ ~  It "provides a municipality with flexibility [in meeting] 
specific rezoning requests while preserving the integrity of adjacent 
pr~perty,"~~'  and in extracting improvements that bare zoning ordinances 
do not provide. For example, an agreement contemplating rezoning could 
554 Id. The court gave "great deference to the city's determination of which laws 
should be enacted for the welfare of the people." Id. at 190. 
Therefore, when the city considers a request for rezoning based upon a 
plan or representation by the developer, it is presumed that the city 
grant[ed] the request after making the determination that the plan as 
represented [was] in the interest of the public health, safety, morals, and 
the general welfare 
and the developer was not permitted to develop the property in a manner inconsistent with 
the plan or representation on which the rezoning was based, despite the fact that 
inconsistent uses may be permissible under the new zoning classification. Id. 
555 Id. 
556 Id. 
'" See id. 
558 Id. at 189 (quoting 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF'S 
THE LAW OFZONING AND PLANNING 5 27.05 at 27-46 (rev. ed 1989)). 
559 Id. at 190. 
560 Id. 
Id. 
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contain provisions designed to mitigate the harshness of commercial or 
industrial rezoning on neighboring residential property by requiring a 
buffer zone.'62 In this way, "conditional rezoning allows a municipality to 
maintain greater control over the development and is a device 
that "allows the city flexibility . . . and gives the city a remedy to enforce 
the developer's plans and representations."564 
However, the court cautioned, "Conditional rezoning is a legislative 
function and therefore must be within the proper exercise of the police 
power, [i.e,] must be reasonably related to the interest of public health, 
safety, morals, and the general welfare."565 Here, the development 
agreement could not be construed as bargaining away the city's police 
power where it was established that the agreement provided more 
restrictive ceilings and development regulations than the current 
underlying zoning regulation.566 The evidence clearly showed "that the 
city's police powers [were] not abridged in any manner and that the 
agreement [was] expressly subject to the remedies available to the city 
under the Omaha Municipal Further, the court found that "the 
agreement actually enhance[d] the city's regulatory control over the 
development rather than limit[ed] it."568 
-- 
562 Id. 
563 Id. 
Id. "Theoretically, if the rezoning ordinance adopts the plan, as in this case, the 
city could institute legal proceedings if the developer builds a project inconsistent with the 
plans without resorting to rezoning the property." Id. For these reasons, the court held 
conditional rezoning to be valid. Id. 
'65 Id. at 190-91. 
566 Id. at 192. For instance, part of the development where office buildings would be 
located had been rezoned to a new district. Id. Absent the agreement, the developer would 
be free to erect any number of buildings without limitation as to square footage. Id. But, 
under the agreement and the rezoning, the developer was limited to three office buildings 
and a total of 390,000 square feet of office space. Id. 
567 Id. 
Id. at 192. The court also rejected the argument that the city engaged in an ultra 
vires act because there was no statutory enabling act permitting conditional zoning. Id. at 
189-90. In addition to these powers granted by the express words, the city also has those 
powers necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, as well 
as those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply 
convenient, but indispensable. Id. at 193. Here, the legislature had given the city broad 
powers to regulate land use, without specifying what regulations the city was permitted to 
use, coupled with a grant of power to implement, amend, supplement, change, modify, and 
repeal these regulations, along with the implied grant of power to enact all necessary zoning 
regulation including conditional zoning, as long as those regulations are within the proper 
exercise of the police power. Id. The final contention made by the challengers was that the 
(continued) 
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The court took great pains to avoid any finding of a restriction on the 
government's exercise of its police powers by the agreement, as opposed 
to a broadening of such powers.569 This seems to minimize the benefits of 
a development agreement, except to the extent that the developer knows 
beforehand what rules will apply. 
In Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. Sun Luis Obispo 
County Board of ~ u ~ e r v i s o r s , ' ~ ~  a California appellate court expressly 
rejected a challenge to development agreements authorized by statute on 
the ground that such agreements amounted to illegal contract zoning.'" 
The court ruled that a zoning freeze was not a surrender or abnegation of 
political power, but that it in fact advanced the public interest since the 
project was still required to be developed in accordance with the county's 
general plan, and the agreement did not permit construction until the 
county had approved detailed building plans.572 The agreement also 
retained the county's discretionary authority in the future and, in any event, 
the zoning freeze was only for a period of five years, rather than for an 
unlimited duration.573 
city fostered "an appearance of evil" by engaging in conditional zoning, and that it could 
result in the cormption of officials-that officials would concentrate more on what they 
could extract from the developer than on proper rezoning criteria. Id. The court found the 
argument lacking in merit. Id. "[Vo evidence of graft or cormption" was present in the 
case, and the mere "appearance of evil" was an insufficient basis for striking down an 
ordinance. Id. The regulation, by imposing restrictions not generally applicable to other 
property within the district, also failed to violate the uniformity requirement of the zoning 
laws. Id. at 194. The court pointed out that the uniformity requirement did not preclude 
different uses within the same district so long as they are reasonable and based on the 
public policy to be served. Id. In fact, the court thought that allowing reasonable 
classifications within a district was a good mle, especially in view of the broad delegation 
of authority given by the legislature to the city in making zoning regulations. Id. 
Accordingly, the uniformity requirement did not prohibit reasonable classification within 
districts. Id. Here, there was no evidence that the city acted unreasonably. Id. at 195. Nor 
was the zoning ordinance an example of spot zoning. Id. at 197. The challengers failed to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the rezoning ordinance was violative of the 
comprehensive plan as might establish illegal spot zoning, since the evidence was in 
conflict as to the range of uses then in existence in the district. Id. 
569 Id. at 192. 
570 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
57' Id. at 745. 
572 Id. at 748. 
573 Id.; see also Warner Co. v. Sutton, 644 A.2d 656, 660 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1994). In Warner, the court distinguished a development agreement from the 
proscriptions against contract zoning and held that, "[ulnlike 'contract zoning,' there is no 
legal impediment to a development agreement between a municipality and a property owner 
(continued) 
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X. CONCLUSION 
Development agreements are a form of land use bargaining, consistent 
with modern land use planning, which is fundamentally an exercise in 
bargaining. Yet, they should not be regarded as a form of contract zoning 
for the following reasons: (I) while development agreements do involve 
an agreement, the city does not bargain away its legislative discretion to 
the extent that it reserves the power unilaterally to terminate the agreement 
if required by the public safety, health, or welfare; (2) while development 
agreements may involve an agreement in advance of rezoning, the 
agreements become final only after a public hearing; (3) development 
agreements do not involve extraneous considerations since the promises 
which provides for rezoning of certain tracts to accommodate a particular residential plan." 
Warner, 644 A.2d at 660 n.2. In this case, all negotiations and decisions with respect to the 
rezoning amendments were taken at public meetings of the governing body and all statutory 
requirements relating to the amendment to the master plan and adoption of amending 
ordinances were properly followed. Id.; see also WILLIAM M .  COX, NEW JERSEY ZONING 
AND LAND USE ADMIN~STRA~ON 5 34-8.2, at 522-23 (1994); Terminal Enters., Inc. v. 
Jersey City, 258 A.2d 361 (N.J. 1969). Terminal Enterprises, Inc. dealt with a challenge to 
the adoption of an ordinance and resolution by the city and county board, whereby the city 
and the county entered into certain agreements with the Port Authority Trans-Hudson 
Corporation (PATH) relating to the construction and operation of a proposed 
Transportation Center in the Journal Square area and to entrance improvements at the 
Grove-Henderson Street Station. Id. at 363. Appellants, individuals and the board of trade, 
challenged the agreement claiming that the agreements with PATH were invalid for several 
reasons, including that the defendants had invalidly obligated themselves to legislate and 
zone in the future concerning public streets, building codes, and bus and taxi operations; 
that the defendants had unlawfully delegated power to PATH, and that the agreements were 
invalid on their face since their fulfillment by PATH was optional. Id. at 365. The court 
affirmed the lower court. Id. at 367. It stated that "[ilnitially, it should be noted that the 
officers of a municipal corporation may limit by contract their own police powers as well as 
those of their successors where the agreement is authorized by statute." Id. at 366. The 
court then held that "[tlhere can be no doubt that PATH has statutory authority to construct 
and operate a Transportation Center at Journal Square. To aid PATH in achieving this 
objective, we think it clear that the Legislature authorized the City and County to relinquish 
some of their police powers." Id. (citations omitted). The court went on to state that "the 
Legislature has given the City and County broad powers to cooperate with PATH in the 
construction and operation of the Transportation Center so long as resulting agreements 
contain 'reasonable terms."' Id. "We think that the terms of the agreements relating to bus 
operations and public streets are fully within the legislative contemplation." Id. "Since 
these various guarantees which the City and County gave PATH were authorized by the 
statutes, plaintiffs' reliance on cases which prohibit contract zoning and prevent binding the 
hands of successors is misplaced." Id. 
Heinonline - -  33 Cap. U. L. Rev. 496  2 0 0 4 - 2 0 0 5  
20041 DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 497 
made by the developer pertain only to subject property; (4) development 
agreements are a valuable land use device, enabling the city to achieve 
benefits and to mitigate the effects of the rezoning; and (5) development 
agreements must be consistent with the comprehensive plan. They should 
also not be considered simply as a form of conditional zoning under which 
the municipality imposes restrictions on land use rather than permitting 
different uses proposed for development, and where the municipality is 
free to rezone at any time during the development. Some binding 
obligation on the municipality is necessary if development agreements are 
to have their intended benefit. However, a binding obligation having been 
fully considered in compliance with the public notice and hearing process, 
and undertaken in the public interest, should be upheld as not running afoul 
of the basic principle prohibiting the contracting away of police powers. 
Rather, the obligation should be regarded as an exercise of those powers. 
Development agreements both fit within and advance existing land use 
planning by encouraging development through security to developers of 
the progression of the development project without fear of subsequent 
zoning changes. At the same time, municipalities retain control over the 
project and may negotiate for other public benefits. The fact of an 
agreement should not act as an impediment to the use of development 
agreements any more than conditioning rezoning on promises made by the 
developer. 
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